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ABSTRACT
The title of this Article poses a rhetorical question. Of course it is
not improper to sue a rapist. The act of rape qualifies as a tort in all
fifty states. Rape causes egregious injuries, both physical and
psychological. The Supreme Court regards rape as the ultimate
violation of personal autonomy. Other than homicide, no act is more
plainly tortious.
Yet the criminal justice system is surprisingly hostile to civil suits
by rape survivors. Judges in criminal cases virtually always allow
impeachment of accusers with evidence of civil suits against the
alleged assailants or third parties. This Article surveys every published
decision on the subject since the 1970s, and it notes judges’ general
agreement that civil litigation “corrupts” accusers in prosecutions for
rape. The courts’ aversion to civil litigation reflects a misapprehension
of the theoretical principles underlying the impeachment rules; it also
reflects assumptions that injuries caused by rape are not remediable in
tort.
Although civil suits are sometimes a legitimate ground for
impeachment, accusers should not automatically forfeit their
credibility in criminal cases simply because they file tort claims.
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Indeed, given the different standards of proof in criminal and civil
proceedings, the alleged victim’s failure to file a tort claim may be
more noteworthy than her filing of a claim. Impeachment of accusers
based on parallel civil litigation actually says more about the wealth
of the accused (a highly prejudicial topic) than about the mendacity of
the accusers.
Reforms are necessary to harmonize criminal and civil litigation.
The rules of evidence should require a more precise showing of
relevance before permitting impeachment of accusers based on their
civil claims. Pattern instructions should guide jurors in weighing this
evidence. New tolling provisions for civil statutes of limitation can
help to reduce the friction between the criminal and civil justice
systems. The goal is to ensure that the criminal and civil justice
systems are complementary, not mutually exclusive.
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INTRODUCTION
The last few years have seen a tremendous increase in lawsuits
1
alleging rape or sexual assault. Not only has the number of plaintiffs
2
grown, but claimants are recovering larger awards. In particular, 2007

1. Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts:
Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 58 (2006) (reporting
that “the number of civil cases being litigated by sexual assault victims has increased
dramatically, perhaps exponentially” as measured by the increase in appellate-level litigation in
such cases); Angie Perone, Unchain My Heart: Slavery as a Defense to the Dismantling of the
Violence Against Women Act, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 115, 116 (2006) (discussing the
increase in state court suits presenting claims of violence against women); Wendy McElroy, Is
‘Duke’ Case Headed to Civil Court?, FOXNEWS.COM, May 16, 2006, http://www.foxnews.
com/story/0,2933,195753,00.html (observing that “the practice of using both criminal and civil
courts to address the same offense has increased substantially”); see also Cathy Maestri & Ben
Goad, Activists Decry Bryant Decision, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Sept. 3, 2004, at
A1 (discussing the chilling effect of the Kobe Bryant prosecution on the reporting of rape to
police, and suggesting that the consequence may be a substitution of civil for criminal cases).
The scope of the present article extends to rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, sexual
molestation, and sexual imposition, because all of these acts involve nonconsensual and/or
improper sexual contact, because they generally tend to occur in private settings, and because
cases involving allegations of such acts tend to put the complainants’ credibility at issue to a
greater extent than other cases.
2. See infra Part I.A.
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3

was a record year for such suits. According to one scholar, the recent
success of civil claims for sexual abuse proves the symbiosis of tort
4
law and criminal law.
There are many reasons for this burgeoning civil litigation.
Broader insurance coverage, better organization among the plaintiffs’
bar, innovative theories of third-party liability, feminist support for
civil remedies, the success of civil claimants in high-profile cases—all
5
have played a role in expanding civil litigation by survivors of rape.
One important change in the last decade is the government’s
endorsement of civil litigation as a remedy for rape victims. At both
the federal and local level, agencies are urging survivors of rape to
6
consider civil recourse. These agencies recognize that criminal
prosecutions cannot make victims whole. Lawsuits are a vital
complement to the criminal justice system because civil litigation
offers more options for redress, lower standards of proof, and greater
7
opportunities for survivors to steer their litigation. Even the U.S.
Department of Justice—hardly a shill for the plaintiffs’ bar—
distributes a publication that “encourages victim consideration of civil
8
remedies.”

3. E.g., Laurie Goodstein, Deal Reported in Abuse Cases in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2007, at A1 (reporting a record $660 million settlement of more than 500 claims against the
Archdiocese of Los Angeles). For more examples, see infra Part I.A.
4. Professor Timothy Lytton has just finished an important book for the Harvard
University Press. See TIMOTHY LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS
HELPED THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE. An excerpt of the
book is available at http://www.hup.harvard.edu/pdf/LYTHOL_excerpt.pdf. In this book, he
argues that suits alleging sexual abuse by Catholic priests have demonstrated the proactive
“policymaking” function of tort law, a function that is separate from, but interrelated with, the
prosecution function. Id. at 5–6, pt. 2.
5. For a detailed discussion of the factors that have fostered the recent increase in civil
suits for rape, see infra Part I.A.
6. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016 historical and statutory notes (West 2007) (“The
Legislature hereby finds and declares that when possible the criminal justice system should be
designed so as to assist the efforts of victims of crime to obtain compensation for their injuries
[in civil litigation] . . . .”); Victoria O. Brien, Civil Legal Remedies for Crime Victims, OVC
BULLETIN (Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1992, at
2–3, available at http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Mar/4/126733.html (describing benefits of civil
litigation by crime victims); see also Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Links to
Victim Assistance & Compensation Programs, by State, http://www.ovc.gov/help/voca_links.htm
(last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (providing a directory of agencies in every state that assist crime
victims in obtaining compensation).
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. Brien, supra note 6, at 3.
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Yet at the same time that the government promotes civil suits,
judges in criminal prosecutions permit scathing impeachment of
9
accusers based on their parallel civil claims. Criminal defense
attorneys tell juries that accusers forfeit their credibility when they
10
file civil suits. Recent examples of this tactic are numerous. Trial
judges generally indulge such impeachment, and the few that question
11
it are vulnerable to reversal by appellate courts. The judiciary seems
9. This Article uses the term “accuser” to refer solely to a complainant in a criminal
prosecution.
10. E.g., King v. Knowles, No. CIV S-03-1780, 2007 WL 1703679, at *15 (E.D. Cal. June 11,
2007) (addressing a claim by the defendant, in his petition for postconviction relief, that the
alleged rape victim and her mother “plotted” to accuse him, perhaps to obtain money); Johnson
v. State, 643 S.E.2d 556, 559–60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing a molestation conviction because
of ineffective assistance of counsel when the defense attorney failed to investigate the accuser’s
civil claim and attack the accuser’s credibility on this basis); Poynor v. State, 962 So. 2d 68, 75
(Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (addressing a suggestion by the defendant that the accuser’s rape
allegation “was ‘all about money’”); Greene v. State, No. E2005-02769-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL
1215022, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2007) (noting that the defendant sought
postconviction relief because trial counsel did not aggressively pursue the theory, among others,
that the victim brought a rape complaint for “financial gain”); State v. Neese, No. M2005-00752CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3831387, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2006) (noting that the
accused impeached the mother of the alleged rape victim on the ground that she had filed a civil
suit seeking damages); Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (describing
the defense’s argument that “the fact that the complainant hired an attorney and was
considering filing a civil suit against him showed that she had a financial motive for claiming that
the [defendant] sexually assaulted her”); Hoover v. State, No. 03-05-00641-CR, 2007 WL
619500, at *3 (Tex. App. Feb. 27, 2007) (mem.) (in a rape case, describing the defendant’s
attempt to impeach the accuser with evidence that she “sought financial gain as a consequence
of the incident”); State v. Wilson, No. 57236-9-I, 2007 WL 2085333, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. July
23, 2007) (noting that, in a rape prosecution, defense counsel wanted to present evidence that
the accuser had sued the housing authority for failing to maintain adequate security to
undermine her credibility); see also Dennis Tatz, Ex-Soccer Coach’s Trial Set to Start in Teen
Rape Case, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), June 21, 2007, at 13 (reporting, in a rape
prosecution, that defense counsel intended to cross-examine the accuser’s family about her civil
suit).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez, No. SA-05-CR-639-XR, 2007 WL 3026609, at *7–8
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2007) (reversing a rape conviction because of the prosecution’s failure to
disclose certain documents which prevented the defense from discovering that the accuser had
bragged that she would sue the city); Johnson, 643 S.E.2d at 559–60 (granting a new trial
because of ineffective assistance of counsel when the defense attorney failed to cross-examine
the victims and their families concerning their civil suit against the defendant’s church); State v.
Bowens, 871 So. 2d 1178, 1186 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing a rape conviction because the trial
court barred the defendant from questioning the accuser about whether she had hired a civil
attorney); Commonwealth v. Baran, Nos. 1804251, 181001, 2006 WL 2560317, at *27 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 16, 2006) (mem.) (vacating a rape conviction because of several problems at
trial including a failure to cross-examine the accused about her civil suit); People v. McFarley,
818 N.Y.S.2d 379, 380 (App. Div. 2006) (mem.) (reversing a rape conviction because the trial
court did not allow defense cross-examination of the accuser regarding her intention to file a
civil suit); People v. Stein, 781 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655–56 (App. Div. 2004) (reversing a rape
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more suspicious of rape suits than of suits seeking damages for other
12
crimes. While lawsuits by victims of automobile accidents can
proceed without objection alongside criminal prosecutions for the
same conduct, rape suits bespeak corrupt motives that undermine
13
criminal prosecutions.
The time has come to revise the rules of impeachment of
accusers who file parallel civil suits. The evidence codes need a
provision that specifically addresses this impeachment. Such a
provision would be analogous to existing rules governing evidence of
14
15
16
prior sexual history, prior convictions, religious affiliation,

conviction because the defendant was not allowed to impeach the accuser with evidence that she
had served her employer with notice of a tort claim); State v. Vanek, No. 2002-L-130, 2003 WL
22994979, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003) (reversing a conviction for sexual imposition
because the defendant was not allowed to cross-examine the complainant about her parallel
civil claim); Commonwealth v. Hanford, 937 A.2d 1094, 1098–99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (reversing
a rape conviction because the trial court denied the defense’s request to introduce the accuser’s
civil complaint); Ramirez v. State, 96 S.W.3d 386, 392, 395, 397 (Tex. App. 2002) (reversing a
police officer’s conviction for sexual misconduct because the state did not disclose to the
defense that the victim planned to sue the city and the defendant).
12. See infra Part I.D.
13. Lawsuits seeking compensation for injuries from automobile accidents are the most
common type of civil litigation today. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers,
Specialization, and Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1068 (2006). Perhaps because
this litigation is more familiar, and because the injuries from car crashes may be easier to
quantify (medical bills, lost wages during hospitalization, etc.), courts are more comfortable with
civil litigation from car accidents. There are far more published opinions insisting on the right to
impeach civil claimants in rape prosecutions than in prosecutions for reckless driving. Compare
State v. Creel, 508 So. 2d 859, 862 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (determining, in a rape prosecution, that
the defense’s impeachment of the accuser based on her civil action was necessary under a state
statute allowing cross-examination regarding “bias, interest, or corruption”), and infra Part II.B
(collecting opinions requiring impeachment of the accuser in a rape case on the ground that she
filed parallel civil claims), with State v. Salazar, 707 P.2d 951, 954 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(upholding a conviction for manslaughter in a two-car collision when the trial court did not
allow the accused to impeach the prosecution’s witness about her pending wrongful death suit),
and People v. Martinez, 458 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (in a prosecution for leaving the
scene of a car accident and causing injury, upholding the trial court’s decision to prevent the
accused from questioning the prosecution’s witness about her civil claim), and State v. Sampson,
79 N.W.2d 210, 212–13 (Iowa 1956) (in a prosecution for intoxicated driving, holding that the
trial court did not unduly prejudice the accused by excluding evidence that the prosecution’s
witness had brought a civil suit).
14. FED. R. EVID. 412.
15. FED. R. EVID. 609.
16. FED. R. EVID. 610.
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17

settlement negotiations, and other topics for which parties and
judges need guidance about the permissible scope of impeachment.
Why limit impeachment that cites accusers’ civil claims? The first
reason is the scant relevance of this evidence. Impeachment on the
ground of bias requires a demonstration that the interest in question
is ulterior—that is, divergent from unimpeachable motives. The
extraneous interest must be such that it might skew the witness’s
story, as opposed to providing additional reasons to tell the same
18
story. In rape cases, judges appear to presume a public, altruistic
motive for accusers’ testimony in criminal prosecutions, whereas
19
judges posit a selfish motive for plaintiffs’ testimony in civil suits.
This dichotomy is fallacious. In fact, one may argue that self-interest
is the primary motive for complainants in both settings. Complainants
in criminal cases may seek personal protection, retribution, and
perhaps restitution from defendants or payments from victim
20
compensation funds.
Requests for restitution and victim
compensation in criminal proceedings are off-limits for impeachment
21
according to well-settled precedent. It is fanciful to suggest that the

17. FED. R. EVID. 408. For more discussion of existing rules that exclude otherwise
relevant evidence based on concerns about prejudice and incentives for out-of-court conduct,
see infra Part IV.A.
18. See infra Part III.A.1.
19. See Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (suggesting that a plaintiff in a
rape suit is seeking to advance her selfish interests, whereas an accuser in a rape prosecution is
advancing the public interest); Wooten v. State, 464 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(noting that cross-examination about the accuser’s civil litigation was necessary to explore
whether she was “actuated by personal considerations instead of altruistic interest generated
solely from motives in the public interest to bring a criminal to justice” (quoting State v.
Doughty, 399 A.2d 1319, 1324 (Me. 1979))); infra Part III.A.1.
20. One scholar has observed that in criminal prosecutions “the promise of restitution or
victim compensation appears to victims to be identical to personal injury awards.” Jeffrey J.
Pokorak, Rape Victims and Prosecutors: The Inevitable Ethical Conflict of De Facto
Client/Attorney Relationships, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 695, 726 (2007) (“In fact, prosecutors usually
both present evidence and argue for restitution as if it is a private tort remedy for harm.”).
21. E.g., State v. Mercer, 106 P.3d 1283, 1292 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the trial
court correctly barred impeachment of the prosecuting witness with evidence that he sought
restitution); Hoover v. State, No. 03-05-00641-CR, 2007 WL 619500, at *3 (Tex. App. Feb. 27,
2007) (mem.) (holding, in a rape prosecution, that the trial court properly barred the accused
from impeaching the accuser on the ground that she had applied for and received compensation
from the Crime Victims’ Compensation Board at the Texas attorney general’s office, because
“[t]he proffered evidence does not show a tendency to lie, and it is only marginally probative on
the issue of bias or motive”); State v. Michaels, No. 39339-1-I, 1997 WL 785646, at *3 (Wash. Ct.
App. Dec. 22, 1997) (per curiam) (holding that evidence of restitution is irrelevant because it
does not show a “financial interest” or “profit motive” on the part of the accuser).
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motivation for tort suits is so dissimilar as to be cognizable in
22
impeachment theory.
In any event, an accuser might actually be more vulnerable to
impeachment if she did not file a parallel civil claim. The standards of
proof are much lower in civil court, so her failure to file a civil claim
23
might invite the criticism that she doubts her own allegations. Thus
the impeachment value of an accuser’s civil suit is dubious, because
the evidence could support diametrically opposite conclusions about
the accuser’s credibility.
The prejudicial effect of this evidence often exceeds its probative
value. One problem is that jurors generally distrust accusers in rape
24
prosecutions. In particular, jurors’ cognition seems prone to an
ulteriority heuristic: confronted with fact patterns in which one or
more parties appear to have acted irrationally, jurors too readily
accept the explanation that the accuser has lied or exaggerated to
25
serve selfish goals. Evidence of parallel civil litigation inflames
26
jurors’ instinctive prejudice in much the same way that evidence of
prior sexual history inflames prejudice against accusers. Moreover,
evidence of accusers’ suits might actually prejudice defendants,
27
because this evidence focuses attention on defendants’ wealth.
Prosecutors might find it necessary to introduce evidence of
defendants’ poverty, or accusers’ wealth, to prevent the inference that

22. See infra Part III.A.1. In addition to so-called “selfish motives,” complainants in both
civil and criminal actions share a number of other purposes that might fall under the rubric
“public.” For example, the civil complainant may want to spare future victims from assault by
the same defendant or help change the community’s mores concerning permissible behavior in
sexual relationships. Civil complainants’ motive to seek retribution may deserve classification as
“public,” in that retribution expresses society’s collective outrage as well as vindicates the
accuser. See infra Part III.A.1.
23. Cf. State v. Sexsmith, 57 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Wash. 1936) (recounting that, during a
larceny prosecution, the “appellant offered to prove that the witness had consulted different
lawyers with the view of starting a civil action against the appellant based upon the transaction
which is the subject-matter of this [criminal case], and that no such suit was ever brought”).
24. See infra notes 254–61 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 257–58 and accompanying text.
26. Brian Dickerson, Rape Victims Rarely Sue—Cost Too High, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
May 17, 2000, at 1B (“Although the public has little difficulty appreciating an ordinary assault
victim’s desire for restitution, some jurors are more suspicious when a rape victim brings all her
legal remedies to bear.”); see also infra notes 254–56 and accompanying text.
27. E.g., Harkins v. United States, 810 A.2d 895, 898–99 (D.C. App. 2002) (“[D]uring cross
examination of the complainant, trial counsel attempted to elicit the complainant’s potential
financial bias. . . . [C]omplainant was asked whether she knew . . . the [criminal defendant] might
be wealthy.”).
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28

accusers filed their suits to make money. Such a discussion is surely
prejudicial and distracting for the jury.
One further reason to limit cross-examination about accusers’
suits is the risk that this impeachment could dissuade rape survivors
from pursuing civil remedies. When rape survivors realize that civil
claims could reduce prospects for successful prosecution or could
subject the complainants to onerous cross-examination by criminal
defense attorneys, some survivors may prefer to forego civil litigation
29
altogether. According to one commentator, “many rape victims . . .
conclude that forswearing any interest in civil damages is the price
they must pay to establish their own credibility” as accusers in
30
criminal prosecutions. The law should not force an election of
remedies. Both civil suits and prosecutions further the public interest.
Civil suits not only compensate victims but also prompt third-party
defendants to take precautionary measures that could prevent future
rapes. For example, suits by rape victims have spurred owners of
apartment buildings to improve security for all residents, and suits
against employers have led to stricter supervision and background
31
checks. The impeachment rules should not subvert the salutary role
played by the civil remedial system.
Another deleterious effect of impeachment based on civil claims
is the discouragement of rape survivors from cooperating with law
enforcement. Indeed, after the well-publicized opprobrium that Kobe
Bryant’s accuser endured when she filed civil claims during the
criminal prosecution, rape survivors across the county may have
32
decided to abandon criminal charges altogether in favor of civil suits.
Criminal prosecutions for rape are very difficult without the
33
cooperation of alleged victims. The growing unwillingness of rape

28. E.g., People v. McLaughlin, 672 N.W.2d 860, 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (permitting, in
a rape prosecution, the prosecutor’s questioning about defendant’s poverty because “it related
to defendant’s argument that the victim falsely accused him” to make money in a lawsuit).
29. See infra Part III.A.3.
30. Dickerson, supra note 26.
31. See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
32. Maestri & Goad, supra note 1 (arguing that rape victims who saw Kobe Bryant’s
accuser excoriated for her civil suit might rather file civil claims without bothering with criminal
prosecutions).
33. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 749–
52, 822–24 (2005) (citing survey results indicating an increase of dismissals in prosecutions of
violence against women due to heightened confrontation requirements and accusers’ reluctance
to testify); Kirk Johnson, The Bryant Trial: Anatomy of a Case that Fell Apart, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
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survivors to assist with criminal prosecutions will especially benefit
rich defendants, who are the most likely targets for civil litigation.
The incompatibility of criminal and civil proceedings could create a
class-bifurcated system in which rich defendants pay for rape while
34
poor defendants serve time.
In effect, the rule allowing
impeachment based on civil suits would become a type of double
jeopardy clause that protects wealthy defendants from facing both
criminal and civil consequences for rape.
To be sure, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause would
not abide a new rule prohibiting impeachment of accusers based on
parallel civil suits. The accused has a constitutional right to confront
35
prosecuting witnesses with evidence of their bias. The defendant
must have some leeway to develop impeachment theories without the
constraint of a per se rule declaring civil suits to be off limits during
cross-examination of the accuser. But the Sixth Amendment right to
impeach is coextensive with the materiality and probative value of the
36
impeachment evidence. The rules of evidence do not give judges
practical guidance in distinguishing relevant from irrelevant
impeachment evidence concerning parallel suits, so judges err on the
side of overinclusion, exceeding the mandate of the Confrontation
37
Clause. Ironically, the effect is to drive a substantial number of rape
cases into the civil remedial system, where the defendants have no
38
constitutional right of confrontation.
39
This Article proposes several reforms. A new rule of evidence
would establish a specific test for the admissibility of impeachment
evidence based on accusers’ civil claims. This rule would not exclude
all such evidence, but it would list criteria that would help judges
evaluate admissibility. Other necessary reforms include the adoption
of pattern jury instructions, the postponement of filing deadlines for
civil claims, and the establishment of new protocols for police who
interact with victims of violent crime.

3, 2004, at A14 (reporting a comment by a prosecutor that the accuser’s reluctance to continue
was the reason for the dismissal of rape charges against Kobe Bryant).
34. See Mark Kreidler, Money May Be the Best Defense, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 2, 2004,
at C1 (citing dismissal of rape charges against Kobe Bryant).
35. See infra Part III.B.1.
36. See infra Part III.B.1.
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. See infra Part III.A.4.
39. See infra Part IV.
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Although this Article focuses on sexual assault, the theoretical
and policy questions it addresses do not arise solely in that context.
Indeed, this Article proposes reforms that would apply to all
categories of prosecutions. Rape cases receive the most attention
because they most starkly illustrate the tension between impeachment
rights and policy concerns about accusers’ interests. If this Article’s
proposals strike an appropriate balance in rape cases, they likely will
make sense in other contexts as well.
The December 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence elevated the importance of the topic of impeachment
because they exacerbated the asymmetry between impeachment of
40
accusers and defendants with evidence of civil litigation. States have
begun to consider whether to adopt or modify the amended language
41
42
in the Federal Rules. Meanwhile, civil suits for rape have increased,
43
and legislatures have passed laws to encourage such suits. In 2004,
44
the Supreme Court rejuvenated the Confrontation Clause, and
lower courts have followed suit by approving liberal impeachment of
45
accusers. The time is ripe for an analysis of confrontation rights and
accusers’ competing interests in rape prosecutions with parallel civil
claims.
This Article proceeds in several steps. Part I examines the
growing incompatibility of civil and criminal proceedings. Part II
analyzes the present admission of evidence concerning accusers’
parallel civil claims. Part III considers arguments favoring reform, as
well as constitutional requirements that necessitate some

40. For a discussion of the 2006 amendments’ revisions to FED. R. EVID. 408, see infra Part
II.A.
41. Changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence do not automatically result in changes to
their state counterparts, although many states follow the federal model. See GEORGE FISHER,
EVIDENCE 3 (2002).
42. See infra Part I.A.
43. Julie Goldscheid, Domestic and Sexual Violence as Sex Discrimination: Comparing
American and International Approaches, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 355, 372 (2005) (noting that
eleven states and the District of Columbia have created civil rights remedies for rape).
44. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004) (requiring confrontation of
hearsay declarants who make testimonial statements); see also Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct.
2266, 2273–74 (2006) (refining the definition of what constitutes a testimonial statement in
deciding two domestic violence cases).
45. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 648 S.E.2d 824, 829–30 (N.C. 2007) (granting a new trial when
identification of the defendant hinged “almost entirely” on an unavailable witness’s prior photo
identification, which the court deemed testimonial under Davis).
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impeachment of accusers. Part IV offers specific proposals, including
a new evidence rule.
I. GROWING “COMPETITION”
BETWEEN CIVIL SUITS AND PROSECUTIONS
An increasing number of rape cases proceed on two tracks:
criminal and civil. Rape survivors find that civil proceedings offer a
number of advantages, including greater control, a wider range of
remedies, and procedural rules that are less favorable to defendants.
Some rape survivors prefer to postpone their filing of civil claims until
the conclusion of criminal proceedings, but a large number of
survivors pursue civil remedies while prosecutions are pending.
A. Recent Increase in Civil Suits Alleging Sexual Assault
The number of lawsuits seeking damages for sexual assault has
swelled since the 1970s. The rate of such litigation increased in the
46
47
1980s, the trend accelerated in the 1990s, and the number of

46. Gail M. Ballou, Recourse for Rape Victims: Third Party Liability, 4 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 105, 109 (1981) (discussing the increase in third-party rape suits); Petula Dvorak, Fighting
for Rape Victims, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1992, at J1 (quoting Gail Abarbanel, director of the
Santa Monica Rape Treatment Center, who indicated that “[o]ver the last five to 10 years we’ve
seen an increase in civil suits” by rape victims); Saundra Saperstein, Rape Victims Turn to
Lawsuits for Relief, WASH. POST, July 29, 1985, at A1 (noting the “growing ranks of women
nationally who are fighting rape by filing lawsuits”); see also JOEL EPSTEIN & STACIA
LANGENBHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE
TO RAPE 73 (1994) (“[M]ost experts on rape say that while there were only a few civil suits 15
years ago, women now bring suit because they are less shamed by rape and more aware of the
legal options for fighting back.”).
47. See New Directions from the Field: Victims’ Rights and Services for the 21st Century,
OVC BULLETIN (Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Aug.
1998, at 2, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/new/directions/pdftxt/bulletins/bltn17.pdf
(“It is primarily within the last decade that civil litigation has emerged as a meaningful option
for crime victims . . . .”); Maureen Balleza, Many Rape Victims Finding Justice Through Civil
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at A1 (observing that the rate of civil rape litigation was
growing from a few suits to a “steady stream”); Eric Frazier, More Women Sue After a Sexual
Assault, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 21, 1999, at 1B (quoting David Beatty, director of public
policy for the National Center for Victims of Crime, as observing a “growing trend” toward civil
litigation in rape cases and that “at least 500 sexual assault victims nationwide a year file civil
lawsuits against their assailants”); see also PROJECT COMM. ON CIVIL REMEDIES FOR SEXUAL
ASSAULT, B.C. LAW INST., CIVIL REMEDIES FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT 3 (1999), available at
http://www.bcli.org/pages/projects/sexual/CivilRemRep.pdf (“Historically, [Canadian] civil
actions for damages for sexual assault have been available in theory, but only relatively recently
have they been used as a means of obtaining redress.”).
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48

lawsuits grew “exponentially” beginning in 2000. This increase is all
the more remarkable considering that the frequency of rapes appears
to have decreased during the period in which the rate of civil
49
litigation has risen.
Not only has the number of lawsuits increased, but recoveries by
plaintiffs have skyrocketed since 2000. For example, lawsuits alleging
sexual abuse by Catholic priests yielded record-breaking settlements
50
in the summer of 2007. Settlements of suits arising from sexual
51
52
assaults on campuses and in apartment buildings have shattered
records. Lawsuits alleging sexual abuse by police have also netted
53
huge settlements. Suits against celebrities such as Kobe Bryant and
Michael Jackson culminated in confidential settlements that were
presumably quite large. One study indicated that the average payout
54
for successful rape lawsuits was $600,000.

48. Bublick, supra note 1, at 58; see also Joe McGurk, Tenant Rape $hock, N.Y. POST, Feb.
5, 2003, at 3 (discussing the consensus among experts that civil suits alleging rape have risen
appreciably in recent years); sources cited supra note 1.
49. David A. Fahrenthold, Statistics Show Drop in U.S. Rape Cases: Many Say Crime Is
Still Often Unreported, WASH. POST, June 19, 2006, at A1 (reporting a decrease in the number
of rapes per capita since the 1970s based on data compiled by the U.S. Justice Department).
Whether the rate of rapes actually fell, or the number of reported rapes fell, is an open question.
Id.
50. Laurie Goodstein, Deal Reported in Abuse Cases in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2007, at A1 (reporting that the $660 million settlement “will be by far the largest payout made
by any single diocese since the clergy sexual abuse scandals first became public in Boston in
2002”).
51. E.g., Gordon Dillow, $6.8 Million Settlement Doesn’t Say “We’re Sorry,” ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Aug. 3, 2003, at B1 (noting that a $6.8 million settlement in lawsuit against
public school for molestation of fourth graders was the largest sexual abuse settlement paid by a
California school district); Nick Perry, UW Pays $480,000 to Settle Suit Over Sex Abuse,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A1 (discussing an assault that took place at a University of
Washington hospital psychiatric unit and noting that “UW officials believe it’s the highest
amount the university has paid to settle any sexual-abuse lawsuit”).
52. E.g., McGurk, supra note 48, at 3 (reporting an interview with the plaintiff’s attorney in
a rape suit against the owners of an apartment building in which the attorney indicated that his
client’s seven-figure settlement was one of the largest ever in a rape lawsuit in New York).
53. See, e.g., Alan Feuer & Jim Dwyer, City Settles Suit in Louima Torture: Victim Gets
$8.75 Million and Cites Police Dept. Changes, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2001, at A1 (indicating that
the City of New York and the police union spent $8.75 million to settle a lawsuit filed by a
victim whom police had brutally sodomized during interrogation); Peter Sleeth, Eugene Settles
Final Lawsuits in Police Sex Scandal, OREGONIAN (Portland), June 8, 2006, at A1 (reporting
that the City of Eugene, Oregon spent over $5 million settling claims that two police officers
had sexually abused female suspects).
54. Jury Verdict Research, a Pennsylvania-based legal consulting firm, reviewed civil rape
lawsuits filed during a seven-year period and found that among successful suits, the median
recovery was $600,000. Frazier, supra note 47.
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Many commentators had not expected that rape suits would be
so frequent or so successful. These scholars believed that the
indigence of most rapists would set a natural boundary for the
55
viability of civil remedies in rape cases. Yet civil litigation continues
to grow, in part because plaintiffs’ attorneys have widened their focus
to include new targets: third-party defendants. Plaintiffs’ attorneys
are suing not only the alleged rapists but also the landlords, hotel
owners, security companies, universities, hospitals, nursing homes,
schools, employers, and government agencies that arguably bear
56
some responsibility for the perpetrators’ conduct. Third-party
defendants often have substantial resources, allowing plaintiffs to
recover damages for their injuries even when the alleged rapists
57
themselves are “judgment-proof.” The theories of third-party
liability for rape have included negligent hiring of perpetrators,
failure to maintain safe conditions on the premises at issue, and, in
58
some cases, knowing involvement by supervisors in the sexual abuse.
This Article’s empirical study confirms the prevalence of third59
party suits based on allegations of sexual assault. Since the 1970s,

55. See, e.g., John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim
Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 699
(2002) (recognizing that perpetrators’ lack of assets forecloses tort litigation for victims in many
cases); Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2195, 2204–05 & n.39 (2000)
(expressing pessimism about the viability of civil remedies for rape victims in large part due to
the indigence of rapists); Perone, supra note 1, at 122 (pointing out that a civil remedy “is only
useful against an individual perpetrator who has assets to recover”); Jennifer Wriggins,
Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 137–38 n.76 (2001) (commenting that many
perpetrators of violence against women lack assets and are therefore “judgment-proof”).
56. Bublick, supra note 1, at 57 (reporting that most of the recent lawsuits for sexual assault
name third parties as defendants); Lois H. Kanter, Invisible Clients: Exploring Our Failure to
Provide Civil Legal Services to Rape Victims, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 253, 258 (2005) (noting
that third-party suits are more common than suits that solely name the rapists); Mike Nixon,
Sexual Assault Cases May Include More Third-Party Suits, ST. LOUIS DAILY REC./ST. LOUIS
COUNTIAN, Apr. 24, 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4185/is_20060424/ai_
n16225077 (indicating that more claimants are suing third parties for damages resulting from
sexual assault).
57. E.g., Wriggins, supra note 55, at 138 n.76.
58. See Nixon, supra note 56 (listing theories for recovery in suits against third parties);
Nat’l Crime Victim Bar Ass’n, Case Law, http://www.ncvc.org/vb/main.aspx?dbID=DB_
CaseLaw495 (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
59. In the summer of 2007, I reviewed a database of published opinions in cases in which
civil litigation involved allegations of sexual assault. I obtained the cases from a larger database
maintained by the National Crime Victim Bar Association (“NCVBA”) that includes judicial
opinions in cases involving lawsuits by crime victims. NCVBA Home Page,
http://www.victimbar.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). I included in this study all cases involving
claims against either perpetrators, third parties, or both. Some caution is necessary in
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there have been at least 2,210 published opinions in cases involving
suits for damages arising from sexual assault. A total of 587 opinions
addressed civil claims filed solely against alleged perpetrators. A far
greater number of cases, 1,633, involved civil claims against third
60
parties. In other words, approximately 74 percent of the published
opinions involved third-party claims. The third-party claims alleged
conduct that took place in a wide variety of settings: residences (16.2
percent), schools (11.3 percent), apartment buildings (8.1 percent),
the workplace (7.2 percent), churches or other houses of worship (5.2
percent), hotels (5.2 percent), parking lots (3.9 percent), hospitals (3.7
percent), jails (2.8 percent), and vehicles (2.4 percent), among
61
others. The number of published cases addressing third-party suits in
the last five years exceeds by 2000 percent the number of published
cases addressing third-party suits in the early 1980s.
Why have rape suits proliferated over this period? A number of
factors appear to be at work. First, a highly specialized group of
62
plaintiffs’ lawyers has begun to focus on such litigation. These
lawyers disseminate information to prospective clients, and they use
the Internet effectively in their marketing. The victims’ bar also has
begun to share information about litigation strategies, including
63
discovery tactics and theories of liability. Lawyers for rape victims
have compiled databases of settlements, and they use this information
64
to maximize recoveries in every case. The ready availability of
interpreting the findings of this study. First, the study has overemphasized recent cases, because
a higher proportion of court opinions—including slip opinions—had become available online in
the ten years prior to my study compared to the preceding decade. Second, there may have been
a higher proportion of third-party claims among published opinions because the complex issues
raise in many cases were more likely to provoke appellate review and because third-party
defendants with deep pockets were more likely to raise the sort of sophisticated defenses that
warrant published opinions.
60. Some of these cases also involved claims against perpetrators, but third-party
defendants appeared to be the primary targets because of their greater resources.
61. By contrast, a much higher proportion of suits against perpetrators alleged conduct that
occurred in residences (31.9 percent).
62. New Directions from the Field, supra note 47, at 2 (observing that civil litigation on
behalf of crime victims has emerged as “a specialized area of attorney expertise”); Kanter, supra
note 56, at 258 (reporting that “a growing number of tort lawyers have become engaged in
representing victims of sexual assault”).
63. For example, the National Crime Victim Bar Association maintains a web site with
training materials for attorneys who wish to represent plaintiffs in bringing civil claims for
sexual assault. Nat’l Crime Victim Bar Ass’n, Information for Attorneys,
http://www.ncvc.org/vb/main.aspx?dbID=DB_AttInfo123 (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
64. E.g., Nat’l Crime Victim Bar Ass’n, Case Law, http://www.ncvc.org/vb/main.
aspx?dbID=DB_CaseLaw495 (last visited Feb. 6, 2008) (“The database also includes [v]erdict
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information and the growing success of the victims’ bar have
65
encouraged more rape victims to file tort claims.
66
Second, victims’ advocacy groups have embraced civil remedies.
Feminists regard these suits as a means of empowering rape
67
survivors. The Office for Victims of Crime at the U.S. Department
68
of Justice has explicitly encouraged the filing of such suits and has
helped to provide training and resources for attorneys representing
69
crime victims in civil actions. A number of other important advocacy
groups, including the National Crime Victim Law Institute, have
70
promoted civil suits against rapists and other perpetrators of crime.
The commitment of victims’ advocates to civil remedies was evident
when the Supreme Court considered whether to overturn the federal
71
civil remedy for violence against women in 2000. A total of thirty-six
state attorneys general and a large group of feminist organizations
72
filed amicus briefs to save the civil remedy.

and [s]ettlement information that has been reported by [b]ar [a]ssociation members or
published in the news media.”).
65. New Directions from the Field, supra note 47, at 2 (“Historically, information about
pursuing civil remedies has not been readily available to crime victims. . . . In response, attorney
networks have been established specifically to refer victims of crime . . . .”).
66. EPSTEIN & LANGENBHAN, supra note 46, at 73 (“The victim service community is also
becoming interested in the use of civil suits by rape victims.”).
67. Bublick, supra note 1, at 62 (suggesting that “increased assertion of tort claims may
reflect women’s greater economic and political power”); Balleza, supra note 47 (noting that
prominent victims’ advocates such as Susan Estrich favor civil litigation as a remedy for certain
rape victims).
68. Brien, supra note 6, at 2 (“This publication encourages victim consideration of civil
remedies.”).
69. New Directions from the Field, supra note 47, at 2 (discussing extensive training
programs funded by the Office for Victims of Crime).
70. For more information about this organization, see generally National Crime Victim
Law Institute, http://www.lclark.edu/org/ncvli (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
71. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 631–34 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(reviewing congressional findings that refer to statistics provided by academics, victims’
advocates, and other experts).
72. The statute in question was 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2000), which is a provision of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). This provision
created a civil cause of action in federal court for a victim of violent crime that had been
motivated by gender animus. The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the civil remedy in VAWA
on the ground that Congress had no authority under either the Commerce Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact this legislation. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. An impressive
coalition of amici filed briefs defending the constitutionality of the challenged provisions. E.g.,
Brief for the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitoners’ Brief on the
Merits at 2–3, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1032809; Motion for Leave to
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Third, rape victims are becoming more and more frustrated with
73
the criminal justice system. Criminal trials have become more
difficult for accusers in the last few years. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
new jurisprudence under the Confrontation Clause limits using out74
of-court statements instead of victims’ live testimony. Courts seem
75
less inclined to protect the privacy of accusers during criminal trials.
Higher sentences for rape have compounded survivors’ reluctance:
some do not want their assailants to go to prison for so long, and
some do not want to endure the more difficult cross-examination that
76
occurs at high-stakes trials. As rape victims become more
disillusioned with the criminal justice system, they may seek redress
77
in civil proceedings.
Fourth, the greater availability of insurance has created new
incentives for civil claims. Recovery is rarely possible under policies
held by the rape survivor or the perpetrator due to policy exclusions
78
for intentional torts. Insurance companies have become more
aggressive in marketing negligence liability insurance to potential
third-party defendants such as landlords, employers, schools, and
79
other institutions. These institutions have begun to purchase this
80
insurance to cover liability for sexual assault cases. When disputes

File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of Equal Rights Advocates et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 1–4, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
73. Benjamin F. Barrett, Jr., Bias in Sexual Assault Cases, in 2 ATLA ANNUAL
CONFERENCE REFERENCE MATERIALS 1845, 1845 (2006), available at 2 Ann.2006 ATLA-CLE
1845 (Westlaw) (“The majority of sexual assault victims are frustrated by the criminal system;
the perpetrator is rarely prosecuted. These victims want the perpetrator to be held accountable,
and they can be through civil cases.”); Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An
Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 472 (2005)
(discussing rape victims’ disillusionment with criminal justice system).
74. Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1354, 1363–66 (2005).
75. Id. at 1379–80.
76. Id. at 1371–75, 1382–84.
77. For example, an organization that counsels rape victims in Southern California
reported that the proportion of victims interested in prosecutions is decreasing, and there are
comparative advantages for victims in the civil remedial system. Maestri & Goad, supra note 1.
78. Matsuda, supra note 55, at 2205 n.39 (noting that insurance policies have generally
excluded coverage for intentional acts by the insured).
79. George Williams, Programs Flourish as Insurers Push Revenue Growth, AM. AGENT &
BROKER, June 1, 2007, at 52 (reporting that insurers are marketing expanded coverage for
sexual abuse at nursing homes and social service facilities).
80. See Susan Bradshaw, A HEAD for Insurance . . . A HEART for Nonprofits,
NONPROFIT WORLD, Nov. 11, 2005, at 25 (explaining why nonprofits need this insurance too);
Charlie Roduta, Schools Diversify Insurance Coverage, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), July 10,
2006, at 1A (claiming that schools are increasingly interested in insurance for sex abuse); Ed
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arise about coverage, courts have found in favor of claimants. The
availability of insurance makes civil litigation more attractive to
plaintiffs’ attorneys.
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Civil Suits
The growing popularity of civil litigation is attributable in part to
the advantages that it offers over criminal prosecution. The
comparative benefits and pitfalls of civil litigation vary depending on
the facts of each case, but it is possible to draw some generalizations.
One important distinction is that the victim controls the civil
82
proceeding, but the government controls the criminal proceeding.
The victim is not even a party to a criminal prosecution, and the
victim cannot choose the prosecuting attorney, select the charges to
file, direct the presentation of evidence, or choose between
settlement and trial. By contrast, in a civil case, the victim can select
the attorney and make important decisions such as whom to sue, what
theory of recovery to assert, what evidence to present, and whether to
83
settle.
Civil proceedings offer better prospects for financial
compensation than do criminal prosecutions. Victims of rape bear
tremendous costs, including medical bills, lost wages, and fees for
professional services such as counseling; in some jurisdictions,
84
restitution is not as likely as civil litigation to cover all these costs.

Waters, Jr., Connie Phillips to Head Statewide Insurance Group, FREDERICK NEWS-POST (Md.),
Dec. 13, 2005, at 13 (reporting that day care centers also buy this insurance).
81. E.g., Rick Hepp, Judges: Insurer Could Be Liable in Sex Assault by 13-Year-Old, STARLEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 27, 2007, at 15 (reporting on a judicial ruling that a boarding
home’s insurance policy could cover sexual assault by a boarder depending on whether the
young assailant knew that the victim would be injured or intended to injure her).
82. Brien, supra note 6, at 2 (“In the criminal case, the prosecutor makes all the
decisions.”); Anthony Sebok, Unusual Claim in Bryant Accuser’s Civil Suit, CNN.COM, Aug. 23,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/23/sebok.bryant/index.html (suggesting that a civil suit
allows a rape victim to take control, whereas a criminal prosecution vests all the control with the
government).
83. Brien, supra note 6, at 2–3 (discussing various ways in which civil litigation gives crime
victims greater control).
84. TED R. MILLER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES:
A NEW LOOK 1 (1996) (taking account of expenses relating to medical and mental health care
and noting that “if rape’s effect on the victim’s quality of life is quantified, the average rape
costs $87,000—many times greater than the cost of prison. . . . When pain, suffering, and lost
quality of life are quantified, the [aggregate] cost of rape [is] . . . $127 billion”); see also Matsuda,
supra note 55, at 2205 n.39 (noting that restitution and payments from crime victimcompensation boards may not fully cover victims’ injuries and losses in all cases).
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Not only is financial compensation important for the victim’s benefit,
but it also imposes an additional punishment on the offender—a
sanction that may be particularly important when the offender
qualifies for a lighter sentence in the criminal case because the
85
offender lacks a criminal history.
Odds of success are better in civil proceedings than criminal
proceedings. Prosecutors bring charges in only a small percentage of
rape cases, and an even smaller percentage of these cases end in
86
convictions. The standard of proof in a civil case is much lower than
in a criminal case: civil plaintiffs only need to prove their allegations
by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas prosecutors must prove
87
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because of the disparate standards
of proof, factual evidence that would be insufficient in a criminal
prosecution might very well suffice to support a plaintiff’s verdict in a
88
civil case.
Civil litigation can reach defendants who might be invulnerable
to criminal prosecution. For example, victims can bring suit against
defendants who won acquittal in criminal proceedings. Plaintiffs may
choose to sue defendants whom the government did not prosecute
within the criminal statutes of limitations, but who may still be
89
vulnerable to suit under the civil statutes of limitations. Plaintiffs
who sued the Catholic Church for covering up sexual abuse by
Catholic priests benefited from longer limitations periods in civil

85. Brien, supra note 6, at 12 (explaining that a victim’s civil lawsuit “can serve to further
punish the perpetrator through the device of punitive damages”).
86. David Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1244–52 (1997) (discussing the low rate of charges and convictions in rape
cases); Seidman & Vickers, supra note 73, at 472 (indicating that “rape is the least reported,
least indicted, and least convicted non-property felony in America”); Morrison Torrey, When
Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1024 (1991) (reporting that approximately 1–4 percent of rape arrests end
in convictions).
87. Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 841 (1993) (pointing
out that in civil suits for sexual assault, “the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard of criminal law need
not be met, and recovery can occur under the civil law’s more lenient ‘preponderance of the
evidence’ standard”).
88. Holly J. Manley, Comment, Civil Compensation for the Victim of Rape, 7 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 193, 199 (1990) (observing that the civil law’s lower standard of proof offers a
“major advantage” for complainants who are choosing between the civil and criminal justice
systems).
89. Many states have established tolling provisions for civil statutes of limitations in cases
involving childhood sexual abuse. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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cases. Because the public discovered the scandal around 2002,
decades after much of the abuse occurred, the priests involved
generally were immune from prosecution under criminal statutes of
91
limitations. In addition, civil suits provide a means of pursuing third
parties who lack the requisite mens rea for criminal liability but who
92
may bear civil liability under a negligence theory.
Civil proceedings can prevent future victimization by prompting
93
third-party defendants to adopt safeguards. Typically, these
safeguards involve the improvement of security at apartment
94
buildings, hotels, and school campuses. In the summer of 2007, the
Marine Corps settled with two female recruits who claimed that
recruiters had raped them; the settlement agreement provided not
only for a substantial recovery but also for changes in the recruiting

90. See Goodstein, supra note 50 (noting that the clergy sexual abuse scandals first became
public in Boston in 2002).
91. To quantify this value, in the summer of 2007, I examined a database compiled by the
Bishop Accountability Project, a nonprofit group that has collected records of sex abuse claims
filed against Catholic priests based on conduct occurring in or after 1940. This database included
hundreds of records. The database indicated that convictions occurred in a very small
percentage of the sex abuse cases in which victims sought monetary compensation.
BishopAccountability.org, http://www.bishop-accountability.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
92. Brien, supra note 6, at 2 (“In a civil court, the victim controls essential decisions
affecting the case against the perpetrator (the first party) and negligent third parties—parties
who do not commit the crime but whose negligence may have facilitated the occurrence of the
crime.”).
93. EPSTEIN & LANGENBAHN, supra note 46, at 74 (“Civil suits have perhaps had their
greatest impact by prompting third parties, such as employers and landlords, to take measures
that will prevent criminal attacks on those to whom they owe a duty of care.”); Kanter, supra
note 56, at 258 (observing that some civil suits by rape victims can bring about “far-reaching
changes that can protect future victims from similar assaults”).
94. A report commissioned by the U.S. Department of Justice discussed the value of civil
litigation in avoiding future victimization:
Civil litigation often provides a crime prevention method. When perpetrators, or
other negligent parties involved in creating the conditions of victimization, are made
to pay for their violent acts or negligence, these acts are often not repeated. For
example, when hotels are ordered to pay money damages for their lack of adequate
security that causes rapes or assaults to occur, they often respond by improving
security to avoid future lawsuits. This is true of many other institutional or third party
defendants who have had to pay damages in negligence suits.
JANE N. BURNELY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL VICTIM ASSISTANCE ACADEMY
HANDBOOK ch. 8, at 2 (1998); see also, e.g., The Price of Rape, TIME, Sept. 6, 1976, at 32,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,918307,00.html (indicating that
rape lawsuits have prompted defendants to improve security at universities, hotels and
apartment buildings, often at considerable expense).
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95

process. In 2006, the New York State Assembly settled a suit
alleging rape by a high-level legislative aide, and the settlement
agreement created new procedures for the reporting of sexual
96
misconduct in the future. In 2005, a suit alleging a sexual assault on a
private college campus led to a court order opening up the college’s
police logs to public scrutiny, and the lawsuit also provoked a
legislative proposal to extend this practice to all private campuses in
97
the state. From 2005 through 2007, lawsuits alleging sexual abuse by
Catholic priests led the Church to adopt sweeping reforms to reduce
98
the risk of such abuse in the future.
Procedural requirements in civil trials are less favorable to the
defense than in criminal trials. Nonunanimous verdicts are
99
permissible in civil cases. Defendants have no constitutional right to
counsel, and accusers may bring their own attorneys to court; in
criminal prosecutions, defendants always have attorneys, and accusers
100
generally do not. Defendants in civil cases generally may overcome
101
liability on a theory of insanity. Civil plaintiffs can rely on evidence
that is inadmissible in criminal prosecutions, such as police reports

95. Among other provisions, the settlement agreement required Marine recruiters to post
notices providing confidential contact information for recruits who wish to report sexual abuse,
and the agreement required the involvement of female Marines at several stages in the
recruiting process. Glen Martin, Marine Corps to Alter Recruiting Practices After Alleged Rapes,
S.F. CHRON., June 8, 2007, at B1.
96. Jennifer Medina, Assembly Settles Suit on Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2006, at B3 (noting that, according to plaintiff’s counsel, the complainant “wanted this for
anyone following in her footsteps”).
97. Andrea Jones, Bill Would Make Colleges Release Crime Reports, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Mar. 18, 2005, at D8 (quoting the plaintiff’s counsel, who argued that open records would
promote awareness of security problems on campuses and would allow future victims to obtain
the police reports for the incidents in which they were involved).
98. One expert suggests that the clergy abuse litigation has provided a “especially powerful
example of how tort litigation can enhance policymaking.” LYTTON, supra note 4, at 10.
99. Kate Marquess, Juries Hang Up on Close Calls, Study Says: Data Shows That Evidence,
Not Diversity, Is the Main Factor, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Oct. 18, 2002, available at WL 1 No. 40
ABAJEREP 3 (citing a study by National Center for State Courts indicating that thirty-four
states permit nonunanimous in civil cases).
100. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape Victims and Prosecutors: The Inevitable Ethical Conflict of De
Facto Client/Attorney Relationships, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 695, 700–30 (2007) (noting that victims
in rape prosecutions rarely have their own counsel and that prosecutors’ objectives do not
always align with victims’ objectives).
101. Brien, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that civil courts do not generally relieve defendants of
civil liability by reason of insanity, so rapists who invoke this defense successfully in criminal
proceedings could still be liable in civil proceedings).
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102

and other categories of hearsay. Indeed, defendants have no
confrontation rights in civil cases. Civil plaintiffs can call defendants
as witnesses, and they can more easily introduce evidence of
103
defendants’ prior crimes and sexual misconduct. In civil cases,
victims have greater latitude to introduce evidence of rape trauma
104
syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder. The procedural and
evidentiary rules in civil trials are far easier for rape survivors to
navigate than the rules in criminal trials.
To be sure, civil litigation is problematic on a number of levels.
Rape survivors who are indigent may not find civil remedies very
useful, both because these survivors lack the resources to hire
attorneys and because their assailants typically lack resources as
105
well. Whereas rape survivors may remain anonymous in criminal
proceedings, they generally must reveal their identities to file civil
106
claims. Civil suits often take longer to resolve than criminal
107
prosecutions. Most states do not extend rape shield laws to civil
cases, so complainants expose themselves to more extensive

102. New Directions from the Field, supra note 47, at 2 (indicating that victims of rape and
domestic violence find that “[t]he burden of proof is lower in civil cases than in criminal cases,
requiring a less rigorous measure of the evidence to establish liability”).
103. Under Rule 404(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and its state analogs, see,
e.g., the prosecution may not introduce evidence of the defendant’s violent character unless the
defendant has somehow opened the door. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Under FRE 404(b), the
prosecution may not cite evidence of the defendant’s prior violent acts unless a special
exception applies. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). FRE 413 suspends FRE 404 in prosecutions of sexual
violence, see FED. R. EVID. 413, but virtually no states have adopted analogs to FRE 413. Thus
the rules of evidence significantly constrain the prosecution’s use of the defendant’s prior
violent acts, at least in state court where the vast majority of rape cases are prosecuted. Civil
cases are not subject to the same constraints. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (limiting the scope of
preclusion to criminal cases); see also Brien, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the ease with which
civil plaintiffs may introduce evidence of prior similar acts).
104. Brien, supra note 6, at 9 (noting that courts are more receptive to this evidence in civil
cases than in criminal cases).
105. See Perone, supra note 1, at 122 (“[T]he assumption that a lawsuit is one of the best
solutions for victims of domestic violence and sexual assault is riddled with class bias.”).
106. Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff in a civil
action for sexual assault could not proceed under a pseudonym); Doe v. Univ. of R.I., Civ.A.
No. 93-0560B, 1993 WL 667341, at *3 (D.R.I. Dec. 28, 1993) (same).
107. EPSTEIN & LANGENBAHN, supra note 46, at 73 (observing that civil suits take longer
than criminal prosecutions); Brien, supra note 6, at 12 (“[C]ivil cases may be in litigation for
years before a decision is rendered.”). Although defendants have a speedy trial right in criminal
cases, this right does not extend to plaintiffs in civil actions. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3161–74 (2000).
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questioning about their sexual histories when they file civil claims.
Rape survivors may be more vulnerable to discovery in civil cases
than in criminal cases. Many states prohibit depositions of crime
victims in prosecutions, but these states allow depositions of crime
109
victims who choose to sue the perpetrators. Courts in civil cases
might limit the recovery of plaintiffs in rape suits based on notions of
110
comparative fault. These various drawbacks create difficulties for
plaintiffs, but a growing number of rape survivors file civil claims
nonetheless.
C. Necessity for Simultaneous Civil and Criminal Proceedings
Some plaintiffs may find it advantageous to postpone the
commencement of civil suits until after the conclusion of criminal
proceedings. Such a strategy might reduce plaintiffs’ litigation costs if
they can rely on some of the proof adduced by the government,
including transcripts of testimony and even the conviction of the
accused. When the civil proceeding follows the criminal proceeding,
the defendant will not be able to invoke a Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination when called to testify in the civil
111
proceeding. The doctrine of collateral estoppel may bar defendants
in civil cases from denying guilt proven in criminal proceedings
(assuming that the elements of the tort claims are coextensive with
112
the elements of the criminal offenses). Many convicted defendants
113
may simply settle rather than face another trial.

108. EPSTEIN & LANGENBAHN, supra note 46, at 73 (“A State’s rape shield law applies only
in criminal cases. In a civil action, the defense counsel is often free to question the victim about
her sexual history.”); see also Kirk Johnson, Twist in Bryant Case As Accuser Files Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2004, at A13 (noting that a civil suit by Bryant’s accuser would potentially
subject her to cross-examination on her prior sexual history that would have been off-limits in
the criminal prosecution because Colorado’s rape shield law did not apply to civil cases).
109. Some state constitutions prohibit depositions of victims in criminal cases. E.g., ARIZ.
CONST. art. 5; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 22(8); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25; OR. CONST. art. 1, §
42(1)(c). Yet these same states allow depositions of civil plaintiffs, including victims of alleged
torts which might also qualify as crimes. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30; IDAHO R. CIV. P. 30; LA. CODE
CIV. P. art. 1437; OR. R. CIV. P. 39.
110. Cf. Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (1999) (proposing that no court should be able to reduce the
damage award for a rape survivor based on her “comparative fault”).
111. Bublick, supra note 1, at 69.
112. One commentator has observed that the majority position in the United States finds
collateral estoppel in these circumstances:
Under the modern view, a criminal conviction precludes the defendant from
denying his guilt in a subsequent civil suit. In federal court it is clear that a prior
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Yet there are several reasons why simultaneous criminal and civil
proceedings may be necessary for rape victims to vindicate their
rights. To begin with, statutes of limitation for intentional torts often
require that plaintiffs file their claims within one or two years of the
114
incident in question. Plaintiffs seeking punitive damages may need
to file more quickly than plaintiffs who simply seek compensatory
115
damages. Some states have tolling provisions that apply if victims
are minors or if victims discover the extent of their injuries at a later
116
time. But for the most part, victims have no choice but to file their
civil claims before the standard statute of limitations. Criminal
prosecutions often drag on for more than a year, especially when the
117
defendants waive their speedy trial rights. A defendant who wishes
to obtain discovery through parallel proceedings, or who wishes to
impeach the accuser with evidence of civil litigation, may try to
postpone the criminal proceedings long enough to force the victim’s
hand in the civil proceedings. Sometimes the postponement of
criminal trials occurs not because of gamesmanship, but because of
the need for DNA testing, the need to locate material witnesses, the
need for psychological evaluation of the defendant or complainant, or
other circumstances. Thus the statutes of limitation for civil claims
may make it impossible to try criminal and civil matters in
118
succession.
federal conviction can be used to collaterally estop the relitigation of the issues in a
subsequent civil suit. Most states now follow this approach. The rationale purported
to support this approach would arguably be the same as that given to support the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in general—namely judicial economy and the finality
of litigation.
Ray B. Schlegel, Case Note, Zinger v. Terrell: The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Criminal
Judgments in Subsequent Civil Litigation; New Law in Arkansas and the Questions Unanswered,
54 ARK. L. REV. 127, 138 (2001).
113. Brien, supra note 6, at 4 (observing that after a conviction in a criminal case, a
defendant may simply capitulate in the subsequent civil case).
114. See infra Part IV.B.2.
115. See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 82 (noting that Kobe Bryant’s accuser faced a two-year
statute of limitations for a civil claim asserting sexual assault, but the statute of limitations was
one year if she intended to seek punitive damages).
116. For a state-by-state analysis of tolling provisions, see infra notes 394–96. Sometimes
plaintiffs in child abuse cases can file suits long after the incidents in question if the complaints
allege delayed discovery of the abuse or its effects. Many lawsuits alleging molestation by priests
were filed after the limitations period for criminal charges had run. See supra note 91.
117. A rape prosecution can take two or more years to move from indictment to trial,
excluding preindictment investigation. Seidman & Vickers, supra note 73, at 472 n.26.
118. Brien, supra note 6, at 4 (“[E]arly filing of a civil action may cause the criminal defense
attorney to attempt to undermine the victim’s credibility as a witness in the criminal case. . . .
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Even if victims have the option of successive trials, they might
prefer simultaneous proceedings to avoid the loss of evidence.
Witnesses may move, die, or become forgetful. Physical evidence may
be misplaced, or the need for such evidence may not be apparent
until shortly before the civil trial, when retrieval is no longer possible.
Records of businesses, landlords, employers may be destroyed at
routine intervals, and so they may no longer be available if civil trials
lag too far behind criminal trials. Some unscrupulous record keepers,
fearing the prospect of third-party liability, may cover up evidence to
119
prevent plaintiffs from using it against them later in civil suits.
Plaintiffs cannot necessarily depend on criminal investigations to
meet all the needs of the civil litigation, especially if plaintiffs intend
to bring claims against third parties. Finally, rape survivors who bear
conspicuous signs of injury shortly after being attacked may wish to
try the civil case while their injuries are still visible to present a more
compelling spectacle to the jury. If civil juries see injuries long after
rapes, they might award lower damages for pain and suffering,
whereas juries might award more generous damages shortly after
rapes because of uncertain timetables for victims’ recovery.
Victims might want to hasten civil litigation for their own peace
of mind. They want to put the entire ordeal behind them. A civil trial
necessitates a very difficult public recitation of what was probably one
120
of the most traumatic incidents in the plaintiff’s life. Rape survivors
may not want to experience such an ordeal two times over a
121
prolonged period. Closure is difficult for a survivor to achieve while
either a criminal or civil proceeding is pending. Simultaneous
proceedings would allow the rape survivor to move on as quickly as
possible.
A rape survivor who foresees the need for a trial in a civil suit
may prefer that the civil trial precede the criminal trial. Jury verdicts

[T]oo long a delay could very well jeopardize the victim’s right to file a civil suit . . . ”); Sebok,
supra note 82 (considering the dilemma faced by Kobe Bryant’s accuser, who needed to file a
civil claim before the conclusion of the criminal prosecution, and arguing that “it is not fair to
ask the alleged victim to wait . . . . [because] if she waits, her claim might end up being barred by
the statute of limitations.”).
119. Cf. Pokorak, supra note 20, at 716–17 (noting that potential third-party defendants may
produce “favorable reports as soon as possible to” nip their civil liability in the bud).
120. Kanter, supra note 56, at 259–60 (indicating that rape victims find both criminal and
civil litigation to be exhausting and stressful).
121. See Brien, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that the plaintiff in a civil case “may have to
repeat details pertaining to the victimization, . . . with the resulting psychological stress”).
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in civil cases may be higher if the criminal prosecution has not already
won a significant sentence. Although the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not protect a sentenced defendant from a private civil suit, after
a severe sentence, the civil jury may reduce its monetary damages
award out of sympathy.
One important consideration is the possibility that the
prosecution might result in acquittal. A complainant whose proof is
foreseeably inadequate to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
but whose proof may be sufficient to show a preponderance of the
evidence in a civil trial, might want to proceed solely in civil court for
fear that an acquittal might weaken the civil case. The acquittal would
not provide a basis for collateral estoppel because of the different
standards of proof, but some authority suggests that acquittals in
criminal prosecutions may be admissible in subsequent civil suits
122
alleging the same acts.
Rape survivors may want to press forward quickly with civil
litigation to ensure that third-party defendants take precautionary
measures as soon as possible. For example, a victim of rape in an
apartment building may want the property manager to improve
security as quickly as possible. A parent whose child suffered sexual
abuse in the neighborhood school may want to conclude civil
litigation against the school district quickly to force reforms at the
school to reduce the risk of future abuse.
For all the foregoing reasons, rape survivors may be impatient to
file civil claims. They may insist on simultaneous civil and criminal
proceedings, even though such proceedings create more
complications than successive actions.
D. Prosecutors’ and Judges’ Hostility to Civil Claims by Accusers
Prosecutors dread the filing of civil claims by rape victims. Rape
123
prosecutions depend heavily on the credibility of accusers. Civil

122. See Anthony J. Bocchino & David A. Sonenschein, Practice Commentaries—Federal
Rules of Evidence 36 (2d ed. 2003) (construing Rule 413 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
conclude that acquittals in prosecutions of alleged sex crimes are admissible in later civil suits
alleging same facts); Jennifer B. Siverts, Note, Punishing Thoughts Too Close to Reality: A New
Solution to Protect Children from Pedophiles, 27 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 393, 399 (2005) (same).
But see Schlegel, supra note 112, at 138 (suggesting that acquittals should not be admissible in
later civil suits, because acquittals lack relevance because of the different standards of proof).
123. State v. Bowens, 871 So. 2d 1178, 1186 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (opining that the
importance of the alleged victim’s credibility in rape prosecution heightens the need for
evidence concerning parallel civil action); Martha Chamallas, Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J.
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litigation exposes accusers to extensive cross-examination and may
inflame juries’ instinctive prejudice against “greedy” complainants.
Given courts’ general approval of such cross-examination, and jurors’
124
enmity toward accusers who sue, parallel civil litigation reduces the
125
likelihood that prosecutors will obtain convictions. Thus many
126
prosecutors regard victim suits as “bad news.” Prosecutors grow
frustrated when civil tort litigation “interferes” with criminal
127
prosecutions based on the same facts. Some prosecutors try to
dissuade victims from seeking civil remedies until after criminal
128
proceedings have ended. Prosecutors regard the success of the
criminal action as the paramount goal, and they explicitly subordinate
129
victims’ interest in remediation.
Prosecutors resent procedural nuisances that arise when accusers
file tort claims. One headache is that prosecutors must constantly be
mindful of their ethical duty not to use (or allow accusers to use)
criminal proceedings to achieve tactical advantages in parallel civil
130
proceedings. Another source of grief is prosecutors’ duty under

441, 457 (2005) (arguing that the accuser’s credibility is crucial in prosecutions of both
acquaintance rape and stranger rape); see also Pokorak, supra note 20, at 700 (“Undoubtedly,
one of the most difficult classes of cases prosecutors must handle is a sexual assault case.”).
124. For a more thorough discussion of jurors’ biases against rape suits, see infra Part
III.A.2. Any scholar who analyzes the judicial system’s prejudice against complainants in rape
cases must pay tribute to the pathbreaking work of Susan Estrich, who is arguably the nation’s
foremost authority on the subject. See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986)
(analyzing courts’ insensitivity to rape victims).
125. Johnson, supra note 108 (“Legal experts said that the [accuser’s] lawsuit, and the new
wrinkles it creates for the prosecution, could effectively end the criminal case . . . .”).
126. See Jonna M. Spilbor, Why Prosecutors Should Dismiss Bryant Case, CNN.COM, Aug.
18, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/18/spilbor.bryant/index.html (“For the prosecution,
the filing of the civil suit is more bad news.”).
127. See Webb v. State, No. 03-04-0004-CR, 2005 WL 1842740, at *7 (Tex. App. Aug. 4,
2005) (mem.) (recounting that a prosecutor of rape worried that parallel civil litigation could
“interfere” with prosecution).
128. For example, in a recent case in Texas, the prosecutor of a rape case received a phone
call from the accuser’s civil attorney before the criminal trial. Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109,
111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “The attorney mentioned the possibility of filing a suit against
Appellant, but the prosecutor asked that the suit not be filed because it would interfere with the
criminal trial. Accordingly, complainant’s attorney said he would wait to file the civil suit until
after Appellant’s trial.” Id.; see also State v. Ahmed, No. 84220, 2005 WL 1406282, at *12 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 16, 2005) (dismissing the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor pressured the
accuser to drop her civil claim against the defendant).
129. Pokorak, supra note 20, at 698 (discussing how prosecutors subjugate the interests of
rape survivors).
130. See State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 439 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (noting an ethics rule
that prohibits using criminal proceedings to facilitate settlement of civil proceedings).
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131

Brady v. Maryland to keep track of all exculpatory evidence,
including inconsistent statements by witnesses; that task becomes
harder when prosecutors do not solely control all investigation and
132
trial
preparation.
During
criminal
trials,
prosecutors’
mischaracterization of parallel proceedings can create reversible
133
error. Yet another concern is defendants’ wider opportunities for
discovery in civil cases: Defendants can use more liberal discovery
rules in civil cases to preview, and perhaps shape, the testimony that
134
the government will offer at trial. Further, prosecutors worry that
135
civil settlements may co-opt accusers. Victims who file civil claims
generally have their own attorneys, so prosecutors find that they must
go through intermediaries to interact with their star witnesses.
Prosecutors and plaintiffs’ counsel may disagree about trial strategy;
prosecutors particularly prefer to have victims testify for the first time
in the criminal trial. In sum, the overlap of criminal and civil litigation
may create a trilateral adversarial contest in which the government,
136
the accused, and the accuser all have distinct interests.
Prosecutors sometimes take drastic action to avoid the perceived
harm of parallel civil and criminal proceedings. In some instances,
prosecutors may dismiss the criminal charges altogether once accusers
137
have filed or settled civil claims. Or prosecutors may move for

131. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
132. People v. Wahl, No. 2-94-0635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (Westlaw), reported in part in 674
N.E.2d 454 (noting, in a rape prosecution, that the defendant “assert[ed] the State had a duty to
provide him with discovery concerning the civil lawsuit” filed by the accuser).
133. See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 96 S.W.3d 386, 395 (Tex. App. 2002) (reversing a police
officer’s conviction for sexual misconduct because the prosecutor presented evidence at trial
that mischaracterized the accuser’s pending civil action against the city of Austin).
134. E.g., Doe v. Lyons, No. Civ. A. 96-0341, 1996 WL 751531, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec.
23, 1996) (denying the district attorney’s motion to quash defendants’ discovery requests in a
parallel civil suit alleging sexual assault); Johnson, supra note 108 (speculating that “if both the
civil and criminal cases are proceeding at the same time, Mr. Bryant’s lawyers could perhaps use
the civil suit, with its looser rules of evidence, to find information that might damage [the
accuser’s] credibility in the criminal case”).
135. William H.J. Hubbard, Note, Civil Settlement During Rape Prosecutions, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1231, 1231–33 (1999) (expressing concern that accusers who settle civil claims while
prosecutions are pending will cease to cooperate with prosecutors).
136. Lininger, supra note 74, at 1394–96.
137. For example, the prosecutor in the Kobe Bryant case dismissed the criminal charges
after the accuser filed a civil suit. See Sebok, supra note 82 (indicating that Kobe Bryant’s
accuser filed her civil claims shortly before the criminal trial due to time pressure imposed by
Colorado’s statute of limitation for civil cases); CNN Saturday Morning News (CNN television
broadcast, Oct. 2, 2004), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0410/
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orders staying parallel civil claims until after the conclusion of
138
criminal proceedings. In these motions, prosecutors argue that
criminal and civil proceedings are incompatible and that the public
139
interest requires the precedence of the criminal litigation.
On a fundamental level, prosecutors may believe that victims’
filing of civil claims amounts to a vote of no confidence in the
140
prosecution. According to this logic, victims who seek civil remedies
have lost faith in the efficacy of the prosecution to redress the wrongs
at issue in the case. It is as if victims who file civil claims are no longer
willing to play subordinate roles to prosecutors in criminal cases, and
they believe that they can do a better job seeking redress alone.
Judges, for their part, seem to harbor some antipathy for rape
lawsuits. One explanation is that judges generally distrust
complainants in rape cases. Some judges feel greater empathy for the
alleged rapists than for the complainants, and these judges go to
141
extraordinary lengths to complicate the task of proving rape. In July
2007, one Nebraska judge barred witnesses, including the
complainant, from using the words “rape,” “victim,” “assailant” and
“sexual assault kit” in a trial for rape; instead, he required the
witnesses to use more innocuous words such as “sex” and
142
“intercourse.” A substantial number of judges seem to suspect the

02/smn.01.html). Lida Rodriguez-Taseff, a civil rights attorney, argued that the dismissal of
criminal charges in the Bryant case was “sour grapes by the prosecutor.” Id.
138. Milton Pollack, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201, 208 (1990)
(explaining why prosecutors would seek to stay civil proceedings).
139. Id.
140. See Spilbor, supra note 126 (describing Kobe Bryant’s accuser’s lawsuit as a “vote of
‘no confidence’ in [the] prosecution”).
141. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 55–56 (1987) (explaining that judges create additional
hurdles for complainants because of the “nightmare” that a man would be falsely accused of
rape); Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 86, at 1327 (observing that “the rape literature is
peppered with anecdotes about male judges who were crudely biased in favor of acquaintance
rape defendants”); Deborah M. Golden, It’s Not All in My Head: The Harm of Rape and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 41 (2004) (“Some male judges
have tended to identify with a male accused of raping an acquaintance, and go out of their way
to protect the alleged rapist with legal barriers.”); Torrey, supra note 86, at 1055 (collecting
studies and other evidence indicating that “judges for the most part seem to adopt and enforce
the most insulting myths about rape victims”).
142. Nate Jenkins, Mistrial Is Called After Word ‘Rape’ Was Banned, CHI. TRIB., July 13,
2007, at 7. The judge himself declared the mistrial because he worried that prejudicial pretrial
publicity concerning his evidentiary ruling might deny the defendant a fair trial. Id. The judge
did not change his evidentiary ruling, but he decided to continue the trial and possibly move it
to another venue. Id. The accuser vowed to persevere: “If I have to turn into a human
thesaurus . . . I will do it.” Id. (omission in original).
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motivations of women who allege that they have suffered sexual
assault: some judges share the popular misconception that
143
complainants are vindictive, greedy, or mentally unstable.
Some judges seem to believe that tort law is ill suited to
144
remediate rape. These judges think that rape allegations belong in
145
criminal proceedings and that accusers who pursue civil remedies
146
are seeking selfish gain rather than serving the public interest.
These judges’ resistance to civil suits in rape cases also may reflect a
view that the indignity and psychological harm that rape causes are

143. Wendy J. Murphy, Minimizing the Likelihood of Discovery of Victims’ Counseling
Records and Other Personal Information in Criminal Cases: Massachusetts Gives a Nod to a
Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 983, 1006 n.120 (1998) (decrying
“judicial bias consistent with the rape myth—that women as a class are vindictive and cry rape
for sport”); Anne W. Robinson, Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusionary Rule: Dual
Justifications for an Absolute Rape Victim Counselor Privilege, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 331, 357–58 (2005) (contending that some judges share societal misconceptions
about rape victims’ mental instability); Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as
Judicial Anomaly: Between “The Truly National and the Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081,
1122 (2001) (explaining that judges distrust complainants “because they are often considered
manipulators and liars intent on using the court to achieve some wrongful purpose, such as
revenge”); Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Amy Fiordalisi, Toward Gender Equality: The Promise
of Paradoxes of Gender to Promote Structural Change, 1 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 131, 140
(1994) (book review) (arguing that “rape victims often are treated with disdain and insensitivity
in the courtroom”); Kathryn M. Carney, Note, Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate Crime, 75 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 315, 346 (2001) (noting that “[s]tudies have shown the prevalence of judicial
bias against rape victims”).
144. E.g., Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing a
trial judge who had pointedly asked the plaintiff what her father thought of her lawsuit for
rape); EPSTEIN & LANGENBAHN, supra note 46, at 74 (discussing an interview with a judge in
Washington state who expressed doubts about whether the civil remedial system would provide
a better alternative for a rape victim than the criminal justice system); see also Sarah M. Buel,
Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against
Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945, 961–69 (2004) (indicating that judges’
insensitivity to the complexities of violence against women creates a hindrance for tort actions
in these cases).
145. When judges receive stay requests in parallel civil and criminal proceedings, they are
more likely to stay the civil proceedings because they believe the criminal proceedings better
serve the public interest. Pollack, supra note 138, at 202 (concluding that the “weight of
authority” endorses Judge Wisdom’s favoritism of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings
arising from the same facts; if courts must stay either the criminal or civil action, Judge Wisdom
would stay the latter, because the former is in the public interest).
146. Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (suggesting that plaintiffs in rape
suits are seeking to advance their selfish interests, whereas accusers in rape prosecutions are
advancing public interest); Marah deMeule, Note, Privacy Protections for the Rape
Complainant: Half a Fig Leaf, 80 N.D. L. REV. 145, 159 (2004) (noting that the state judiciary
opposed extending rape shield laws to civil cases because civil claimants seek monetary gain,
whereas criminal prosecutions vindicate public interest).
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147

not compensable in tort. Occasionally judges seem to believe that a
rape survivor should only recover damages for physical harm that
148
required medical care. Because damages cannot make the victim
whole, a victim who accepts any damages “acknowledge[s] that the
monetary award constitutes all that is owed to her by the wrongdoer
149
for the harms he inflicted upon her.” Civil settlements of rape
complaints seem to portend the “commodification” of rape and the
150
sanctions prescribed for this crime. Judges’ rulings on damage
awards have occasionally undervalued the suffering of rape
151
survivors. Some judges have even discounted damage awards in
147. On a national level, the judiciary has repeatedly signaled its lack of enthusiasm for civil
litigation in cases involving sexual assault. Various representatives of the federal and state
judiciary spoke out against VAWA’s civil remedy for rape victims; the opponents did not simply
raise concerns about federalism, but they also challenged the wisdom of creating a new civil
cause of action for rape. Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and
Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 273 (2000) (discussing
lobbying by federal and state judges during early debates over the proposal that created
VAWA’s civil remedy). Regarding these cases as significantly less urgent than criminal
prosecutions, both federal and state judges opposed the extension of the rape shield law to
cover civil cases. Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs’ Sexual Pasts: Coping with Preconceptions
Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559, 564 (2002) (discussing opposition by the judicial
conference and U.S. Supreme Court to the extension of the rape shield laws to civil cases);
deMeule, supra note 146, at 159 (discussing the states judiciaries’ opposition to rape shield
laws).
148. See, e.g., Zerangue v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 820 F.2d 130, 133–34 (5th Cir. 1987) (deeming
a $228,000 jury award in rape case to be excessive, even though the rapist forcibly dragged the
victim to an abandoned house, sexually assaulted her multiple times in an hour-long ordeal, and
then left her naked, bound, and gagged; the court found that she only needed minimal medical
attention, and therefore her injuries did not merit the jury’s award); see also Golden, supra note
141, at 45–51 (noting division among courts whether rape, in and of itself, is “physical injury”
sufficient to state a claim under the Prison Rape Elimination Act); Lynn Hecht Schafran,
Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 439, 440 (1993) (discussing an unpublished New York case in which the judge accepted the
defense attorney’s argument that rape without physical injury was not violent).
149. Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the Victim’s Desire for
Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1115, 1162 (2004).
150. Hubbard, supra note 135, at 1241 (“[P]retrial settlement commodifies rape because a
rapist can ‘pay’ for a rape after the fact. Rape is not commodified completely because
individuals cannot buy and sell rape before the fact, but settlement (and civil litigation
generally) creates an imperfect market in which the rape is legitimized, after the fact, for a price.
Under this view, complete noncommodification of rape would entail barring all payments of
money damages in every civil rape case.” (footnote omitted)).
151. See, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1061 (Utah 1989) (holding that, in
a rape suit trial, the jury could properly consider the alleged victim’s prior consensual sexual
experience to assess damages); see also Schafran, supra note 148, at 439 (reviewing the
transcript of a New York trial in which the judge found that, “because the victim had been
sexually assaulted previously by her father and brothers, the impact of the most recent rape was
not as severe for her as it would have been for a first-time rape victim”).
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rape cases based on notions of comparative fault, such as the
152
plaintiffs’ lack of caution in associating with the rapists. Congress is
aware of judges’ discomfort with civil suits by rape victims: when
Congress created new civil remedies for rape victims in 1994,
Congress simultaneously established programs for judicial training to
ensure that judges would be more sensitive to the plight of rape
153
survivors.
Judges may resent rape suits as a nuisance that hinders the
efficient management of judges’ dockets. Parallel criminal and civil
154
trials are unwieldy, especially if they occur simultaneously. The
judge in each case needs to adjudicate complicated evidentiary
155
motions and discovery disputes. Each judge also needs to resolve
arguments about whether to stay one proceeding while the other is
156
pending. Parallel actions create more headaches for judges than a
single action would.
In sum, many prosecutors and judges seem to believe that it is
wrong to sue for rape, at least while prosecutions of alleged assailants
157
are pending. Though the act of rape qualifies as a tort, and the U.S.

152. Bublick, supra note 110, at 1416 (noting some judicial reduction of damage awards for
rape survivors on a theory of “comparative fault” and arguing for limitations on the use of this
theory in the adjudication of civil suits for rape).
153. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 13991–92, 14036 (2000) (establishing training programs for judges).
In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Supreme Court acknowledged the
“voluminous congressional record” demonstrating “pervasive bias” among state judges in rape
cases. Id. at 619–20. The Court nonetheless struck down VAWA’s civil remedy on the ground
that Congress lacked authority to enact this legislation under either the Commerce Clause or
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 627.
154. Pollack, supra note 138, at 204 (suggesting that simultaneous civil and criminal
proceedings use judicial resources less economically than successive proceedings because
collateral estoppel or res judicata may simplify the litigation of the second matter); Note, Using
Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1023,
1035–36 (1985) (simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings “us[e] judicial resources
inefficiently” because parties may need to present identical evidence and factfinders may need
to decide identical issues).
155. Note, supra note 154, at 1036 (“[P]arallel proceedings are likely to produce increased
litigation over discovery requests. Because an accused may feel pressure to limit civil discovery,
he may make broad use of his privilege against self-incrimination. If the accused’s opponent
reacts by alleging that the accused has improperly invoked the privilege, motions to compel
discovery, opposed by motions for protective orders, will proliferate. Although parties conduct
civil discovery largely without judicial supervision, adjudication of disputed discovery requests
absorbs additional judicial resources.”).
156. Pollack, supra note 138, at 203–05 (listing and discussing considerations that guide
judges in determining whether or not to grant a stay).
157. Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69 n.9 (D. Mass. 1999) (“Rape . . . is actionable as a
civil assault and battery in every State.”).
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Supreme Court regards rape as the ultimate violation of self,
prosecutors and judges seem committed to the primacy of the
criminal justice system. Their lack of enthusiasm for rape suits helps
to explain why accusers are so vulnerable to impeachment based on
parallel civil litigation—a topic to which the next Part now turns.
II. PRESENT RULES PERMITTING
IMPEACHMENT OF ACCUSERS BASED ON CIVIL CLAIMS
At present, ample authority allows impeachment of accusers in
rape prosecutions with evidence of the accusers’ civil claims against
the accused or third parties. This Part analyzes evidence codes, case
law, and ethical rules that authorize such impeachment.
A. Evidence Codes
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide little specific authority
addressing impeachment on the ground of bias. Proponents of such
impeachment might cite two rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence:
159
Rule 401, which sets forth the definition of relevant evidence, and
160
Rule 611(b), which allows cross-examination on “matters affecting
the credibility of the witness.” Counterbalancing these rules is Rule
161
403, which permits the exclusion of relevant evidence when the
judge deems that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its
probative value. Unfortunately, because Rule 403 depends heavily on
the discretion of the trial judge, its application is difficult to predict.
Some states’ evidence codes go further than their federal
counterpart in guaranteeing the right to impeach witnesses with

158. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Short of homicide,
[rape] is the ‘ultimate violation of self.’” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION REPORT, RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS 1 (1975))).
159. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows: “‘Relevant evidence’
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401.
160. Rule 611(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows: “Cross-examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the
credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination.” FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
161. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows: “Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
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evidence of bias. A number of states have adopted Rule 616 of the
162
Uniform Rules of Evidence, drafted by the National Conference of
163
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Rule 616 provides: “For the
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of bias,
prejudice, or interest of the witness for or against a party to the case is
164
admissible.”
Other states have included language about bias
165
elsewhere in their impeachment rules. Some states have enacted
statutes acknowledging the right to a “thorough and sifting” cross166
examination.
Only one rule in the federal and state evidence codes relates
directly to the topic at hand. Rule 408, adopted by virtually all
jurisdictions, excludes evidence of settlement offers and statements
167
made in the course of settlement negotiations. The purpose of this

162. See, e.g., DEL. R. EVID. 616; IND. R. EVID. 616; TENN. R. EVID. 616. The states
adopting Rule 616 have sometimes modified its language slightly. For example, Rule 616 of the
Tennessee Rules of Evidence provides: “A party may offer evidence by cross-examination,
extrinsic evidence, or both, that a witness is biased in favor of or prejudiced against a party or
another witness.” TENN. R. EVID. 616.
163. Nat’l Conference of Comm’n on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Rules of Evidence Act
(Mar. 8, 2005), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ure/evid1200.htm.
164. UNIF. R. EVID. 616.
165. E.g., HAW. R. EVID. 609.1(a) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked by
evidence of bias, interest, or motive.”); LA. CODE. EVID. ANN. art. 607(d)(1) (2006) (“Extrinsic
evidence to show a witness’ bias, interest, corruption, or defect of capacity is admissible to
attack the credibility of the witness.”); OR. EVID. CODE R. 609-1(1) (“The credibility of a
witness may be attacked by evidence that the witness engaged in conduct or made statements
showing bias or interest.”); S.C. R. EVID. 608(c) (“Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent
may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence
otherwise adduced.”); TEX. R. EVID. 613(b) (setting forth the procedure for examining witness
concerning bias); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 2004) (allowing the admission of
evidence concerning bias based on a “sliding scale recovery agreement”).
166. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-137 (2005) (“The right of cross-examination, thorough and
sifting, belongs to every party as to the witnesses called against him.”); GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-964 (West 2008) (“The right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination shall belong to every
party as to the witnesses called against him.”).
167. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
(a) Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of any
party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was
disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent
statement or contradiction: (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish—or
accepting or offering or promising to accept—a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim, except when offered in a
criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in
the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.
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rule is to ensure that parties negotiate earnestly without fear that
168
their statements will come in at trial to show their liability. The final
sentence of Rule 408 indicates that evidence of settlement
negotiations could be admissible if offered for a purpose other than
169
proving a party’s fault, such as “proving a witness’s bias.”
Amendments to Rule 408 in December 2006 clarified that the rule
extends to criminal proceedings. The commentary to the 2006
amendments highlighted an asymmetry that protects the accused and
exposes the accuser to impeachment with settlement negotiations.
“An offer or acceptance of a compromise of a civil claim is excluded
from all criminal cases if offered against the defendant as an
admission of fault because a defendant may offer or agree to settle a
170
litigation for reasons other than a recognition of fault.” Yet the
accuser remains vulnerable to impeachment based on civil settlement
negotiations, because the defendant is not trying to show the
accuser’s fault—the defendant wants to highlight the accuser’s bias.
Thus Rule 408 furnishes both a sword and a shield to the accused,
who either can introduce evidence of settlement negotiations in the
parallel civil case to show the accuser’s bias or insist that this topic is
171
off limits.
In sum, the evidence codes give judges wide latitude to allow
impeachment of accusers with evidence of civil claims. Some judges
172
instinctively distrust complainants who seek damages for rape.
Judges are likely to exercise their discretion to hold the accusers
accountable in criminal cases for their perceived avarice in parallel

(b) Permitted uses. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for
purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples of permissible purposes include
proving a witness’s bias or prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay; and
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408.
168. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (citing as a “consistently impressive”
justification for the rule “public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes”).
169. FED. R. EVID. 408.
170. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEE ON RULES
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 44 (2005), available at http://xrint.com/law/us/federal/
rules/frsum-2006.pdf; accord FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.
171. Cf. Marbray v. State, No. CACR 07-342, 2007 WL 4181544, at *4 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov.
28, 2007) (reversing a rape conviction after “the State was allowed to elicit from the victim
testimony that Marbray came home telling the victim that he was sorry and giving her ‘money
and stuff’”).
172. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
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civil cases. Section B collects examples of judicial rulings approving
such impeachment.
B. Case Law
The case law is replete with appeals in which defendants
challenge their rape convictions on the ground that trial courts
constrained their impeachment of accusers with evidence of parallel
civil litigation. Virtually all courts considering such arguments show
unqualified support for the premise that lawsuits compromise the
173
credibility of accusers in criminal cases. The theory is that civil
litigation makes the accusers biased because they would personally
174
benefit from a successful result in the criminal proceedings.

173. See Webb v. State, No. 03-04-00004-CR, 2005 WL 1842740, at *8 (Tex. App. Aug. 4,
2005) (mem.) (“Generally, a defendant is permitted to show that the complaining witness has
brought a civil suit for damages based on the same occurrence for which the defendant is being
prosecuted.”). The Ohio Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in its survey of the law:
“The general rule is that the pendency of a civil action brought against an accused by a witness
in a criminal case is admissible as tending to show interest and bias of the witness to prove a
motive to falsify, exaggerate or minimize on his part . . . .” State v. Vanek, No. 2002-L-130, 2003
WL 22994979, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003) (citations omitted). The court in that case
reversed the rape conviction because the defendant lacked the opportunity to cross-examine the
complainant based on a parallel civil claim. Id.; see also People v. Hinton, No. B146149, 2002
WL 1398233, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. June 28, 2002) (holding, in a rape prosecution, that the
relevance of an accuser’s parallel civil suit is “well settled”); State v. Godsey, Nos. 03C01-9803CR-00121, 03C01-9803-CR-00122, 1999 WL 966549, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 1999)
(holding, in a rape prosecution, that “[g]enerally, a civil claim by a victim for injuries inflicted by
a criminal defendant is relevant to witness bias”); Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Right to CrossExamine Prosecuting Witness as to His Pending or Contemplated Civil Action Against Accused
for Damages Arising Out of Same Transaction, 98 A.L.R.3d 1060 § 2(a) (1980) (“The general
rule is that it is proper for the accused to cross-examine the prosecuting witness as to his
pending or contemplated civil action against the accused.”).
174. E.g., United States v. Gutierrez, No. SA-05-CR-639-XR, 2007 WL 3026609, at *8 (W.D.
Tex. Oct. 16, 2007) (reversing a rape conviction because the defendant could not impeach the
accuser with evidence of her intention to file a civil suit); Barboza v. Bissonnette, 434 F. Supp.
2d 25, 37 (D. Mass. 2006) (opining, in a rape prosecution, that “[i]f the family hoped to sue the
defendant in a civil suit and thereby win money damages, that fact was relevant to the jury’s
determination of any bias on the family’s part that could shade their testimony against the
defendant” (citations omitted)); Hinton, 2002 WL 1398233, at *8 (“The victims in this case did
have a financial interest that would be served by favoring the prosecution. A guilty verdict
reasonably would be seen as aiding their civil suit against defendant’s employer at the time of
the molestation incidents.”); State v. Bowens, 871 So. 2d 1178, 1185 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“It is
the possibility of gain or loss dependent upon the witness’ testimony which reveals partiality and
interest.”); Commonwealth v. Hanford, 937 A.2d 1094, 1098–99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (reversing
a rape conviction because the trial court denied a defense request to introduce a civil complaint
filed by the accuser); Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (stating that
according to the defense, “the fact that the complainant hired an attorney and was considering
filing a civil suit against him showed that she had a financial motive for claiming that
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According to this view, civil litigation corrupts the accuser.
Defendants frequently win reversal of their convictions when they
demonstrate that they lacked the opportunity for thorough cross176
examination concerning accusers’ civil suits.
Some courts have ruled against defendants who appealed the
exclusion of impeachment evidence concerning the accusers’ civil
suits. These courts usually have not disagreed about the pernicious
effect of such suits on accusers’ credibility. Rather, these courts have
upheld convictions because trial courts did in fact afford enough
opportunities for defendants to impeach based on parallel civil
177
178
claims, errors were harmless, or defendants failed to preserve

[defendant] sexually assaulted her”); Hoover v. State, No. 03-05-00641-CR, 2007 WL 619500, at
*3 (Tex. App. Feb. 27, 2007) (mem.) (noting, in a rape prosecution, that “bias or interest may
arise when the witness has a financial stake in the outcome of the case”); State v. Wilson, No.
57236-9-I, 2007 WL 2085333, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 23, 2007) (stating that defense
counsel, in a rape prosecution, told the jury to disbelieve the accuser because she was suing the
housing authority for failing to maintain adequate security).
175. State v. Creel, 508 So. 2d 859, 862 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (equating, in rape prosecution,
the accuser’s civil suit with “bias” and “corruption”).
176. E.g., Johnson v. State, 643 S.E.2d 556, 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing a molestation
conviction due to lack of cross-examination concerning the accuser’s civil claim); Cunningham v.
State, 522 S.E.2d 684, 688 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing a conviction for child molestation
because the trial court denied cross-examination concerning the accuser’s civil suit); Bowens,
871 So. 2d at 1186 (reversing a rape conviction because the trial court barred the defendant
from questioning the accuser about whether she had hired a civil attorney); Maslin v. State, 723
A.2d 490, 493 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (reversing a conviction for sex offenses because the
trial court granted the state’s motion in limine to preclude reference to the accuser’s civil suit);
People v. McFarley, 818 N.Y.S.2d 379, 380 (App. Div. 2006) (reversing a rape conviction
because the trial court had denied cross-examination of the accuser regarding her intention to
file a civil suit); People v. Stein, 781 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655–56 (App. Div. 2004) (reversing a rape
conviction because the defendant was unable to impeach the accuser with evidence that she had
served her employer with notice of a tort claim); Vanek, 2003 WL 22994979, at *4 (reversing a
conviction for “sexual imposition” because the defendant lacked the opportunity for crossexamination of the complainant based on her parallel civil claim); Ramirez v. State, 96 S.W.3d
386, 392–96 (Tex. App. 2002) (reversing a police officer’s conviction for sexual misconduct
because the prosecutor presented evidence at trial that mischaracterized the accuser’s pending
civil action against the city of Austin, and so the defendant had no chance to cross-examine the
accuser concerning the suit).
177. E.g., Savastano v. Hollis, Nos. 02-CV-3299 (JBW), 03-MISC-0066 (JBW), 2003 WL
22956949, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2003) (finding no error in the trial court’s limitation of an
impeachment concerning a civil suit filed by the family of the an alleged sexual abuse victim
because the defendant “could still inquire directly about the mother’s supposed monetary
motive to fabricate, and this was done repeatedly”); Harkins v. United States, 810 A.2d 895,
898–99 (D.C. 2002) (upholding a conviction for sexual abuse when the defense counsel did in
fact examine the accuser about her alleged financial motivations); State v. Louviere, 833 So. 2d
885, 905–06 (La. 2002) (declining to reverse a conviction for rape and other offenses when the
defendant did in fact have an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser about a civil suit);
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issues for appeal with a timely objection or proffer. Only once in a
blue moon has an appellate court declared that civil litigation has
scant relevance to the accuser’s credibility as a witness for the
180
prosecution.

Poynor v. State, 962 So. 2d 68, 75–76 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the accused had the
opportunity to present his theory that the alleged rape victim and her family were motivated by
avarice and were seeking damages in a civil lawsuit); Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 114–15 (stating that,
in a rape case, the defense can generally impeach the accuser with evidence that she has filed or
may potentially file a civil claim, but here the prosecution’s failure to disclose the accuser’s
intention to file a claim did not violate Brady because the withheld evidence was not material
given the strength of the government’s other evidence); Hoover, 2007 WL 619500, at *4
(assuming that the trial court erred in limiting some evidence of the accuser’s financial interest
in rape prosecution but finding that the error was harmless because the accuser had made
admissions before the jury concerning this subject).
178. E.g., Yeung v. Finn, 160 Fed. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
prosecution should have disclosed to the accused that the prosecutor had spoken with the
alleged rape victim’s civil attorney, but the error was harmless because of the overall strength of
the government’s evidence); Bissonnette, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 37–38 (upholding a rape
conviction—even though the trial court erred in prohibiting the defendant from cross-examining
the accuser regarding a parallel civil suit—because evidence of the defendant’s guilt was so
overwhelming that this error was harmless); Hinton, 2002 WL 1398233, at *10 (holding, in a
rape prosecution, that denying cross-examination about a civil suit was harmless); McCarthy v.
State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 532–33 (Ind. 2001) (in sex abuse prosecution, ruling that the trial court
erred by denying defendant cross-examination regarding the accuser’s civil claim but that the
error was harmless); Commonwealth v. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d 547, 555–56 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)
(holding that the trial court erred in prohibiting cross-examination of the accuser about her visit
to a civil attorney but upholding the rape conviction because the government’s evidence was
overwhelming); People v. VanLandingham, No. 241311, 2003 WL 22850027, at *2 (Mich. Ct.
App. Dec. 2, 2003) (affirming a conviction for criminal sexual conduct and finding that any error
in excluding cross-examination concerning the accuser’s civil suit was harmless because of the
strength of the government’s overall evidence).
179. E.g., Tolbert v. State, No. CACR 02-315, 2003 WL 840955, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 5,
2003) (declining to reverse a rape conviction even though the trial court foreclosed crossexamination of the accuser’s attorney concerning the accuser’s intent to file a civil suit, because
the accused never objected to the attorney’s invocation of attorney-client privilege nor asked
the trial court to compel the attorney’s testimony); Salazar v. State, No. 05-05-01455-CR, 2006
WL 3291049, at *4 (Tex. App. Nov. 14, 2006) (stating, in a prosecution for sexual assault, that,
the defendant could not win a reversal based on the denial of cross-examination concerning the
potential for parallel civil suits because the defendant did not attempt a timely crossexamination during the trial).
180. Apparently only one court has squarely rejected the premise that rape suits are
impeachable. Emphasizing that “crime victims have the right to sue persons who have harmed
them,” the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld a rape conviction even though the trial court
excluded evidence that the accuser’s family intended to sue. State v. Martine, No. 93-0583-CR,
1993 WL 467905, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1993). The court found that “[t]here is no
inconsistency in pursuing civil remedies in addition to criminal charges.” Id. Accordingly, the
defendant’s proposed impeachment of the accuser based on her parallel civil suit had “limited
impeachment value.” Id.
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A few examples from published opinions illustrate the tenor of
typical cross-examination concerning accusers’ parallel civil suits:
“And you sued [the accused] trying to get money through this rape
181
story of yours, haven’t you?”
182

“[H]ow much money are you going to make . . . ?”

183

“Ma’am, do you expect to get any money out of this case?”

184

“[Y]ou are going to take [the accused] for all he’s worth?”

Defense attorneys sound similar themes in their summations and
arguments:
“[The accusers] fabricated their testimony as part of a devious plot
185
to generate a lawsuit.”
“[I]f [the accused] were convicted, these lawyers could bring a
lawsuit on behalf of [the accuser] that stands to make her a very
186
wealthy woman.”
“[T]he rape allegation was part of [the accuser’s] plan to extort
187
money from [the Seattle Housing Authority] . . . .”
“[The accuser showed] greed and unsavory motives in filing a civil
188
suit.”
“[T]he complaining witness and her mother were lying because of
189
the pendency of a civil lawsuit.”

181. Louviere, 833 So. 2d at 905.
182. McCarthy, 749 N.E.2d at 532.
183. Pettway v. State, 597 So. 2d 737, 740 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
184. Poynor v. State, 962 So. 2d 68, 75 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
185. People v. Davis, No. F036806, 2002 WL 1558497, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15, 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Tyson v. State, 626 N.E.2d 482, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
187. State v. Wilson, No. 57236-9-I, 2007 WL 2085333, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 23, 2007).
188. People v. Castillo, No. H026086, 2005 WL 236837, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2005).
189. Powell v. State, 137 S.W.3d 84, 91 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 63
S.W.3d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
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“[The accuser] believed it would be easy to obtain money from him
190
through a civil lawsuit . . . .”
“[The accusers’] claims are fabricated and their motive for
191
fabricating these claims is to sue the State and to get rich quick.”
“[The rape prosecution] was about money, [and] . . . money was
192
what she’s after.”

What is perhaps most striking about the case law is the
willingness of courts to admit evidence of parallel suits without a
particularized inquiry into relevance. Many courts appear to assume
that that impeachment with parallel suits is automatically
193
admissible. As one court indicated, the prospect that an accuser
might win a civil recovery is “always a proper subject for cross194
examination.” Courts do not seem interested in considering specific
questions about the nature of the accuser’s civil claim or the
190. Gallardo v. State, No. F03269, 1998 WL 767633, at *2 (Tex. App. Nov. 3, 1998).
191. People v. Davis, No. F03269, 2002 WL 1558497, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15, 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
192. State v. Ross, 685 A.2d 1234, 1237 (N.H. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. See, e.g., Pettway v. State, 597 So. 2d 737, 741 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that “[i]t
is always competent” when cross-examining the accuser or any other witness to inquire about
civil claims arising out the same facts at issue in the prosecution); McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d
528, 533 (Ind. 2001) (declaring, in a sex abuse prosecution, that, as a general matter, “[i]f a
witness in a criminal trial has a financial motive for testifying in a certain fashion, then the jury
should hear about those matters because they are relevant to the question of the witness’
credibility”); State v. Bowens, 871 So. 2d 1178, 1185 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (stating a categorical
rule that parallel civil suits indicate the accusers’ bias and reversing a sexual abuse conviction
when the trial court limited cross-examination on this ground); Commonwealth v. Barboza, 763
N.E.2d 547, 556 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that the accuser’s interest in civil litigation is
relevant as a categorical matter); Ross, 685 A.2d at 1236 (reversing a conviction for sexual
assault because the trial court denied cross-examination concerning the accuser’s civil suit and
opining that “[i]t is axiomatic that an accused may highlight a complaining witness’s interest in
the outcome of the accused’s case”); People v. Stein, 781 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (App. Div. 2004)
(concluding without specific analysis that accusers’ civil suits are “highly relevant”); State v.
Ferguson, 450 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ohio 1983) (reversing a rape conviction because the trial court
denied cross-examination regarding the accuser’s lawsuit, and “[i]t is beyond question that a
witness’ bias and prejudice by virtue of pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding is a
matter affecting credibility”); State v. Vanek, No. 2002-L-130, 2003 WL 22994979, at *4 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003) (following the general rule that evidence of parallel suits is admissible to
impeach accusers in rape prosecutions); Webb v. State, No. 03-04-00004-CR, 2005 WL 1842740,
at *8 (Tex. App. Aug. 4, 2005) (mem.) (discussing the general rule admitting evidence of a civil
claim to show the accuser’s bias, without mentioning the need for particularized inquiry into its
relevance in each case).
194. Cunningham v. State, 522 S.E.2d 684, 688 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing a conviction
because the trial court did not permit cross-examination concerning the accuser’s civil suit).
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circumstances in the criminal trial at the time the accused offers the
195
evidence. Perhaps because bias is universally considered to be a
196
material topic, courts do not spend much time considering the
probative value of each particular piece of evidence offered to
impeach accusers based on civil litigation.
Some appellate courts have insisted that the mere possibility of
tort claims provides a ground for impeachment of accusers in rape
prosecutions. Thus, when accusers have not yet filed civil complaints
or even any formal notice of tort suits, impeachment of accusers
197
based on the potential for such suits is permissible. A defendant
could impeach an accuser who spoke with a civil attorney, relative, or
198
friend about the possibility of filing a civil claim. Some courts do not
allow impeachment if accusers have not yet manifested any interest in

195. For a detailed discussion of relevance, see infra Part III.A.1. For a list of factors that
should bear on the relevance of such impeachment evidence, see infra Part IV.A.
196. 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6095 (2d ed. 2007) (indicating that “the law regards proof of bias as a particularly
favored basis for attacking witness credibility”). The Supreme Court held in United States v.
Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), that “[p]roof of bias is almost always relevant” in a criminal trial. Id. at
52. This holding does not mean that all evidence of purported bias is admissible. The particular
ground for bias cited by the proponent must be material, and the evidence must have probative
value. See infra Part III.A.1.
197. See, e.g., State v. Arlington, 875 P.2d 307, 315 (Mont. 1994) (indicating that the majority
rule in the United States allows the impeachment of accusers regarding the mere potential to
sue the accused); Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 114–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting, in a
rape prosecution, that a complainant who had not yet filed a civil claim could have been
impeached concerning her potential to file the claim; failure of prosecution to disclose that she
was considering a claim did not violate Brady, however, because it was not material in light of
all the evidence in this case). See generally 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 652 (2007) (indicating that the
“defense counsel in a criminal case is entitled to cross-examine the victim or complaining
witness regarding any pending or contemplated civil suit against the accused when the civil suit
involves the same parties and arises out of the same set of circumstances or events giving rise to
the criminal case” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
198. E.g., Yeung v. Finn, 160 Fed. App’x 568, 569–70 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
prosecution should have disclosed to the accused that the prosecutor had spoken with the civil
attorney of the alleged rape victim, but the error was harmless due to the overall strength of the
government’s evidence); Barboza v. Bissonnette, 434 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding
error when the trial court hearing the rape prosecution denied the defendant an opportunity to
cross-examine the family of the accuser concerning a meeting with a civil attorney); Bowens, 871
So. 2d at 1186 (reversing a rape conviction because the trial court barred the defendant from
questioning the accuser about whether she had hired a civil attorney); State v. Whyde, 632 P.2d
913, 916 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing a rape conviction and listing cases requiring the
opportunity for impeachment concerning the accuser’s possible intention to file a civil suit); cf.
State v. Kooyman, 112 P.3d 1252, 1266 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (noting in dicta that a defendant in
a sex abuse prosecution was able to cross-examine the accuser about her conversation with a
civil attorney, even though she had not decided whether to file a civil suit).
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civil litigation,
but other courts seem inclined to permit
impeachment concerning the mere possibility of civil recovery.
C. Ethical Rules
Conceivably, the rules of ethics for lawyers might constrain harsh
cross-examination of accusers in rape prosecutions. Rule 4.4(a) of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) provides
as follows: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden
a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the
200
legal rights of such a person.” Subpart 5 of the preamble to the
Model Rules states that a lawyer “should use the law’s procedures
201
only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others.”
The ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal
Justice provide that “[t]he interrogation of all witnesses should be
conducted fairly, objectively, and with due regard for the dignity and
legitimate privacy of the witness, and without seeking to intimidate or
202
humiliate the witness unnecessarily.”
In reality, these various rules of ethics have very little effect on
lawyers’ treatment of witnesses during cross-examination. The rules
are difficult to enforce, in part because proof of a violation requires
some indication that the cross-examining attorney had an improper
purpose. All of these rules permit tough questioning unless its sole
purpose is to traumatize the witness. Very few lawyers would admit
such a purpose. The difficulty of enforcing these rules may explain the
203
dearth of published opinions interpreting them.
A more fundamental problem is that many defense lawyers
believe they have an ethical duty to cross-examine accusers as
199. E.g., Demetrios v. State, 541 S.E.2d 83, 88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding, in a rape
prosecution, that the trial court properly barred the defendant from cross-examining the accuser
about whether she intended to file a civil suit when she had not yet talked about any suit with an
attorney and there was no other evidence that she had manifested an intent to file a suit); State
v. Patton, 598 N.E.2d 777, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (opining that the exclusion of impeachment
concerning the accuser’s civil suit is only a reversible error if there is a civil action pending or
the accuser has “taken other affirmative steps in contemplation of a civil suit”).
200. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2007). As of June 2007, forty-four
states have adopted some version of this rule.
201. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl.
202. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS § 4-7.6(a).
203. See generally Lininger, supra note 74, at 1389 (noting that bar disciplinary panels rarely
enforce Rule 4.4(a)). On January 14, 2008, a WESTLAW search in the ALLCASES database
for “‘Rule 4.4(a)’ /50 cross-examin!” did not turn up any cases.
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zealously as possible. In rape cases, some lawyers even engage in
abusive conduct toward accusers because they feel their duty of
205
zealous advocacy requires it. A few ethics scholars have urged
defense lawyers to restrain their examinations of accusers in rape
206
cases, but this perspective remains a minority view. It is safe to say
that the rules of ethics do not exert much restraining influence on
criminal defense attorneys who are contemplating whether to
impeach accusers with evidence of parallel civil suits. To the contrary,
the rules of ethics seem to mandate aggressive cross-examination
207
using all strategies not explicitly proscribed by the rules of evidence.
III. CONSIDERING THE CASE FOR REFORM
Part II has shown that courts generally—and often uncritically—
admit evidence of an accuser’s parallel civil litigation and that the
evidentiary and ethical rules do not restrain this practice. Part III
evaluates whether a new approach would be more appropriate.
Section A considers the case for restrictions on the impeachment of
accusers with evidence of parallel civil suits. Section B discusses some
of the arguments for allowing such impeachment
A. Reasons to Limit Impeachment with Evidence of Civil Claims
The analysis in this Section proceeds in four steps. Part III.A.1
assesses the relevance of impeachment that refers to civil suits. Part
III.A.2 considers the countervailing concern of prejudice toward the
defendant. Part III.A.3 focuses on the tendency of this impeachment
to hinder rape victims’ use of the civil remedial system. Part III.A.4

204. See Albert W. Alschuler, Essay, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of
Lord Brougham and the O.J. Simpson Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 293 (1998)
(describing the view of O.J. Simpson’s defense team that “a lawyer is obliged to do everything
useful on behalf of a client that the law does not forbid”); Monroe H. Freedman, How Lawyers
Act in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1717, 1727 (2002) (extolling zealous
advocacy by lawyers).
205. See TIMOTHY BENEKE, MEN ON RAPE 104–05 (1982) (asserting that a defense lawyer
should play on jurors’ stereotypes to win an acquittal in rape cases because, by failing to do so,
he would forego a potentially winning strategy).
206. E.g., David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellman, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1026 (1990) (disavowing
harsh cross-examination of rape victims).
207. ANDREW E. TAZLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 81–93 (1999)
(noting that defense attorneys’ interpretation of ethical rules can countenance ruthless crossexamination of accusers in rape cases, such as in the prosecution of William Kennedy Smith).
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explores the risk of deterring victims from cooperating with law
enforcement.
1. Questionable Relevance. Relevance is a necessary, but not
208
sufficient, condition for the admission of evidence. Relevance
209
consists of two components: materiality and probative value.
Materiality is the importance of the point to be proven—the point
210
must matter to be material. Probative value is the evidence’s ability
211
to prove the point in question.
212
Bias is definitely material. Bias is an ulterior motive, loyalty or
213
antipathy that causes witnesses to shade their testimony. It is not
simply a strong interest in the outcome of a trial; it is an interest that
214
might cause witnesses to alter their stories.
To show bias, the impeaching party at least must show that (1)
the witness has a motive distinct from already known, unimpeachable
215
motives and (2) the witness’s additional motive could skew the
216
witness’s story. If either component is absent, the motive is not

208. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.”).
209. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”).
210. Id. (requiring that evidence must bear on a “fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action”).
211. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 153–59 (3d ed.
2003).
212. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984).
213. See Barboza v. Bissonnette, 434 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D. Mass. 2006) (in a rape
prosecution, opining that the accused is entitled to cross-examine witnesses about matters “that
could shade their testimony against the defendant” (citations omitted)); Webb v. State, No. 0304-00004-CR, 2005 WL 1842740, at *8 (Tex. App. Aug. 4, 2005) (mem.) (indicating that
evidence of an alleged bias is relevant to the extent that the evidence shows that the “witness
may shade his testimony”).
214. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 211, at 466–68.
215. The requirement of a distinct motive derives from two sources: the language in Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that limits the admission of “cumulative” evidence, see
FED. R. EVID 403, and the language in Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that requires
all evidence to have incremental probative value, see FED. R. EVID 401.
216. The potential impact on the witness’s testimony is the “bottom-line” inquiry in
evaluating evidence of bias. “A successful showing of bias on the part of a witness would have a
tendency to make the facts to which he testified less probable in the eyes of the jury than it
would be without such testimony.” Abel, 469 U.S. at 51.

2008]

RAPE IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE

1601

material, and it is not cognizable as bias for purposes of the
impeachment rules.
Redundancy limits materiality. So, for example, when the jury
knows that a witness is the parent of one party, there is slight
materiality in adding that the witness may have other ties to that
217
party or may share financial interests with that party. A baseline of
bias in such a case reduces the marginal materiality of new asserted
grounds for bias. As another example, courts in criminal prosecutions
generally do not allow parties to impeach the accused for
simultaneously defending a civil suit alleging the same facts as the
prosecution. The additional motive to avoid civil liability is of limited
materiality because the accused already has strong selfish motivation
218
to avoid punishment. Motives only amount to impeachable bias if
219
they provide distinct, substantial reasons to slant testimony.
Does an accuser’s civil litigation necessarily give rise to bias?
Courts answering in the affirmative seem to presume that the motives
of accusers in criminal prosecutions are divergent from the motives of
plaintiffs in civil suits. According to this view, accusers in criminal
prosecutions have a public, altruistic motivation, whereas civil
220
plaintiffs seek personal gain. This supposed dichotomy cannot

217. For example, when a witness already had strong enmity against the accused because
she believed that he killed her husband, the suggestion that she had additional unfavorable
motivations due to her civil suit against the accused was of negligible materiality. State v.
Salazar, 707 P.2d 951, 954 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); see also People v. Chapman, No. C039884, 2003
WL 22064345, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003) (holding that there was only slight relevance
in the proposed impeachment of the accuser’s mother concerning a civil suit filed against the
accused, because “[t]he mother was hardly an impartial witness; she was the mother of the
alleged victim”).
218. See State v. Ahmed, No. 84220, 2005 WL 1406282, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 2005)
(holding the prosecution’s questions regarding the defendant’s retention of a civil attorney to be
irrelevant and nonprejudicial).
219. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 54–56 (holding that evidence that the witness and the accused
were both members of the Aryan Brotherhood, that members of this prison gang took an oath
to lie for each other, and that violations of the oath were punishable by death was sufficient to
state a ground for bias in favor of the accused); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55
(1972) (holding that evidence that the government witness, who himself was vulnerable to
prosecution, had received promises of leniency in exchange for cooperation in the trial of the
accused was sufficient to show witness’s bias); see also FED. R. EVID. 401 (suggesting that a
motive to avoid civil liability would only constitute ‘relevant evidence’ if it had the “tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”).
220. See Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (suggesting that plaintiffs in
civil rape suits are seeking to advance their selfish interests, whereas accusers in rape
prosecutions are advancing the public interest); State v. Arline, 612 A.2d 755, 759–60 (Conn.

1602

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1557

withstand close scrutiny. Rape victims often initiate criminal
proceedings for “selfish” reasons: a desire for personal protection, an
interest in vindication or retribution, or even a desire for
compensation through restitution from defendants or payments from
221
state victim compensation funds. Thus the interests that lead rape
survivors into the criminal and civil justice systems are actually quite
similar—perhaps even duplicative. These reasons certainly defy a
222
facile categorization along a public/private axis. Because the reasons
for victims’ participation in the criminal and civil justice systems are
alike in many ways, the materiality of an accuser’s selfish motivation
is questionable. To put it differently, the accuser already has a
baseline of selfish inclination to assist the prosecution even without
consideration of civil litigation. The presumption that an accuser
would be a neutral witness but for the corrupting influence of a civil
223
suit is dubious.

1992) (indicating that rape suits are impeachable because “the outcome of the prosecution may
be beneficial to the prosecuting witness”); State v. Bowens, 871 So. 2d 1178, 1185–86 (La. Ct.
App. 2004) (reversing a rape conviction when the defendant could not cross-examine the
accuser about whether she had hired a civil attorney because the existence of civil litigation
might “indicate that the witness has an interest in the criminal case or is otherwise not totally
impartial”); deMeule, supra note 146, at 159 (noting that the state judiciary opposed the
extension of rape shield laws to civil cases because rape claimants seek monetary gain, whereas
criminal prosecutions vindicate public interest); see also Wooten v. State, 464 So. 2d 640, 642
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that cross-examination about an accuser’s civil litigation was
necessary to explore whether she was “actuated by personal considerations instead of altruistic
interest generated solely from motives in the public interest to bring a criminal to justice”
(quoting State v. Doughty, 399 A.2d 1319, 1324 (Me. 1979))).
221. See James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1205, 1226 (2004) (“Securing retribution and redressing the victim
encompasses . . . the entire penal raison d’être.”); Pokorak, supra note 20, at 726 (suggesting that
in rape prosecutions, “the promise of restitution or victim compensation appears to victims to
be identical to personal injury awards”); Jennifer Gentile Long, Explaining Counterintuitive
Victim Behavior in Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Cases, PROSECUTOR, Nov./Dec. 2006,
at 14 (explaining that victims in sexual assault cases seek self-empowerment and attempt “to
master their situations” and “regain control over their lives”).
222. Courts construing the Federal Rules of Evidence have rejected the public/private
taxonomy of motivation in other contexts such as the hearsay rule’s former testimony exception.
For example, in Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1978), the Third
Circuit recognized that the motivation for a criminal prosecution might be very similar to the
motivation for a private action arising from the same facts—so similar, in fact, that the
prosecuting authority could qualify as a “predecessor in interest” of the later private claimant
for purposes of the former testimony exception under Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Id. at 1186–87.
223. Some courts have recognized the fallacy of this presumption. See, e.g., Reeves v. State,
432 So. 2d 543, 546–47 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (finding no harm when the trial court prohibited
the accused from cross-examining the accuser about her parallel civil suit seeking damages for
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On the subject of materiality, it is important to answer
emphatically the question that frames this Article. Lawsuits for rape
are not wrong or shameful. Rape survivors deserve civil remedies as
224
much as any other claimants in the civil system. Rape suits were
unusual in this country until recently—due to factors unrelated to the
merit of these suits, such as sexism, stigma, and the lack of a
specialized bar—but now rape suits are becoming more
commonplace. Government agencies at the federal and local levels
encourage rape survivors to consider civil recourse, and courts should
not presume ill motives on the part of claimants who follow the
225
government’s advice. The notion that a rape suit is intrinsically
wrong should not continue into the new millennium.
Even assuming arguendo that accusers’ selfish motivations might
be material, courts must carefully sort through evidence of parallel
civil litigation to assess their probative value. The rule that allows
226
impeachment for bias whenever an accuser has filed a tort suit is
both overinclusive and underinclusive. The rule is overinclusive
because not all plaintiffs in tort actions seek financial gain: sometimes
claimants sue third-party defendants to force adoption of safeguards
227
that will prevent future rapes. Further, the rule is underinclusive
because it reaches only a fraction of rape victims who intend to file

rape, because the nature of the alleged crime made her highly prejudiced against the defendant
irrespective of her potential to recover damages); People v. Murray, 261 P. 740, 742 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1927) (finding no error in prohibiting cross-examination of the accuser regarding her
civil complaint, because the purpose of this cross-examination was to show her hostility toward
the defendant, which was amply apparent in her testimony already).
224. See State v. Martine, No. 93-0583-CR, 1993 WL 467905, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 16,
1993) (holding, in a rape prosecution, that “[t]here is no inconsistency in pursuing civil remedies
in addition to criminal charges,” so evidence of a parallel civil suit “has limited impeachment
value”).
225. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–18 (1976) (holding that prosecutors may not
discuss post-Miranda silence because the suspect who invokes his Miranda rights is acting on the
government’s advice, and there should be no inference of unsavory motives when he follows the
officers’ suggestion that he remain silent).
226. For a discussion of courts’ generally uncritical admission of such evidence, see supra
Part II.B.
227. See, e.g., People v. Davis, No. F036806, 2002 WL 1558497, at *4–5, 13–14 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 15, 2002) (indicating that accusers, female corrections officers, in a rape prosecution, filed a
parallel civil suit for purposes other than financial gain—including to force changes within the
California Department of Corrections, “to ensure that this did not happen to other victims,” and
to “help[] other women” by donating the proceeds from their lawsuit to a local rape crisis
center).
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tort claims. An accuser can evade impeachment on this subject if
the accuser simply postpones filing a tort claim until the close of
229
evidence in the prosecution or arranges to keep the tort claim notice
230
secret. Assuming that an interest in civil remedies is tantamount to
bias, a rule that gauges this interest based solely on publicly filed
documents will uncover only a fraction of the bias it seeks to
231
expose. Furtive plaintiffs—those for whom impeachment is perhaps
232
the most important—are the least likely to be accountable. The rule
rewards gamesmanship instead of revealing it.

228. See Tessmer v. State, 539 S.E.2d 816, 820 (Ga. 2000) (holding, in a prosecution for
murder that culminated a history of sex abuse, that the government did not violate Brady by
withholding evidence that the victim’s mother was “thinking about” a lawsuit, but had not yet
decided what to do, and that this information was not material because she had not yet made up
her mind or taken any step toward filing a suit); Demetrios v. State, 541 S.E.2d 83, 88 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2000) (suggesting that the majority rule would bar impeachment of accusers who have not
yet filed suit or manifested any intention to file suit).
229. E.g., People v. Smith, No. 238005, 2003 WL 22301047, at *10 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 7,
2003) (affirming the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial to show the
jury that the accuser, who did not file suit against the defendant until two days after the
sentencing hearing, sought financial gain); Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 111, 114–15 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007) (holding, in a rape prosecution, that “[t]he trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in denying the motions for mistrial” when the prosecutor asked the complainant’s
civil attorney to postpone filing a civil suit to avoid interference with the criminal trial); Salazar
v. State, No. 05-05-01455-CR, 2006 WL 3291049, at *4 (Tex. App. Nov. 14, 2006) (in a sexual
assault prosecution, upholding the trial court’s denial of defense cross-examination concerning
the accuser’s civil suit when the accuser did not file the claim until after the criminal jury began
deliberations, because the accused’s attempted cross-examine was not timely); State v. Swenson,
Nos. 36025-6-I, 38742-1-I, 1997 WL 369477, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 7, 1997) (per curiam)
(affirming the trial court’s rejection of the defendant’s request for a retrial based on the
accusers’ filing of a civil suit a few months after the defendant’s conviction for sexual abuse).
230. In People v. Stein, 781 N.Y.S.2d 654 (App. Div. 2004), the government prosecuted a
public school teacher for allegedly raping and sexually abusing students. Id. at 655. The civil
attorney filed tort claim notices against the school district before the end of the criminal trial,
but the attorney managed to keep these notices confidential. Id. at 656. The appellate court in
Stein reversed the conviction because the prosecutor had known about the tort claim notices
and failed to disclose them to the accused. Id. at 655.
231. For example, the media and pundits heaped invective on Kobe Bryant’s accuser for
filing a civil claim against him in August 2004. She had actually contemplated that claim for the
entire preceding year, however, so her motives in the prosecution were arguably “tainted”
throughout that prior one-year period. Johnson, supra note 108 (“But a civil action has also
apparently been contemplated for much longer than a few days. The lawyer who filed the suit,
John C. Clune, called a prominent former sex crimes prosecutor, Linda Fairstein, more than a
year ago to solicit her advice about a possible civil case . . . .”).
232. See State v. Buss, 887 P.2d 920, 925 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that courts must
permit defendants to impeach accusers for intending to file a civil claim, because accusers
otherwise “would not be in any particular hurry to file a civil action which would make them
appear biased when testifying in the criminal proceeding”).
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On the other hand, a broader impeachment rule—one allowing
233
impeachment based on the mere potential for a civil suit —is even
less likely to yield evidence with probative value. The potential to file
a lawsuit should not be sufficient to allow impeachment, because
234
virtually every victim of violent crime has a potential tort claim. Do
all victims lack credibility simply because they could theoretically sue
for damages? Some courts attempt to draw the line by allowing
235
impeachment of an accuser who has visited with a civil attorney, but
this demarcation does not make sense either. Victims might seek an
attorney’s advice regarding a number of topics, including their rights
to testify in the criminal case, their desire to protect their privacy, or
their interest in obtaining a restraining order.
The scant probative value of impeachment based on civil suits
becomes even clearer when one considers that the subject of
restitution is generally off-limits for impeachment. Victims of crime
236
can obtain restitution at the time of sentencing. In a restitution
order, the court directs the offender to pay for the victim’s losses.
Rape survivors can obtain restitution for medical services,
rehabilitation, temporary housing, child care expenses, lost income,
attorney’s fees, and “‘any other losses suffered by the victim as a
233. See, e.g., Smith, 2003 WL 22301047, at *10 (noting that, in a trial for criminal sexual
conduct, the “defendant vigorously cross-examined the complainant regarding her potential
filing of a civil suit,” even though the complainant denied hiring an attorney or planning to file a
civil suit); Swenson, 1997 WL 369477, at *3 (stating that the defendant in a sexual abuse
prosecution had the opportunity to question accusers about the potential of them filing a civil
claim); Buss, 887 P.2d at 924–25 (finding that the trial court erred during a rape prosecution
when the court disallowed impeachment based on a potential suit by accuser’s family, even
though the prosecutor insisted that the possibility of a lawsuit was merely speculative).
234. Professor Lynne Henderson has recognized that “all crime victims at least in theory
have the right to sue perpetrators in tort for damages.” Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice?
Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596, 1615 (1996) (reviewing GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH
JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)); see also, e.g., Webb, 232
S.W.3d at 114–15 (holding that there was no Brady violation when the prosecution did not
disclose that the accuser was considering filing a civil claim and remarking that “[t]he possibility
that a civil suit will be filed after a criminal trial should not be news to any defense attorney”).
235. E.g., Yeung v. Finn, 160 F. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the prosecution
should have disclosed to the accused that the prosecutor had spoken with the alleged rape
victim’s civil attorney, but error was harmless because of the strength of the government’s
evidence); Barboza v. Bissonnette, 434 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37–38 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding error
when the trial court, during a rape prosecution, denied the defendant an opportunity to crossexamine the family of accuser concerning a meeting with a civil attorney); State v. Bowens, 871
So. 2d 1178, 1186 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing a rape conviction because the trial court barred
the defendant from questioning the accuser about whether she had hired a civil attorney).
236. The court may order the offender to make restitution immediately, or the court may
include restitution among the conditions for probation or parole. Pokorak, supra note 20, at 726.
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proximate result of the offense.’” There is very little practical
238
difference between restitution and a civil tort action. In the victims’
239
eyes, restitution is basically the same as civil litigation. But courts
hardly ever allow impeachment of accusers with evidence that they
240
intend to seek restitution. Given the consensus that accusers’
interest in restitution lacks probative value as a ground for
impeachment, it is difficult to understand why accusers’ interest in
civil litigation indicates suspicious motives.
Similarly, courts do not allow impeachment of accusers based on
their requests for payments from crime victim compensation boards.
These boards provide compensation for the following expenses,
among others: medical bills, lost wages, transportation costs, housing
241
costs, day care expenses, and legal fees. Although an accuser’s

237. Amy J. Sepinwall, Defense of Others and Defenseless “Others,” 17 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 327, 367 (2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2264(b)(3)(F) (2000), a provision of the federal
VAWA statute); see also Pokorak, supra note 20, at 726 (listing categories of restitution
available to survivors of rape).
238. State v. Martin, No. 99-0518, 2000 WL 231160, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2000)
(noting that, in terms of relevance in establishing bias, evidence of an accuser’s civil suit and
evidence of an accuser’s restitution request are cumulative at best).
239. Pokorak, supra note 20, at 726 (explaining that victims regard restitution as very similar
to a personal injury award, and prosecutors argue for restitution as if it were a personal injury
award).
240. Many courts do not believe that the victim’s interest in restitution is relevant to bias.
E.g., State v. Michaels, No. 39339-1-I, 1997 WL 785646, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1997)
(per curiam) (“Unlike the filing of a civil suit, mere participation in a criminal action that may
result in restitution does not affirmatively and unambiguously demonstrate a financial interest
in the outcome of the prosecution. Nor does it have the same tendency to show ill-will.”); see
also State v. Mercer, 106 P.3d 1283, 1292 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the trial court
correctly barred impeachment of the prosecution’s witness with evidence that he sought
restitution); Martin, 2000 WL 231160, at *4 (denying a request for a new trial because newly
discovered evidence of the accuser’s interest in restitution was not material and the defense did
not demonstrate misconduct by the accuser or the government in withholding this evidence at
the time of trial). One practical problem is that the topic of restitution generally does not come
up until the time of sentencing—several weeks after the trial of the accused—so the accuser’s
interest in restitution is not manifest at the time of trial. Another obstacle to impeachment
based on restitution is that trial judges generally do not want jurors to consider the sentencing
consequences of their verdicts. See United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (“It
has long been the law that it is inappropriate for a jury to consider or be informed of the
consequences of their verdict.”). People v. Lee, No. A078429, 1999 WL 595455, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 27, 1999) (“A jury may not consider the subject of penalty or punishment in
determining the question of a defendant’s guilt.”).
241. Nat’l Ass’n of Crime Victim Comp. Bd’s, Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview,
http://www.nacvcb.org/articles/Overview_01.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008):
Compensation programs can pay for a wide variety of expenses and losses related to
criminal injury and homicide. Beyond medical care, mental health treatment,
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interest in payment from a victim compensation board seems
242
strikingly similar to the accuser’s interest in civil litigation, courts
generally bar impeaching the accuser for applying for victim
243
compensation. Again, the courts seem to assume that civil litigation
has a uniquely pernicious quality that undermines the credibility of
accusers. The courts’ aversion to civil litigation and tolerance of other
remedial systems is inexplicable when all of these systems offer
approximately the same categories of compensation.
There is yet another reason to doubt the probative value of
impeachment citing an accuser’s civil claim: success in the criminal
244
prosecution does not necessarily advance the civil action. Evidence
from the criminal prosecution is not necessary or sufficient for the
accuser to prevail in the civil suit, and it may be inadmissible in the
245
civil case. The verdict or judgment in the criminal prosecution is not

funerals, and lost wages, a number of programs also cover crime-scene cleanup, travel
costs to receive treatment, moving expenses, and the cost of housekeeping and child
care. And states continue to work with victims and advocates to find new ways to
help victims with more of the costs of recovery.
242. See Pokorak, supra note 20, at 726 (indicating that “victim compensation appears to
victims to be identical to personal injury awards”).
243. Whaley v. Thompson, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1164–65 (D. Or. 1998) (holding, in a rape
prosecution, that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by withholding evidence that
accuser had applied for aid from the Victim’s Assistance Program); State v. Dines, No. 57661,
1990 WL 166452, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1990) (holding, in a rape prosecution, that trial
court did not err in excluding evidence that the victim’s family “was motivated to give false
testimony in hopes of collecting funds from the Victims of Crime Fund”); Hoover v. State, No.
03-05-00641-CR, 2007 WL 619500, at *3 (Tex. App. Feb. 27, 2007) (mem.) (holding, in a rape
prosecution, that the trial court properly barred the accused from impeaching the accuser on the
grounds that she had applied for and received compensation from the Crime Victims’
Compensation Program at the Texas attorney general’s office, because “[t]he proffered
evidence does not show a tendency to lie, and it is only marginally probative on the issue of bias
or motive”).
244. A criminal conviction is not required for a complaint to prevail in a civil suit for rape.
See State v. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d 197, 210 & n.13 (La. 1996) (noting, in a rape and murder
case with a parallel civil claim, that “success in a civil suit does not depend on obtaining a guilty
verdict in a criminal trial,” so the defendant’s attempted impeachment of the accuser concerning
details of a civil suit would be only “marginally relevant”). The probative value of a conviction
is questionable when the defendant is suing third-party defendants such as landlords and hotel
owners for maintaining unsafe premises; the fact that a rape occurred, not the culpability of a
particular rapist, is crucial in such a case. See State v. Langston, 889 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994) (“The relevant issue in the victim’s suit against the hotel was not whether defendant was
the perpetrator of the crime, but whether a crime was committed in the hotel.”).
245. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); N.C. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); OHIO R. EVID. 804(b)(1)
(prohibiting admission of transcribed testimony from prior proceeding unless current opponent,
or predecessor in interest, had opportunity and similar motive to develop testimony in prior
setting). These state rules are merely examples; each federal rule has many state counterparts.
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necessarily admissible in the civil trial, especially if the tort at issue in
the civil trial has different elements from the offense at issue in the
246
criminal prosecution. The prosecutor’s victory may actually limit
recovery in the civil case, because an incarcerated defendant cannot
earn money to pay damages, and the civil jury may be more
sympathetic to a sentenced defendant who has already paid a price in
the criminal justice system. If assisting the prosecution does not
advance the civil suit, there is little reason to presume that the accuser
will shade any criminal testimony because of the parallel civil
247
litigation.
Some third-party litigation is particularly likely to lack probative
248
value as a ground for impeachment of accusers. For example, a suit
alleging that a landlord or hotel owner failed to keep premises secure
does not depend on proof of a particular assailant’s identity, so long
249
as the plaintiff can show that the rape occurred on the premises.
Similarly, third-party plaintiffs’ suits (e.g., a suit by the accuser’s
relative against the alleged perpetrator) have limited probative value
250
in impeaching the accuser unless the accuser is a party to the suit.

See 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5009 (2d ed. supp. 2007) (listing the forty-two states that have
recodified their evidence rules in response to the Federal Rules).
246. See Schlegel, supra note 112, at 137–38 (“[C]ivil cases usually involve more than one
detailed separable issue, and therefore, the criminal judgment might not be clearly applicable to
the issue in the subsequent suit.”). Third-party suits are particularly likely to involve elements
distinct from those at issue in criminal prosecutions.
247. Conceivably a conviction could be helpful in some civil suits, but the point here is to
show the folly of a blanket rule allowing impeachment of every accuser with a parallel civil
claim. The tendency of a criminal conviction to advance a civil claim needs case-by-case
examination, because without this lynchpin, impeachment with evidence of parallel litigation
does not make much sense.
248. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, No. 57236-9-I, 2007 WL 2085333, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. July
23, 2007) (confirming the trial court’s finding that the accuser’s suit against the Seattle Housing
Authority was only “‘very tangentially’ relevant” to the prosecution of the alleged rapist).
249. See Falls v. Brinkman, No. 89-16480, 1990 WL 186813, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 1990)
(affirming the exclusion of the defendant’s cross-examination of the accuser about a possible
third-party suit against the hotel where the sexual assault occurred and observing that the suit
only had “slight, if any, relevance to the sexual assault charges”); Langston, 889 S.W.2d at 98
(holding that, in a prosecution for sexual abuse and related offenses, “evidence about the
[accuser’s] civil action against the hotel was irrelevant to defendant’s conviction for the crime
charged [because t]he relevant issue in the victim’s suit against the hotel was not whether
defendant was the perpetrator of the crime, but whether a crime was committed in the hotel”).
250. Poynor v. State, 962 So. 2d 68, 75–76 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (in a rape prosecution,
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the victim’s family
member’s conversation with an attorney about a possible tort claim was only relevant regarding
the family member’s credibility and not the accuser’s credibility).
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As a general matter, the more attenuated the civil litigation is to the
prosecution, the less likely it will offer probative value as a basis for
impeachment of an accuser in a criminal prosecution. Moreover, civil
litigation that rests on theories of third-party recovery will require
explanation to the jury in the criminal prosecution, and this
explanation could prove time-consuming and distracting.
*

*

*

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the criminal defense
attorneys’ argument for the relevance of civil suits could cut both
ways. Some defense counsel might argue that an accuser’s filing of a
civil suit indicates bias, but defense counsel could just as plausibly
argue that the failure to file a civil suit undermines the accuser’s
251
credibility. After all, the standards of proof are much lower in civil
trials than in criminal trials. Defense counsel could suggest that the
accuser’s reluctance to file a civil claim acknowledges that the
evidence is weak—too weak even for the lower standard of proof in
civil court. The fact that evidence of parallel suits could support
opposite inferences about the credibility of accusers casts further
doubt on the probative value of this evidence.
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is not to suggest that
evidence of accusers’ parallel suits could never be relevant in criminal
prosecutions. Rather, the purpose is to show that this relevance might
be slight in many cases. The crucial question is not the relevance of
the evidence when considered in a vacuum, but rather the relevance
of the evidence in relation to its prejudicial effect. This ratio, not the
absolute amount of probative value, determines whether the evidence
can withstand the balancing test in Rule 403. Accordingly, the
analysis turns to the topic of prejudice.
2. Prejudice Disproportionate to Probative Value. Rule 403
excludes evidence that would result in prejudice, confusion, or waste
of time that would substantially outweigh the probative value of the
252
evidence. In addition to Rule 403, most evidence codes include
other rules that guide judges in evaluating the interrelationship of

251. See, e.g., State v. Sexsmith, 57 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Wash. 1936) (recounting that during the
prosecution, “appellant offered to prove that the witness had consulted different lawyers with
the view of starting a civil action against appellant based upon the transaction which is the
subject-matter of this [criminal case], and that no such suit was ever brought”).
252. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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probative value and prejudice with respect to particular categories of
253
evidence. No such rule exists in either the federal or state evidence
codes identifying the potential harmful effect of evidence relating to
an accuser’s parallel civil litigation. The following discussion lists
possible deleterious effects of admitting this evidence in a criminal
trial.
To begin with, evidence of a parallel rape suit inflames jurors’
prejudice against the accuser. Jurors instinctively distrust accusers in
254
rape cases,
and jurors search for a “reason to doubt the
255
256
allegation.” A civil suit provides that reason. Because of a
psychological phenomenon that might be termed the ulteriority
heuristic, jurors attempt to make sense of perplexing facts by
resorting to a familiar explanation: people lie to advance their hidden
selfish motives, especially greed. Jurors strain to comprehend the
seemingly irrational behavior at issue on the day of the charged
offense, and they find the story easier to assimilate when they
perceive it as a ruse contrived by a rational, deceptive accuser for self257
enrichment. Research indicates that anger is a stronger motivator

253. See infra Part IV.A.
254. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1991, S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 47 (1991) (“41
percent of judges surveyed believed that juries give sexual assault victims less credibility then
[sic] other crime victims.” (citing COLORADO SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS
IN THE COURTS, GENDER & JUSTICE IN THE COLORADO COURTS 91 (1990))); see also Carney,
supra note 143, at 346 (“[S]tudies of jury behavior and attitude reveal poorly disguised hostility
toward rape victims . . . .”).
255. See Long, supra note 221, at 12 (“When a victim alleges a domestic or sexual assault,
the prevalence of myths surrounding domestic and sexual violence causes the public to search
for a reason to doubt the allegation rather than to search for the truth.”); Torrey, supra note 86,
at 1050 (“While cognitive structures allow individuals to learn new information, they tend to
perpetuate themselves by screening out information that is inconsistent with what is already
believed. Cognitive inflexibility is what prosecutors face in trying to convict rapists when jurors
have cognitive structures based on rape myths.”).
256. Jurors are more uncomfortable with civil suits for rape than with civil suits alleging
other nonsexual crimes. See Dickerson, supra note 26 (“Although the public has little difficulty
appreciating an ordinary assault victim’s desire for restitution, some jurors are more suspicious
when a rape victim brings all her legal remedies to bear.”).
257. See Barrett, supra note 73 (“Jurors are suspicious of plaintiffs. Underlying this
suspicion is the bias that the plaintiff has an ulterior motive, usually money, for bringing the
case . . . .”); Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and
Sexual Assault Trials, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437, 439, 461 (2006) (discussing jurors’
susceptibility to a defense strategy portraying the accuser as an “unstable money-grubber” and
further asserting that jurors are prone to regard accusers in rape prosecutions as “gold-digging”
and “hoping to seek damages in a subsequent civil suit, especially if the defendant is wealthy”);
see also Torrey, supra note 86, at 1051 (surveying psychological research to show that jurors feel
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for jurors than sympathy, and accusers often bear the brunt of that
258
anger. Moreover, the cognitive structure of availability bias leads
jurors to favor readily available evidence (details of accusers’ civil
suits) over less available evidence (details concerning the sexual
259
misconduct alleged by the prosecution). Jurors may find it easier to
“try the victim” and focus on the victim’s apparent avarice rather than
260
on the alleged misconduct of the accused. As with evidence of
261
accusers’ prior sexual history, evidence of accusers’ civil lawsuits
becomes such a distraction that it may thwart the prosecution for
reasons unrelated to the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
Evidence of parallel civil litigation can actually prejudice the
defendant as well as the accuser. One problem is that this evidence
262
draws attention to the wealth or poverty of the defendant. Once
jurors hear about a lawsuit, they might assume that the accused has
the wealth to make such a suit worthwhile—an assumption that could
engender prejudice against the accuser among jurors with an
antielitist inclination. A prosecutor may counter the “gold digger”
hypothesis by offering evidence of the defendant’s poverty or the

a need to posit a “just world,” and so they grasp at explanations that do not require them to
ponder human capacity for such depraved crimes as rape).
258. Elizabeth F. Kuniholm, Representing the Victim of Sexual Assault
and Abuse: Special Considerations and Issues, in 2 ATLA ANNUAL CONFERENCE REFERENCE
MATERIALS, supra note 73, at 1889, 1889 (summarizing research on jurors’ cognitive
phenomena that come into play during rape trial).
259. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (suggesting that “people assess the frequency of a class or the
probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to
mind”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973) (“[A] person could estimate . . . the
likelihood of an event . . . by assessing the ease with which the relevant mental operation of
retrieval, construction, or association can be carried out.”); Kuniholm, supra note 258 (“Recent
juror bias research has strongly supported the notion that jurors react to evidence by focusing
on the most available evidence to the exclusion of less available evidence. In other words,
people tend to criticize and judge most harshly that which they are most familiar with.” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
260. See John Q. La Fond & Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Sex Offenders and the Law, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 17 (1998) (discussing defense strategy of “try[ing] the victim” in
rape cases).
261. Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent
and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 158–159 (2002) (indicating that the
exclusion of the accuser’s prior sexual history is necessary to prevent prejudice and ensure truthseeking in rape prosecutions).
262. See, e.g., Harkins v. United States, 810 A.2d 895, 898 (D.C. 2002) (in a prosecution for
sexual abuse, noting that an examination of the accuser about her alleged interest in filing a civil
suit raised the issue that the defendant “might be wealthy”).
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accuser’s wealth. Courts allow this evidence because the
263
impeachment concerning the civil litigation opened the door. Of
course, evidence of the defendant’s poverty can be highly
264
prejudicial. The risk that jurors’ preoccupation with wealth or
poverty will distract them from the particular facts of a case is a
significant one, and it far outweighs the negligible probative value of
265
impeachment concerning parallel suits.
Yet another risk is the inference that the civil claim has merit—
266
especially if the jury learns that the claim has settled. As long as
civil suits are fair game for impeachment, some authority suggests
that the government may put evidence of accusers’ civil settlements in
the record during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, because a party may
generally lead off with impeachment of its own witness to blunt the
267
impact of this evidence. The accused suffers significant prejudice

263. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Renico, No. 04-CV-74268-DT, 2006 WL 3313755, at *9–10
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2006) (reporting that “the prosecutor ask[ed] about [the defendant’s] lack
of income and resources and argued in his closing that the victim was not bringing this rape
allegation to make money by suing” the defendant); People v. McLaughlin, 672 N.W.2d 860, 878
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding, in the same rape prosecution case, that the prosecutor’s
questions about defendant’s poverty was permissible because “it related to defendant’s
argument that the victim falsely accused him” to make money in a civil lawsuit and so the
prosecution reasonably “challenged this argument by eliminating all likely motives to bring a
false rape charge, including the absence of a financial motive to falsely accuse the defendant”).
264. In a criminal prosecution, evidence of the defendant’s poverty is highly prejudicial,
because it poses “a risk that it will cause jurors to view a defendant as a ‘bad man’—a poor
provider, a worthless individual.” People v. Henderson, 289 N.W.2d 376, 381 (1980); see also
Hideaki Sano, Evidence, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 779, 793 (2003) (urging that courts should exclude
evidence of poverty even when defense impeachment raises question about accuser’s motive).
265. Evidence of relative wealth and poverty could cause prejudice to the prosecution as
well as the defense. A defendant might mention civil litigation as a means of signaling to the
jury that the defendant is wealthy and the accuser lacks resources—a fact that could foment
class prejudice in the jury. See State v. Merrick, No. 22885-1-III, 2005 WL 3048027, at *5 (Wash.
Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2005) (holding, in a rape prosecution, that the trial court properly limited
defense questions concerning the prosecution’s witness’s alleged financial desperation because
this questioning might have yielded confusing and prejudicial evidence).
266. See, e.g., State v. Davis, No. E2003-02162-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2378251, at *4 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2004) (noting that, during the cross-examination of the defendant in a rape
case, the prosecution established that “he had lost all of his possessions due to a civil suit
brought by the victim’s parents”).
267. See, e.g., State v. Zack, Nos. 99CA007321, 99CA007270, 2000 WL 763329, at *7–8
(Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2000) (upholding a conviction for sexual abuse even though the
government introduced the fact of the accusers’ civil settlements with the city and concluding
that “the prosecutor examined [the accusers] about their civil settlements . . . in order to reveal
their potential biases regarding having a financial motivation to accuse [the defendant] of
improper conduct”). See generally FED. R. EVID. 607 (allowing any party to impeach the
credibility of a witness); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 211, at 468 (“On direct, the
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when the jury in a criminal case learns of a civil settlement that seems
to confirm the accusers’ account of the facts at issue in the
268
prosecution. Indeed, the general rule allowing evidence of parallel
civil suits bolsters the prosecution when the suits have settled before
269
the criminal trials.
Special concerns arise when the parallel civil litigation includes
claims against third parties. Such third-party litigation might be
prejudicial against the prosecution because it might create the
mistaken impression that the accused has less culpability, as if liability
270
were a zero-sum game.
References to third-party litigation could also prejudice the
accused. For example, many third-party suits allege negligent hiring
of the alleged perpetrator. In such a suit, the plaintiff needs to show
that the employee’s unreliability was evident at the time of the hiring
decision. The plaintiff frequently tries to meet this burden by
introducing evidence of prior convictions of the employee, along with
other evidence of the employee’s past misconduct. The discussion of
such facts in a criminal prosecution would be extremely prejudicial to

proponent may bring out facts his adversary might later explore as indications of bias on the
part of the witness. Otherwise the later attack takes on artificial meaning because it suggests not
only that the witness is biased but that the proponent tried to hide it.”).
268. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, No. 57236-9-I, 2007 WL 2085333, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July
23, 2007) (noting, in a rape prosecution, that the accused actually moved to exclude any
reference to the parallel civil suit that the accuser had settled with the landlord, because
evidence of this suit would cause undue prejudice against the accused); cf. State v. Snyder, 104
N.E.2d 169, 171 (Ohio 1952) (“[T]he record of a judgment in a civil action is not admissible in a
criminal prosecution to establish the facts essential to a conviction.”).
269. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and its state analogs, which generally protect parties
from impeachment with evidence of settlement negotiations, see FED. R. EVID. 408; see also,
e.g., N.C. R. EVID. 408; OHIO R. EVID. 408, would be of no use to the accused in fending off
evidence that the accuser has settled a civil claim involving the same facts that are at issue in the
criminal prosecution. Rule 408 would be unavailing for two reasons. First, Rule 408 only covers
settlement offers and settlement negotiations; it does not extend to consummated settlements.
FED. R. EVID. 408(a). Second, Rule 408 only applies when the proponent of the evidence is
seeking to show the liability of a settling party. FED. R. EVID. 408(b). Thus, the prosecution
could claim that it is offering the evidence to show the bias of a witness, not to show the guilt of
the accused. See, e.g., Zack, 2000 WL 763329, at *7–8 (accepting such an argument by the
prosecution); 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 654 (2007) (“Rules of evidence pertaining to the admissibility
of compromises and offers to compromise, do not require the exclusion of evidence of a
settlement between a witness and a party if such evidence is used to show bias or prejudice
rather than liability.”).
270. See Palermo v. State, 992 S.W.2d 691, 698 (Tex. App. 1999) (noting that, as a general
matter, the accused should not be able to reduce his criminal liability by pointing to the possible
civil liability of third parties).
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271

the defendant —especially when the rules of evidence would
otherwise exclude this information.
Most of the foregoing discussion has focused on the risk that
evidence could lead the jury to favor or disfavor a party. There is
another important risk to consider: the potential to confuse the jury.
272
Confusion is a ground for excluding evidence. There are several
aspects of introduction of evidence of civil litigation could be
confusing for juries in criminal cases. First, civil actions have different
standards of proof, and a party may want to point out this difference
if it serves the party’s interest. The multiplicity of standards could
befuddle juries as they attempt to weigh evidence in the criminal
prosecution. Moreover, parallel civil suits often involve complicated
theories such as strict liability, respondeat superior, comparative
273
fault, and other confusing concepts. The accused may discuss the
doctrines of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion to show the civil
claimant’s bias to favor a guilty verdict. Parties in a criminal
prosecution may also want to address the merits of a parallel civil
claim, because this discussion could shed light on whether the claim is
an opportunistic ploy or a righteous cause. Exploring the merits of the
civil case by interrogating accusers could be very difficult because
274
accusers may not fully understand the theories in the civil case. For
all these reasons, a detailed discussion of civil claims could lead to a
275
confusing minitrial during the criminal trial.
In sum, evidence of parallel civil litigation is a wild card that
could cause significant prejudice and confusion. The evidence could
jeopardize the interests of both the government and the accused.
271. See Kraus v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-000183-MR, 2005 WL 790778, at *5 (Ky.
Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2005) (holding, in the prosecution of an alleged rape by an employee of a taxi
service, that the trial court properly excluded evidence of the accuser’s civil suit against the taxi
service for negligent hiring).
272. See FED. R. EVID. 403. The state analogs to FED. R. EVID. 403 also permitted
exclusion of relevant evidence on the grounds of confusion. E.g., N.C. R. EVID. 403; OHIO R.
EVID. 403.
273. See, e.g., Wilson, 2007 WL 2085333, at *3 (agreeing with the trial court that the
probative value of evidence concerning a third-party civil suit was “exceedingly outweighed by
the risk of confusion of the issues” and was “an incredible waste of time [because] the State
would be entitled to, in essence, litigate the merits” of the civil suit).
274. Child witnesses would have special difficulty with the cross-examination. For an
excellent treatment of the challenges that arise during the cross-examination of accusers in child
abuse cases, see generally Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of Children’s
Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029 (2007).
275. See, e.g., Wilson, 2007 WL 2085333, at *3 (upholding a rape conviction after trial court
excluded a third-party civil suit to avoid retrial of civil claims).
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Although prejudice and confusion do not outweigh probative value in
every case, the imbalance frequently favors exclusion—especially
when one considers that the probative value of this evidence is often
negligible.
3. Hindrance of the Civil Remedial System. In evaluating the
admissibility of evidence, the primary focus is the foreseeable effect
of the evidence on the proceedings at hand. But policymakers also
take account of externalities: the effect of evidentiary rulings on the
world outside of the particular trial in question.
The current rule permitting impeachment based on accusers’ civil
suits may pressure some rape survivors to forego civil litigation.
Survivors who follow the news see that civil claimants face
tremendous embarrassment when they take the stand in criminal
trials. For example, Kobe Bryant’s and Mike Tyson’s accusers
276
endured a firestorm of criticism for their “greedy” motives. This
opprobrium not only causes anguish for the survivors, but it may also
277
reduce the odds for a successful prosecution. An accuser who
believes that filing a civil claim might help a rapist to escape
punishment would understandably feel reluctant to sue. According to
one commentator, “[m]any rape victims . . . conclude that forswearing
any interest in civil damages is the price they must pay to establish
278
their own credibility” as accusers in criminal prosecutions.
It is hard to quantify the extent to which the current
impeachment rules discourage claimants from filing civil suits. The
279
overall rate of civil litigation for rape is increasing. Yet the
proportion of rape survivors who file civil suits is still alarmingly low.
One expert indicated that fewer than 10 percent of rape survivors file
280
civil claims. The reluctance of survivors to sue probably owes to a
wide range of factors, but their vulnerability to impeachment based
281
on civil litigation makes a difference. Indeed, the incompatibility of

276. Appeals Court Grants Tyson Hearing on Legal Point, JET, Jan. 10, 1994 (“Tyson’s
lawyers have claimed that Desiree Washington invented the rape story to get rich off the former
heavyweight champion”); Johnson, supra note 33 (explaining how outcry over civil suit factored
in demise of criminal prosecution).
277. See supra Part III.A.2.
278. Dickerson, supra note 26.
279. See supra Part I.A.
280. Frazier, supra note 47 (quoting the policy director for the National Center for Crime
Victims).
281. Dickerson, supra note 26.
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civil and criminal proceedings is common knowledge throughout the
United States. The whole nation watched as the prosecution of Kobe
282
Bryant fell apart shortly after his accuser filed a civil claim.
Criminal and civil recourse should not be mutually exclusive for
rape survivors. A criminal conviction is important because it
incapacitates the offender, deters future offenses by others, and sends
a message to society condemning sexual misconduct. Yet the civil
system offers important complementary redress. The civil system
extends accountability to parties who are beyond the reach of
criminal prosecution because they lack the requisite mens rea (or,
perhaps, because the prosecution cannot prove their guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt). Civil litigation prompts third-party defendants to
undertake proactive measures such as enhancing the security of
buildings, improving background checks in hiring, strengthening
oversight, and establishing better mechanisms for reporting sexual
predators when they display early warnings of their tendencies.
Arguably, such proactive measures are just as important as any
283
retrospective justice.
4. Deterrence of Victims’ Cooperation with Law Enforcement.
Faced with a Hobson’s choice, rape survivors might favor civil
remedies over criminal trials. After all, the civil justice system allows
victims to take control of litigation, whereas victims are subordinate
to prosecutors in the criminal justice system. The civil system affords
fewer procedural rights to defendants. It offers a different range of
284
remedies, including injunctive relief. Of course, only the criminal
system can incarcerate defendants, but this remedy may be of less
interest to victims of acquaintance rape, who may believe that they
can protect their safety in the future simply by avoiding their
assailants.
As a general matter, victims’ willingness to cooperate with law
enforcement varies inversely with their fear of embarrassment during

282. Johnson, supra note 33.
283. See EPSTEIN & LANGEBAHN, supra note 46, at 74 (“Civil suits have perhaps had their
greatest impact by prompting third parties, such as employers and landlords, to take measures
that will prevent criminal attacks on those to whom they owe a duty of care.”); cf. Manley, supra
note 88, at 204–11 (discussing cases in which third-party civil suits have been utilized to
“adequately compensate[] [a rape victim] for her injuries”).
284. For a list of the advantages that civil litigation offers over criminal prosecution, see
supra Part I.B.
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285

cross-examination. The recognition of this phenomenon led to the
286
passage of the first rape shield laws in the 1970s. There is some
evidence that victims’ fear of testifying has increased since the 1990s.
Data released by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics in June 2005
indicate that victims’ concerns about embarrassment in the criminal
justice system have become a more significant deterrent to the
287
reporting of violence against women.
Victims’ advocates in
particular areas of the country have noticed that an increasing
number of rape victims who seek counseling do not report the rapes
288
to police due to fears about testifying at trial. In particular, the

285. Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence
Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 936–37 (2001) (noting that
a woman’s decision to report sexual violence is influenced by the potential for “embarrassing
questions . . . by defense attorneys in public about a victim’s sexual history”); Thomas R. Baker,
Cross-Examination of Witnesses in College Student Disciplinary Hearings: A New York Case
Rekindles an Old Controversy, 12 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 23, 29–30 (2000) (observing that in college
disciplinary hearings adjudicating allegations of date rape, the victims’ willingness to file
complaints depends on the extent of adversarial examination).
286. 23 ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5382
(2005) (analyzing the policy behind federal rape shield law, and noting the proponents’ concern
that rape victims who feared embarrassment at trial would not seek charges against their
assailants); Christina C. Tilley, A Feminist Repudiation of the Rape Shield Laws, 51 DRAKE L.
REV. 45, 48–55 (2002) (reviewing the legislative history of the federal rape shield law).
287. Among women who declined to report violent crimes committed against them by
intimates (defined as current and former spouses and boyfriends), the percentage citing privacy
concerns has grown since the 1990s. A 1998 report indicated that 15.4 percent of nonreporting
victims cited privacy concerns as the reason for their reluctance to file complaints against their
assailants. A follow-up report in June 2005 indicated that 33.8 percent of nonreporting victims
cited privacy concerns as their reason for not filing complaints against assailants who were
boyfriends or girlfriends; 25.1 percent of nonreporting victims cited privacy concerns as their
reason for not reporting violent crimes committed against them by spouses. Compare
LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE BY
INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS,
AND GIRLFRIENDS 19 (1998) (setting forth data for the years 1992 through 1996), with
MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FAMILY VIOLENCE
STATISTICS, INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 26 (2005) (setting
forth data for the years 1998 through 2002).
288. Elaine D’Aurizio, Kobe Bryant Rape Case Seen Having a Chilling Effect, RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), June 15, 2004, at A1 (faulting the Bryant case for “having a chilling
effect” on the reporting of rape); Maestri & Goad, supra note 1 (noting that in Riverside,
California, there was no decline in the number of rape victims seeking counseling, but the
number of victims willing to press criminal charges did decline because of fears about the ordeal
of trial); CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast Jan. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/sections/i_video/main500251.shtml?id=595566n, (noting that “rape
hotline calls at the University of Northern Colorado, where Bryant’s accuser was a freshman,
dropped 25 percent after the case broke” and suggesting that the drop reflected victims’
unwillingness to report sexual assaults, not a drop in actual assaults).
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vituperation that accusers endure when they file civil suits might lead
many to give up their role as accusers and focus solely on the civil
289
litigation. Criminal prosecutions of rape become more difficult
without the cooperation of the accusers, so accusers’ withdrawals
290
frequently result in dismissals of charges.
Occasionally a trial court hearing a rape prosecution will exclude
evidence of an accuser’s civil suit because “sex-crime victims deserve
special protection” from such impeachment “to encourage other
291
victims to come forward.” Appellate courts may find this goal “wellintentioned,” but will likely reverse the trial court because the rules of
evidence do not presently provide a solid basis for excluding this
292
evidence.
In sum, there are at least four reasons to limit cross-examination
of accusers based on their civil suits. First, this evidence has negligible
relevance. Second, this evidence is highly likely to inflame the jury’s
prejudice against accusers. Third, the impeachment of rape survivors
with evidence of civil suits might lead them to give up civil recourse.
Finally, an accuser who refuses to give up civil remedies might very
well attempt to withdraw from the criminal prosecution of the alleged
assailant.
B. Reasons to Allow Impeachment with Evidence of Civil Claims
Notwithstanding arguments to limit impeachment of accusers
with evidence of their parallel civil suits, there at least two reasons to

289. See Maestri & Goad, supra note 1 (reporting that in Southern California, rape victims
who saw Kobe Bryant’s accuser excoriated for her civil suit would rather file civil claims without
bothering with criminal prosecutions and that although there was no decline in the number of
rape victims seeking counseling, the number of victims willing to press criminal charges did
decline).
290. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 33, at 822–24 (citing a survey indicating an increase in
dismissals of criminal prosecutions alleging violence against women because of heightened
confrontation requirements and accusers’ reluctance to testify); Johnson, supra note 33
(reporting a comment by the prosecutor that the accuser’s reluctance to continue was reason for
dismissal of rape charges against Kobe Bryant).
291. See, e.g., People v. Griffin, 671 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that the trial
court, in a rape prosecution, excluded evidence of the accuser’s parallel civil suit because the
court wanted to minimize the hardship of cross-examination to encourage rape victims to file
criminal complaints).
292. The ‘rape shield law’ has severely restricted impeachment of the victim by use of prior
sexual history (with very carefully denied exceptions). But nothing in that law, or any other
pertinent authority, provides a protective cocoon for alleged sex-crime victims against all other
standard forms of impeachment, including those tending to show bias, hostility or monetary
incentive to fabricate. Id. at 37.
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be wary of an outright ban on such impeachment. First, the accused
has a constitutional right to confront all accusers. Second, the risk of
fraudulent rape accusations, however remote, necessitates that
defense attorneys have some tools to expose deceitful accusers. This
Section discusses each of these concerns in turn.
1. Constitutional Requirement of Confrontation. The Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause gives criminal defendants the
right to confront their accusers. At the core of the confrontation right
293
is the right to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses. The right
to cross-examination serves two purposes. First, it has utilitarian
value in testing the truthfulness of the government’s witnesses and
294
exposing reasons why the jury should doubt their testimony.
Second, and separate from its utilitarian value in a particular case,
cross-examination is important for its own sake: it is a crucial aspect
of fairness, and the court’s willingness to allow cross-examination of
295
the accuser respects the dignity of the accused. Because crossexamination is much more than a device to detect truthfulness, a trial
court generally cannot turn off the right of cross-examination when it
296
seems expedient to do so.
Among the various categories of cross-examination, questioning
that probes bias is particularly important. The Supreme Court has
construed the Confrontation Clause to require cross-examination of
the complaining witnesses for the purpose of “revealing possible
biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives . . . as they may relate directly
297
to issues or personalities in the case at hand.” The Court has
“recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is
a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected
298
right of cross-examination.” The Court has declared that “a criminal

293. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (“Our cases construing the
[Confrontation Clause] hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of crossexamination.”).
294. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (“Cross-examination is the principal means
by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”).
295. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (equating cross-examination with
inalienable rights such as the right to trial by jury and insisting that judges cannot dispense with
the right to cross-examination simply because they think that the evidence in question is
reliable).
296. Id.
297. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.
298. Id.
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defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing
that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate crossexamination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part
299
of the witness.”
Proper proof of bias need not consist solely of illegal or immoral
conduct by the witness. Parents may be biased witnesses in their
child’s trial for reasons of love and loyalty; although perfectly
commendable, these reasons still warrant caution as jurors evaluate
300
the credibility of a parent’s testimony. More germane for present
purposes, when the defendant impeaches the accuser for filing a
lawsuit against the defendant, that lawsuit need not be “wrong” to
301
provide fodder for impeachment. In other words, conduct need not
be blameworthy to be impeachable for bias; the conduct must simply
302
be relevant to bias.
The right to impeach is not absolute, however. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that the accused has no constitutional right to
303
impeach with evidence of scant relevance. The Court has approved
“reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about,
among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
304
marginally relevant.” Moreover, the Court has stressed that “the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,
305
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Lower courts have
recognized the same principle in the specific context of rape
306
prosecutions.

299. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986).
300. William G. Hale, Bias as Affecting Credibility, 1 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1 (1949) (“The
existence of bias does not necessarily imply conscious falsehood.”). For example, the common
membership of the witness and a party in an organization can give provide grounds for bias,
whether or not the organization is engaged in illegal or immoral activities. United States v.
Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52–54 (1984).
301. Thus an answer of “no” to the question that frames this article—“Is it wrong to sue for
rape?”—does not end the inquiry. A rape suit could be well-founded and still provide the basis
for impeachment, at least in theory.
302. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
303. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.
304. Id.
305. Delaware v Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam).
306. See, e.g., Savastano v. Hollis, Nos. 02-CV-3299(JBW), 03-MISC-0066(JBW), 2003 WL
22956949, at *16–17 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2003) (“Trial judges have broad discretion to impose
reasonable limits which means defense counsel are not the sole arbiters of what is necessary
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Rule 412, the federal rape shield statute which has repeatedly
308
309
withstood constitutional review since its amendment in 1994,
310
provides an example of a permissible limit on cross-examination.
The law reflects a judgment that in a rape prosecution, the prejudicial
effect of an accuser’s prior consensual sexual history generally
311
outweighs the probative value of the evidence. The rule rests in part
on policy concerns about reducing the disincentives for reporting
312
rape. The rule does not wall off all inquiry about the accuser’s
sexual history, however. The defendant still may inquire about the
accuser’s sexual history (1) for proof of prior consensual acts
involving the accused and the accuser, (2) for proof that another
person was the source of the biological material or the cause of the
bodily injury at issue in the prosecution, or (3) for any other purpose
313
as required by the Constitution.
Courts and commentators
reviewing the constitutionality of the rape shield law have lauded its
cross-examination.”); McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind. 2001) (declaring, in a sex
abuse prosecution, that the right of cross-examination is subject to “reasonable limitations”);
State v. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d 197, 210 (La. 1996) (noting, in rape prosecution, that,
notwithstanding constitutional requirement of confrontation, the trial court may properly limit
examination of the accuser concerning the details of a parallel civil suit when the evidence at
issue was prejudicial, confusing, and only marginally relevant); Hoover v. State, No. 03-05-0064CR, 2007 WL 619500, at *3 (Tex. App. Feb. 27, 2007) (mem.) (holding, in a rape prosecution,
that the trial court could exclude impeachment evidence offered for bias when “the degree of
possible relevance of the evidence as presented [is] so low as to be within the ‘zone of
reasonable disagreement’”); State v. Wilson, No. 57236-9-I, 2007 WL 2085333, at *2–3 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 23, 2007) (noting that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), “[t]he trial court has discretion to admit or exclude evidence or
limit cross-examination regarding bias where the circumstances only remotely show bias or
where the evidence is vague or merely argumentative or speculative”).
307. FED. R. EVID. 412.
308. See, e.g., United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 157 (5th Cir. 2006) (agreeing with “[o]ther
circuits [that] have held that evidence of prior sex acts of alleged victims of a sexual assault can
be excluded without violating the Sixth Amendment”).
309. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 tit. IV,
§ 40141, 108 Stat 1796, 1918–19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2074 note (2000)).
310. See FED. R. EVID. 412 (generally prohibiting evidence of the alleged victim’s prior
sexual behavior or “sexual predisposition” but admitting this evidence in limited circumstances).
311. See 124 CONG. REC. H11,944 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann), reprinted in FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 66 (West 2007) (“Such evidence quite often serves no real purpose and
only results in embarrassment to the rape victim and unwarranted intrusion into her private
life.”).
312. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note (“By affording victims protection in
most instances, the rule . . . encourages victims of sexual assault to institute and to participate in
legal proceedings against alleged offenders.”).
313. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b) (defining these exceptions to Rule 412’s general prohibition
of sexual history evidence).
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purposes and concluded that its exceptions guarantee against
314
violations of defendants’ constitutional rights.
Courts that scrutinize the constitutionality of limits on crossexamination have shown particular concern about one question: does
the limitation prohibit all cross-examination on a subject, or does it
simply set parameters for cross-examination on that subject? In
August 2007, the en banc Ninth Circuit considered this dichotomy in
determining the appropriate standard of review for limits on
315
defendants’ cross-examinations. The court held that if a trial court
excludes examination into an area of inquiry, the court applies
de novo review. If the trial court limits the scope of an examination
but permits some inquiry into the topic, then the appellate court
316
applies the abuse of discretion standard. The Ninth Circuit relied on
317
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, in which the Supreme Court held that
although trial courts have “wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable
318
limits” on cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause protects the
319
Other courts have
defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine.
followed the Court’s distinction and applied heightened review to
limitations on the defendant’s constitutional opportunity to cross320
examine.

314. For a constitutional analysis of the rape shield laws, see Anderson, supra note 261, at
153–61 (proposing a new rape shield law and arguing that it passes Confrontation Clause
scrutiny), and J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the
Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 589–90 (1980) (arguing that, because rape shield laws
may not exclude evidence for which probativity outweighs prejudice, laws containing absolute
prohibitions on sexual history evidence are unconstitutional). For an interesting proposal to
reform rape shield laws so that they exclude evidence of accusers’ prior prostitution, see Karin
S. Portlock, Note, Status on Trial: The Racial Ramifications of Admitting Prostitution Evidence
Under State Rape Shield Legislation, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1407–08 (2007).
315. United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-7481).
316. Id. at 1101.
317. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
318. Id. at 679.
319. Id. at 678–79.
320. See United States v. Holt, 486 F.3d 997, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing limitations
on cross-examination’s scope for abuse of discretion, but reviewing de novo when
“confrontation is directly implicated”); United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054, 1063 (8th Cir.
2007) (same); United States v. Martínez-Vives, 475 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[W]e first
perform de novo review to determine whether a defendant ‘was afforded a reasonable
opportunity to impeach adverse witnesses’ . . . . Provided that threshold is reached, we then
review the particular limitations only for abuse of discretion.” (quoting United States v.
Callipari, 368 F.3d 22, 36 (1st Cir. 2004))); United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 155–56 (5th Cir.
2006) (reviewing limits on cross-examination for abuse of discretion unless they curtail
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The foregoing constitutional authority guides the formulation of
the policy proposals in this Article. Three lessons are particularly
noteworthy. First, the constitutional protection of cross-examination
321
depends upon the proper ratio of probative value to prejudice.
Second, constitutional jurisprudence can legitimately incorporate
322
policy concerns about protecting accusers from undue harassment.
Third, an unconditional ban on impeachment concerning a particular
subject is less likely to pass constitutional muster than a more
nuanced rule with exceptions for certain categories of permissible
323
impeachment.
Because the Confrontation Clause applies in criminal
prosecutions but not in civil suits, it is important to bear in mind that
the hardship of cross-examination in criminal cases could drive rape
victims to pursue remedies solely in the civil system, where
defendants would have diminished rights to cross-examine witnesses.
Perhaps ironically, a policy proposal that restricts cross-examination
somewhat in the criminal system may in the long run protect
confrontation rights by avoiding the wholesale diversion of
complainants from the criminal justice system to the civil system. To
put it simply, the criminal trial is not the only game in town. Rape
survivors will not play that game unless the rules are fair to the
accuser as well as the accused.
2. Need to Expose Fraudulent Accusations. It is impossible to
quantify the incidence of fraudulent rape accusations. Some
commentators maintain that accusers in rape prosecutions are no
more likely to trump up charges than are accusers in other categories
324
of prosecutions. One expert has indicated that the percentage of

confrontation, in which case they are reviewed de novo); see also United States v. Crockett, 435
F.3d 1305, 1311 (10th Cir. 2006) (laying out similarly dichotomous standards of review, but
ruling that the defendant had not preserved the issue for appeal).
321. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 352 (“Our criminal justice system’s exclusionary and
relevance rules demonstrate that ‘[i]t is beyond dispute that a criminal defendant has no
constitutional right to present irrelevant, prejudicial evidence in his or her behalf.’” (quoting
Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the
Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 806 (1986))).
322. See supra notes 303–06 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 315–20 and accompanying text.
324. Professor Susan Estrich of the University of Southern California Gould School of Law,
a rape victim herself, has little patience for the myth that women routinely make up accusations
of rape. “Do women lie about rape? Occasionally, but no study has ever found that women lie
about rape any more often than men lie about other crimes. Why would they, given the stigma
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deliberately false rape accusations may be approximately 2 percent of
325
the total accusations. Yet the growing damage awards may create
temptations for some claimants to falsify charges in the hope of
negotiating a lucrative settlement.
The rules governing admissibility of impeachment evidence
concerning accusers’ civil suits should never become so restrictive
that they prevent defendants from ferreting out fraudulent
accusations. A few recent stories give pause to reformers who would
assume that all rape accusations are reliable.
In 2007, Michael Flatley, the Irish dancer who founded
Riverdance, won a multimillion dollar tort judgment against a woman
326
who had sued him for rape. The accuser spent a night with Flatley in
a hotel room; the following morning, in the presence of a witness, she
327
appeared “relaxed and happy.” Her lawyer served Flatley with a
settlement demand a few months after the encounter in the hotel
328
room. The lawyer threatened that the woman would accuse Flatley
329
of rape unless Flatley paid for her silence.
330
Also in 2007, a police officer in Texas faced a charge of rape.
The prosecution withheld evidence from the defendant indicating that
the accuser had boasted to others before the trial that the accuser was
“a good liar” and was “going to lie through my teeth . . . to get a lot
331
money.” The court concluded that the withholding of this evidence
amounted to a Brady violation, necessitating a new trial for the
332
defendant.

that is still attached to victims, and the humiliation involved in pursuing a complaint?” Susan
Estrich, Why Would Accuser in Duke Rape Case Lie?, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 23, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,192763,00.html.
325. Torrey, supra note 86, at 1028 (“In fact, there is no empirical data to prove that there
are more false charges of rape than of any other violent crime. Estimates indicate that only 2
percent of all rape reports prove to be false, a rate comparable to the false report rate for other
crimes.”).
326. Debra Cassens Weiss, Michael Flatley Awarded $11M for False Rape Accusation,
A.B.A. J. – L. NEWS NOW, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.abajournal.com/news/michael_flatley_
awarded_11m_for_false_rape_accusation.
327. Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 6 (Cal. 2006).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 7–9.
330. United States v. Gutierrez, No. SA-05-CR-639-XR, 2007 WL 3026609, at *1 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 16, 2007).
331. Id. at *2 (omission in original).
332. Id. at *9.
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The risk of fraudulent rape accusations—albeit a remote one—
warrants some caution in the formulation of an evidentiary rule
governing the admissibility of impeachment concerning the accusers’
parallel civil suits. Courts should admit such evidence when the
defendant can make a credible threshold showing of a scheme or
artifice by the accuser (e.g., past filing of fraudulent claims or
comments to friends about fraudulent intent in the present case). On
the other hand, without the slightest indication of a fraudulent
scheme, the defense should not be able to impeach with evidence of
parallel civil suits.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS
A comprehensive approach to the problems addressed in this
Article requires two categories of reforms. First, it is necessary to
revise the evidence rules to ensure that courts do not admit unduly
333
prejudicial evidence about accusers’ parallel civil suits. Second, a
number of ancillary reforms would help to minimize the overall
334
friction between the civil and criminal justice systems.
A. Amendment of Evidence Codes
Federal and state evidence codes currently include many
provisions that limit the admissibility of impeachment evidence.
These rules address several categories of evidence: (1) evidence of
335
(2) evidence of prior unconvicted conduct
prior convictions,
336
337
indicating untruthfulness, (3) evidence of religious beliefs, (4)
338
evidence of prior inconsistent statements, (5) evidence of settlement
339
340
offers and negotiations, (6) evidence of prior sexual history, and
341
(7) evidence of offers to pay medical bills. Each of these categories
333. See infra Part IV.A.
334. See infra Part IV.B.
335. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 609; N.C. R. EVID. 609; OHIO R. EVID. 609. These state rules are
merely examples; each federal rule has many state counterparts. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 245, § 5009.
336. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 608; N.C. R. EVID. 608; OHIO R. EVID. 608.
337. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 610; N.C. R. EVID. 610; OHIO R. EVID. 610.
338. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 613; N.C. R. EVID. 613; OHIO R. EVID. 613.
339. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 408; FED. R. EVID. 410; N.C. R. EVID. 408; N.C. R. EVID. 410;
OHIO R. EVID. 408 (civil); OHIO R. EVID. 410 (criminal).
340. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 412; N.C. R. EVID. 412; TENN. R. EVID. 412. The Ohio Evidence
Rules do not include a counterpart to Federal Rule 412.
341. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 409; N.C. R. EVID. 409; OHIO R. EVID. 409.
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of evidence poses a special risk that prejudice might exceed probative
value or that admission of the evidence might discourage socially
useful conduct out of court.
Evidence of an accuser’s civil suit is similar to these categories of
evidence. The great risk of prejudice, the sometimes dubious
probative value, and the need to incentivize socially useful conduct—
all these considerations militate in favor of establishing a new
evidence rule for impeachment of an accuser based on civil claims.
Such a rule would promote greater uniformity in court rulings,
enhance the predictability of outcomes, and help to promote a
complementary relationship between criminal and civil litigation in
rape cases.
1. Specific Rule Governing Impeachment with Parallel Civil
Claims. Appendix A sets forth a proposed rule of evidence that
would govern impeachment of accusers with evidence of their parallel
civil litigation. Rather than admitting such evidence automatically or
excluding it altogether, the new rule would rely on a balancing test to
sort admissible from inadmissible evidence. The rule would require
that the proponent of the evidence must show that probative value
exceeds prejudicial effect—a balancing test that is stricter than the
342
default test under Rule 403, but less exacting than some tests used
343
elsewhere in the impeachment rules. The proponent would need to
344
offer specific facts and circumstances supporting admissibility.
The new rule occasionally would allow impeachment with
reference to the fact of civil litigation, but the rule would not allow
the impeaching attorney to refer to the amount of damages sought in
the civil suit. This restriction is a per se judgment that the prejudicial
effect of admitting the plaintiff’s prayer for damages would far exceed
the probative value of this evidence. Some trial courts have allowed
342. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and its state counterparts require the exclusion of
evidence when the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of
prejudice, confusion of the jury, or waste of time. FED. R. EVID. 403; e.g., N.C. R. EVID. 403,
OHIO R. EVID. 403. In other words, if the deleterious and beneficial aspects of the evidence are
close to equipoise, Rule 403 would not bar admission.
343. Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b) and its state counterparts require parties impeaching
a witness with a conviction more than ten years old to show that the probative value of the
conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. FED. R. EVID. 609(b); e.g., N.C. R.
EVID. 609(b), OHIO R. EVID. 609(b). Federal Rule 703 imposes a similar requirement to
introduce facts and data underlying an expert opinion. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (admitting the
evidence if its probativity substantially outweighs its prejudice).
344. For a nonexhaustive list of acceptable facts, see infra Part IV.A.2.
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defense counsel to mention the actual dollar figure sought by the
345
plaintiff, but this evidence lacks much probative value beyond the
346
mere fact of civil litigation. Plaintiffs often exaggerate damages in
347
complaints just to be cautious, and the dollar figures in the
348
complaints are not evidence. These dollar figures—often in the
millions—could be highly inflammatory if made known to juries in
349
criminal prosecutions.
The proposed rule would also prohibit the admission of
pleadings and other paperwork from the accuser’s civil action. These
documents, filled with legalese, would offer little probative value
350
beyond that which the descriptions of the litigation could convey.

345. E.g., State v. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d 197, 210 (La. 1996) (indicating that, in a rape and
murder prosecution, the trial court admitted evidence that the victim’s father was seeking $1.6
million in civil damages); State v. Neese, No. M2005-00752-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3831387, at
*4–5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2006) (noting that the defendant, in a rape prosecution,
introduced evidence that the alleged victim’s family had filed a lawsuit seeking $2 million); State
v. Nelson, No. 31414-2-II, 2005 WL 2363803, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2005) (recounting
that, in a prison rape prosecution, the trial court admitted evidence of the accuser’s $5 million
claim against the county).
346. As one court noted, “evidence of the dollar amount of damages the victim was seeking
had little probative value. It is the existence of the pending lawsuit, not the amount of damages,
that is material. The victim’s motive to lie did not increase in direct proportion to the amount of
damages sought.” People v. Shiu, No. F035213, 2001 WL 1571464, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 10,
2001); see also Koo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 95, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding, in a rape
prosecution, that the amount of damages sought in the accuser’s parallel civil suit was “unlikely
to affect the jury’s verdict”).
347. See, e.g., Koo, 640 N.E.2d at 102–03 (holding, in a rape prosecution, that the trial court
properly excluded the amount of damages because “the prayer for damages is frequently
exaggerated”).
348. See, e.g., Merzbacher v. State, 697 A.2d 432, 444 (Md. 1997) (“[F]igures contained in ad
damnum clauses often mean very little.”).
349. See, e.g., Shiu, 2001 WL 1571464, at *13 (upholding the trial court’s decision to allow
impeachment of the accuser regarding the fact of a parallel civil suit but not the amount of
damages requested, $2.1 million, because of the figure’s potentially inflammatory nature);
Merzbacher, 697 A.2d at 443–44 (affirming the defendant’s conviction for sex abuse when the
trial court allowed some cross-examination about the accuser’s civil claim but excluded the
precise dollar figure in the complaint’s ad damnum clause as too prejudicial).
350. See Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d at 210 (holding, in a prosecution for rape and murder, that
the trial court properly excluded the details of the parallel civil suit); Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d
864, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (upholding the defendant’s conviction after the trial court
allowed defense counsel to question the accuser about a parallel civil suit but did not allow that
suit’s pleadings to be introduced); Gallardo v. State, No. 01-95-01306-CR, 1998 WL 767633, at
*3 (Tex. App. Nov. 3, 1998) (holding, in a rape prosecution, that the trial court may properly
“prohibit questions which delve into the intricate details of a civil suit”); see also Hoover v.
State, No. 03-05-00641-CR, 2007 WL 619500, at *4 (Tex. App. Feb. 27, 2007) (mem.) (finding no
error when the trial court admitted testimony concerning the alleged victim’s financial interest
in the rape prosecution but excluded paperwork relating to her claim).
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Moreover, the pleadings could confuse the jury. Because of the
352
psychological phenomenon known as “availability bias,” there is a
risk that jurors would emphasize the pleadings heavily in their
deliberations because the pleadings would be readily accessible in the
jury room, while jurors would lack transcripts or other paperwork
353
memorializing other evidence they heard in the trial. The pleadings
in the civil proceeding are hearsay when offered for their truth in the
354
criminal prosecution; they are not admissions by a party-opponent
355
because the accuser is not a party to the criminal proceeding.
The proposed rule carves out three exceptions that allow the
admission of evidence concerning the accuser’s civil claims. First, this
evidence is admissible when offered to show that the witness has
356
made prior inconsistent statements in the civil case. Second, the
evidence is admissible if the government is prosecuting the witness for
an offense relating to abuse of the judicial process (e.g., for making a
357
false accusation to extort money from the defendant). Third, as in
the case of the rape shield law, the evidence is admissible if exclusion
358
would violate the constitutional rights of the accused.

351. See Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d at 210 (noting that introducing the details of a parallel civil
suit into a prosecution for rape and murder could have “confused the jury and wasted the
court’s time”).
352. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
353. This very concern is the reason why other evidence rules generally exclude certain
documents used in the examination of witnesses. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 612 (preventing the
proponent from entering into evidence a document used under the present recollection
refreshed rule, although the opponent may do so); FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (same for a document
used under the past recorded recollection rule); FED. R. EVID. 803(18) (allowing a learned
treatise to be read the jury but not admitted into evidence).
354. See FED. R. EVID. 801. If offered to reveal the accuser’s inconsistent statements rather
than for the truth of the matters asserted, the pleading would not be hearsay. See FED. R. EVID.
801(c) & (d). The proposed rule would allow the use of pleadings for this purpose. See infra
Appendix A: Proposed Rule 416(b)(1).
355. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
356. See infra Appendix A: Proposed Rule 416(b)(1); see also State v. Strich, 915 A.2d 891,
903 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (holding implicitly that an accused should be able to cross-examine
his accuser concerning her statements in civil litigation if they are inconsistent with her
statements in prosecution), cert. denied, 920 A.2d 310 (Conn. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 225
(2007).
357. See infra Appendix A: Proposed Rule 416(b)(2); cf. United States v. Reed, 715 F.2d
870, 872 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding an extortion conviction when the alleged rape victim had
tried to extort money from the accused in exchange for dropping the criminal complaint).
358. See infra Appendix A: Proposed Rule 416(b)(3); see also FED. R. EVID. 412 (containing
the same exception).
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The new rule includes procedural requirements that reduce the
risk of surprise and provide a fair opportunity for all sides to
359
challenge the admissibility of the evidence. The rule requires the
proponent of the evidence to provide notice two weeks before trial or
at a later time for good cause shown. The rule calls for an in camera
hearing so that the parties can raise their concerns about the
admissibility of the evidence outside the presence of the jury.
The new rule would very likely pass muster under the
Confrontation Clause. This rule is certainly less restrictive than the
rape shield law because it sets forth a balancing test in lieu of the
360
blanket exclusion in the rape shield law. The new rule does not put
the entire topic of civil suits off limits for discussion, which would
trigger the highest level of review under the Confrontation Clause;
rather, it sets parameters for the permissible scope of discussion on
361
this topic. In any event, the new rule borrows language from the
rape shield law that relaxes the rule to the extent necessary to meet
362
constitutional requirements, so it would survive a facial challenge.
2. Commentary Guiding the Interpretation of the New Rule. The
Advisory Committee’s notes are an important source of authority for
judges interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence. These notes do
not have the same force as the rules themselves, but the Supreme
Court and a number of federal courts have recognized that the notes
363
364
are “instructive” and “of weight.” It is particularly important for
the notes to guide judges in their application of the evidentiary rules

359. See infra Appendix A: Proposed Rule 416(c). For analogous requirements, see FED. R.
EVID. 412 (requiring fourteen days’ notice of intent to use specific evidence of the accuser’s
prior sexual history), FED. R. EVID. 413 (requiring fifteen days’ notice of intent to use specific
evidence of prior sexual assaults committed by the accused), and FED. R. EVID. 414 (requiring
fifteen days’ notice of intent to use specific evidence of prior child molestation committed by the
accused).
360. Federal Rule 412 flatly prohibits evidence of the accuser’s sexual history that falls
outside of the exceptions set forth in subsection (b). See FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
361. See supra Part III.B.
362. See Anderson, supra note 261, at 153–61 (arguing that her proposed New Rape Shield
Law, which has no catch-all constitutional exception, is constitutional).
363. Moody Nat’l Bank v. GE Life & Annuity Assurance Co., 383 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir.
2004).
364. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946)).
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365

governing rape cases, lest judges resort to the same instinctive
366
biases that the rules seek to correct.
Every jurisdiction that adopts the new rule proposed in this
Article should include application notes that identify particular
considerations relevant to the balancing test for evidence of parallel
civil suits. The following facts militate in favor of allowing this
impeachment: (1) evidence that the accuser contacted a civil attorney
367
before contacting law enforcement authorities, (2) evidence of a
significant time lapse between the alleged offense and the filing of a
368
criminal complaint, (3) evidence that the accuser delayed filing a
criminal complaint until learning that the accused had significant
369
assets or was otherwise vulnerable to a civil suit, (4) evidence that
the accuser sought compensation from the accused before filing the
370
(5) evidence that the accuser took an
criminal complaint,
371
inconsistent position on a material fact in the parallel civil litigation,
365. See, e.g., Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., 171 F.R.D. 179,
181 (D. Md. 1997) (reviewing the Advisory Committee’s note in interpreting FED. R. EVID. 412,
the rape shield law); State v. MacRae, 677 A.2d 698, 703 (N.H. 1996) (noting that a defendant,
in a sexual assault prosecution, cross-examined the accuser about contacting a private attorney
before law enforcement authorities).
366. See Aiken, supra note 147, at 585 (noting the irony that the interpretation of
discretionary elements in civil rape shield law might possibly be influenced by “the cultural
preconceptions and biases that motivate the rule”).
367. E.g., State v. Davis, No. E2003-02162-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2378251, at *4 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2004) (describing a case in which, during the rape prosecution, the victim’s
family admitted that they had contacted a civil lawyer before meeting with the police).
368. E.g., People v. McFarley, 818 N.Y.S.2d 379, 380 (App. Div. 2006) (mem.) (explaining
that the defendant was allowed to “explore his theory that the victim and her mother had a
profit motive in accusing defendant of rape five months after the alleged rape occurred”). A
delay in reporting could be due to a number of circumstances, many of which are completely
understandable.
369. E.g., Maslin v. State, 723 A.2d 490, 491 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (holding that when
the accuser alleged she suffered abuse as a college student, then waited twenty years to file
criminal charges, after alleged assailant was “enjoying professional and political success,” the
trial court’s exclusion of impeachment evidence about accuser’s civil suit was reversible error
under these suspicious circumstances).
370. E.g., People v. Mink, 699 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 (App. Div. 1999) (reversing conviction for
sexual abuse because the trial court excluded proffered evidence that “after the incident, and
before contacting the police, the victim told [her boyfriend] that she was looking for financial
compensation from defendant and wanted his help in getting the money”).
371. See, e.g., State v. Strich, 915 A.2d 891, 903 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (holding, when the
complainant attributed her injuries to different causes in the civil and criminal cases, that the
accused should be able to impeach on this basis if he shows that the inconsistency is real and not
speculative), cert. denied, 920 A.2d 310 (Conn. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 225 (2007); cf.
Goode v. State, No. W2004-01577-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 2759740 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25,
2005) (finding that counsel performed ineffectively by failing to impeach the victim with
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and (6) evidence that the accuser made out-of-court statements
372
revealing an intent to defraud the court or the accused. The
probative value of the impeachment is generally proportionate to the
importance of the impeached witness in the government’s overall
373
proof. This list of relevant considerations is not exhaustive, and
none of these facts is separately dispositive, but each fact has at least
some bearing on the admissibility of impeachment concerning
accusers’ civil claims.
The application notes should indicate that certain prosecutorial
tactics open the door to the admission of evidence concerning an
accuser’s parallel civil litigation. For example, if the prosecutor
affirmatively represents that the accuser has nothing to gain in filing
374
charges, then the prosecution puts the civil suit in issue. Even
without an affirmative representation about the accuser’s motive, if
the prosecutor simply asks the jury to speculate what the accuser’s
motives could be, this tactic could warrant cross-examination of the
375
accuser about any parallel civil litigation.

evidence of her inconsistent statements in a parallel proceeding, though the error was harmless);
State v. Yarbrough, 596 So. 2d 311, 312 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (finding harmless error when the
trial court denied opportunity for impeachment of accuser based on her inconsistent statements
in civil deposition).
372. E.g., McFarley, 818 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (finding, in a rape prosecution, reversible error
when the trial court prevented the accused from inquiring about the accuser’s statement before
the alleged rape indicating that the accuser might want to frame an innocent person).
373. Compare People v. Griffin, 671 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (App. Div. 1998) (reversing a rape
prosecution when the trial court prohibited impeachment evidence concerning the accuser’s
civil suit because “[it] was a one-witness case, where the credibility of the two people involved
was the paramount issue for the jury to resolve”), with Poynor v. State, 962 So. 2d 68, 75 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the fact that a rape victim’s family member spoke with an attorney
about a possible tort claim was only relevant for in impeaching the family member’s credibility).
374. See People v. Stein, 781 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (App. Div. 2004) (opining that the
government’s failure to disclose that accusers had filed tort claim notices was especially
egregious because prosecutor told jury “there was no evidence that the complainants were
bringing civil lawsuits as a result of the defendant’s conduct”); Garcias v. State, No. 01-95-00177CR, 1996 WL 155341, at *2 (Tex. App. Apr. 4, 1996) (holding that, after the prosecutor in a
sexual assault case moved to exclude evidence concerning the accuser’s civil suit, the prosecutor
should not have argued in summation that “[complainant] and her family have never sued the
apartment complex and it’s been almost two years”).
375. For example, in State v. Whyde, 632 P.2d 913 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981), the court reversed
a rape conviction when, after the trial court excluded evidence of the victim’s parallel suit, the
prosecutor argued to the jury: “I think you have a right to ask yourself what reasonable motive
would there be on her part to fabricate an incident of that nature? . . . What reason is there?” Id.
at 915; see also People v. Wallert, 469 N.Y.S.2d 722, 724–25 (App. Div. 1983) (reversing
exclusion of an impeachment concerning the accuser’s civil suit because the prosecution argued
to the jury that the accuser had no ulterior motive for bringing the rape complaint).
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B. Ancillary Reforms
Section A suggests reforms in evidence codes that would help to
reduce prejudice against accusers who bring civil suits. Evidence rules
alone are not sufficient to address the problem, however. This Section
recommends four additional reforms that would reduce the friction
between parallel civil and criminal proceedings: (1) drafting pattern
jury instructions, (2) enlarging limitations periods for filing civil
claims while criminal prosecutions are pending, (3) extending rape
shield laws to cover civil cases, and (4) developing new protocols for
police officers.
1. Pattern Jury Instructions. After admitting evidence about
accusers’ civil suits, judges should provide guidance to jurors about
how to weigh this evidence. Although the judge should not invade the
province of the jury, the judge may identify general considerations for
the jury to ponder in evaluating credibility. Many jurisdictions
currently use pattern instructions to help the jury assess credibility of
376
377
witnesses such as informants, accomplices, witnesses with prior
378
379
criminal history, witnesses who use addictive drugs, witnesses with
380
381
mental disabilities, witnesses who make inconsistent statements,
382
witnesses who invoke privileges, and government witnesses who
383
cooperate pursuant to plea agreements. The advantages of pattern

376. Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the First Circuit § 2.07,
available at http://www.med.uscourts.gov/practices/crpji.97nov.pdf.
377. E.g.,
Connecticut
Criminal
Jury
Instructions
§
2.5-2,
available
at
http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.5-2.htm.
378. E.g., Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the First Circuit §
2.03, available at http://www.med.uscourts.gov/practices/crpji.97nov.pdf; New York Criminal
Jury Instructions, Credibility of Witnesses, available at http://www.nycourts.gov/cji/1General/CJI2d.Credibility.pdf.
379. E.g., Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions § 1.16, http://www.lb5.uscourts.
gov/juryinstructions/crim2001.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
380. E.g.,
California
Criminal
Jury
Instructions
§
331,
available
at
http://www2.courtinfo.ca.gov/crimjuryinst/documents/crimjuryinst-draft.pdf.
381. E.g., Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 6.1, available at
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/jury/crimjury.pdf;
New
York
Criminal
Jury
Instructions, Credibility of Witnesses, supra note 378.
382. E.g., Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the First Circuit,
supra note 378, § 2.12; California Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 380, § 320.
383. E.g., Pattern Criminal Federal Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit § 3.13, available
at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pjury.pdf.
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instructions are manifold: they are uniform, predictable, and likely to
withstand appellate review.
In the particular context of rape prosecutions, pattern
instructions regarding testimony by accusers with parallel civil suits
would be very useful. Parties in these cases have sought widely
divergent instructions. Some have asked courts for an instruction that
384
civil claimants always lack credibility as accusers, while others have
385
sought an instruction that civil suits are completely innocuous.
Courts should steer clear of these extremes because a per se rule of
386
credibility would usurp juries’ factfinding role. An instruction that
emphasizes the jury’s ultimate authority as factfinder, while
highlighting considerations relevant to the assessment of evidence
regarding civil suits, would bring clarity to an area in which jurors
387
might otherwise be prone to misconceptions.
A model for appropriate jury instructions appears in Appendix B
of this Article. The proposed instruction stresses the jury’s primacy as
the arbiter of credibility. The instruction explains that the jury should
only consider evidence of the parallel suit insofar as it affects the
388
credibility of a witness. The instruction cautions the jury against
389
inferring the defendant’s guilt from the civil litigation. It indicates
that the plaintiff has a right to file a civil suit and that the civil suit
need not await the conclusion of the criminal prosecution, but the
384. See, e.g., People v. Pereda, 607 N.Y.S.2d 98, 100 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that, in a
rape prosecution in which the accusers had filed parallel civil claims by accusers, the trial court
“appropriately denied the defendant’s request to charge the jury that the complainants were
interested as a matter of law”).
385. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 685 A.2d 1234, 1235 (N.H. 1996) (ruling, in a rape prosecution,
that, the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that the accuser had “every right” to bring a
lawsuit against the accused, that lawsuits were “not unusual,” and that filing the civil suit
definitely did not affect the accuser’s credibility).
386. Id. (holding that the trial court should not have instructed the jury that “the
complainant’s pending civil suit had no bearing on her credibility as a witness in the criminal
trial as a matter of law”); Pereda, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 100 (holding that trial courts may not instruct
juror that civil claimants in rape prosecutions are biased “as a matter of law”).
387. E.g., Savastano v. Hollis, Nos. 02-CV-3299 (JBW), 03-MISC-0066 (JBW), 2003 WL
22956949, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2003) (holding, in a rape prosecution, that, the trial court
did not err in instructing the jury that “the law encourages civil lawsuits” and “the fact of a civil
lawsuit alone does not make a criminal complainant more or less credible”).
388. Cf. Akin v. State, 698 So. 2d 228, 237 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (upholding the trial
court’s instruction that the jury “may consider [the parallel suit], and only consider it insofar as
it may affect a particular witness’s testimony”).
389. Torrey, supra note 86, at 1045. Until 1975, this language was mandatory in jury
instructions for all rape trials in California. Id. at 1045 n.157 (collecting other examples of jury
instructions reinforcing jurors’ instinctive prejudice in rape prosecutions).

1634

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1557

instruction does foreclose any adverse inference from the civil suit.
This instruction might require modification in some cases, but it
provides a good starting point.
Historically, jury instructions in rape prosecutions have served to
390
reinforce myths about accusers’ credibility.
For example, a
mandatory jury instruction in California virtually insisted upon
incredulity: “The law requires that you examine the testimony of the
391
female person named in the information with caution.” The Model
Penal Code also advised that judges give a jury instruction urging
392
ginger treatment of an alleged rape victim’s testimony. Because
psychologists and legal experts have identified the susceptibility of
393
jurors to prejudice against accusers in rape cases, it is important for
jury instructions to correct, rather than to compound, jurors’ natural
biases to disfavor accusers. A pattern jury instruction that guides
jurors who hear evidence of an accuser’s parallel civil litigation would
help ensure impartial consideration of the evidence in rape
prosecutions.
2. Tolling Provisions for Civil Statutes of Limitation. Any effort
to improve the compatibility of civil and criminal systems in rape
cases must take account of the constraints imposed by civil statutes of
394
limitations. A significant number of statutes impose one-year or
395
two-year deadlines for the filing of civil claims alleging assault or

390. Id. at 1045.
391. Id. at 1045. Until 1975, this language was mandatory in jury instructions for all rape
trials in California. Id. at 1045 n.157.
392. “In any prosecution before a jury for a [sex offense], the jury shall be instructed to
evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the
emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to
alleged activities carried out in private.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1962).
393. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
394. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-104 (2007); COL. REV. STAT. § 13-80-103 (2007); D.C. CODE §
12-301 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-514 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(1)(a) (West
2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (1994); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-105
(LexisNexis 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.111 (West
2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (2000); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105 (2007).
395. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 12-542 (2003); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1 (West 2006);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8119 (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 657-7 (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-219 (2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202
(West 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-11-2-4 (LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West
2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(2) (West
2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07 (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 516.140 (West 2007); MONT.
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battery. Many states have extended the limitations period for civil
396
claims alleging sexual abuse of a child, but claims alleging assaults
against adults are usually subject to the one- or two-year limitations
periods. Moreover, irrespective of the particular tort alleged in the
lawsuit, the limitations period for suits seeking punitive damages is
397
generally one year.
The short timetable for the filing of civil claims exacerbates the
conflicts between the civil and criminal justice systems. Prosecutors
sometimes pressure rape survivors to postpone the filing of civil
398
claims. Prosecutors occasionally dismiss charges when accusers file
399
civil claims before the prosecution goes to trial. It appears that
many prosecutors believe criminal and civil cases cannot coexist, at
least at the same time.

CODE ANN. § 27-2-204(3) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.190 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (1997) ; OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110
(2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-15 (2006);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243
(2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.100 (West 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-12
(LexisNexis 2006) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.57 (West 2001).
396. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (2006); ALA. CODE § 6-2-8 (LexisNexis 2005); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-56-104 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1380-103.7 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577(d) (West 2000); D.C. CODE § 12-302 (2001);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8145 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-3-33.1 (2007); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West
2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.249 (West 2006); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-c (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-117 (LexisNexis
2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4C (LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.15 (West
2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.046 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (2007); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 508-4-g (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61B-1 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. §
37-1-30 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.215 (LexisNexis 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 152(5) (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.111 (2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95
(West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5533 (West 2007); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-555 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-25
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-106 (2000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001
(Vernon 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.1 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.12, § 522 (2002);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.587 (West 2001); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105 (2007).
397. E.g., Sebok, supra note 82 (noting that Colorado’s limitations period for lawsuits
alleging sexual assault is two years but the limitations period for lawsuits alleging punitive
damages is only one year).
398. E.g., Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (recounting that a
prosecutor dissuaded a rape complainant’s civil attorney from filing tort claims until end of
criminal trial); see also State v. Ahmed, No. 84220, 2005 WL 1406282, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 16, 2005) (refusing to reverse the defendant’s rape conviction, although the prosecutor
pressured the accuser to drop her civil claim against defendant).
399. See supra note 137.
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Even without pressure from prosecutors, survivors may feel
uncomfortable proceeding with civil claims while the prosecution is
400
pending. Survivors may feel that the burden of simultaneous civil
and criminal proceedings would be too overwhelming. They may
worry about their vulnerability to impeachment or discovery if the
two actions proceed at once. Survivors may not even know until the
end of the criminal trial whether they want to file civil claims: they
may want to see what the evidence shows during the criminal trial, or
they may want to see what amount of restitution the court orders.
Although a number of rape survivors may find simultaneous civil and
401
criminal proceedings to be advantageous,
others may prefer
successive proceedings.
The law should permit survivors to make this decision. All states
should adopt tolling provisions to allow the filing of claims for sexual
assault (and perhaps other categories of claims) within one year of
the defendant’s conviction or release from incarceration, whichever is
402
later. A few states have adopted such tolling provisions already.
These provisions do not conflict with the primary rationales for
statutes of limitation—repose for defendants and preservation of the
evidence—because the pending prosecution ensures that all parties
are aware of the controversy and are vigilant to retain evidence.
Tolling provisions for are necessary to avoid a windfall for defendants
when timing constraints lead to the abandonment of either criminal
charges or civil claims.
3. Protocols for Police Agencies. Police agencies should adopt
new protocols requiring officers to apprise rape survivors of their
right to seek civil redress. Officers should read a standard form
indicating the procedures and time constraints for bringing civil suits.
They should explain that victims might be able to sue not only the
perpetrators but also third parties who bear some responsibility for
the assaults. Perhaps the standard form could include a brief
description of the remedies available in civil law and a comparison of
civil and criminal recourse. Hopefully the statement that relays this

400. See Bublick, supra note 1, at 70 (arguing that “[s]tatutes [o]f limitation have been a
barrier to some victim suits,” because the statutes impose short windows for intentional torts).
401. See supra Part I.B.
402. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-511 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577(e) (West
2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-248(1) (2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-214.1 (West 2005);
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213-b (McKinney 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-228(k) (2004).
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information could be short enough for officers to memorize, just as
403
they have memorized Miranda warnings.
If police notified rape survivors of their right to sue, a higher
proportion of survivors would consider this option. The efficacy of
imparting information to rape survivors through police is evident in a
number of examples. When police began advising survivors about the
availability of rape crisis centers, the number of survivors using these
404
services grew. When police began notifying survivors about the
value of counseling and therapy, the use of these resources increased
405
as well. Greater awareness of civil remedies for rape would bring
406
wide benefits, not only to survivors but also to society as a whole.
Police encouragement of civil remedies would also help to
overcome juries’ prejudice against civil litigation by accusers. If a jury
in a criminal case heard that an alleged rape victim visited with a civil
attorney because a police officer had recommended it, that jury
would be less likely to see the consultation as an indication of the
accuser’s greed. Just as the Miranda warning legitimizes postarrest
407
silence, the officers’ recommendation of civil remedies might help
to diminish the stigma that attends rape suits.
CONCLUSION
This Article examines trial courts’ routine admission of
impeachment evidence that accusers in rape prosecutions are suing
403. For model for a straightforward presentation of civil remedies to rape survivors, see A
GUIDE TO CIVIL LAWSUITS: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SURVIVORS OF RAPE AND
CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE (2007), published by the Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault.
404. Rachel M. Capoccia, Piercing the Veil of Tears: The Admission of Rape Crisis
Counselor Records in Acquaintance Rape Trials, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1350 (1995) (noting
that police have referred rape survivors to crisis centers and that the number of victims seeking
these services has increased).
405. A large number of police agencies now steer rape survivors to counseling services. See,
e.g., Detroit Police Department (Rape Counseling Center), http://www.ci.detroit.mi.us/police/
dept/chief/rcc_m.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (providing information about rape counseling);
Univ. of Md., Consolidated USMH & UMCP Policies and Procedures Manual (Apr. 17, 1995),
http://www.president.umd.edu/policies/vi130a.html (“Police will assist in arranging for
counseling or other resources if the survivor wishes . . . .”); Rape, Abuse & Incest Nat’l
Network, Violence Against Women Act of 2005: Sexual Assault Services Program,
http://www.rainn.org/policy/sexual-assault-services-program-2006.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008)
(noting the increased demand for counseling services).
406. See supra Part I.A.
407. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) (holding that the prosecution could not
impeach the accused for following Miranda warnings because this fact is of scant relevance to
guilt or innocence and because government induced his silence).
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the accused or third parties. The evidence has questionable relevance,
and its prejudicial effect far outweighs its probative value. Moreover,
when accusers face onerous cross-examination for pursuing both
criminal and civil remedies, they are likely to forego one of these
avenues of redress.
The accused has a right to attempt impeachment of the accuser—
including, in some cases, impeachment with reference to civil
litigation arising from the same facts as the criminal indictment. But
the evidence codes may impose reasonable limits on the scope of
permissible impeachment.
408
Law has an important expressive function. Presently the
impeachment rules express the judgment that civil suits indicate ill
motives on the part of accusers. Yet there is nothing wrong with suing
a rapist. There is no shame in seeking civil remedies for one of the
most egregious torts imaginable. To the contrary, the denial of civil
409
recourse to survivors of sexual assault is unconscionable.
The impeachment rules in criminal cases should not force an
election of remedies. Survivors of rape should be able to avail
themselves of both the criminal and civil justice systems.
Impeachment of accusers based on parallel civil litigation should
require, as a predicate, a particularized showing of relevance that
exceeds prejudice, and the impeachment should follow the other
guidelines proposed in this Article.
As in the case of the rape shield laws, the new requirements
would enhance the truth-seeking function in criminal prosecutions by
excluding prejudicial evidence. The new rules would also embolden
more rape survivors to vindicate their rights in both the criminal and
civil justice systems.

408. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2043 (1996) (discussing law’s expressive function in promoting social norms, particularly gender
equality).
409. See Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989) (“To leave children who are
victims of [sexual abuse] without a right to redress those wrongs in a civil action is
unconscionable.”); Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Conn. 1994); see also supra Part
I.A.
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APPENDIX 1 PROPOSED RULE OF EVIDENCE
Rule 416. Impeachment with Evidence of Civil Claim
(a) Requirements for admission. In a criminal prosecution, a
witness is not subject to impeachment with evidence that the witness
has filed or has contemplated filing a civil claim asserting the liability
of the accused or a third party based on some or all of the facts
alleged by the government in the prosecution unless the proponent of
the impeachment evidence meets all of the following requirements:
(1) the proponent must make a particularized showing that the
probative value of this evidence, supported by specific facts and
circumstances, outweighs its prejudicial effect; (2) the proponent must
refrain from introducing copies of the complaint or other pleadings in
the civil action; (3) the proponent must refrain from discussing the
wealth or poverty of the witness or the accused; (4) the proponent
must not mention the amount of damages sought or the settlement
reached in the civil claim; and (5) if the witness has not yet filed a civil
claim, the proponent must show that the victim’s intention to file a
claim has manifested itself in one or more overt actions or statements.
(b) Exceptions. Whether or not the proponent meets the
requirements listed in subdivision (a) above, evidence that a witness
has filed or has contemplated filing a civil action is admissible in the
following circumstances: (1) this evidence is admissible to show the
witness has made statements that are materially inconsistent with the
testimony of the witness in the present criminal prosecution; (2) this
evidence is admissible if the government is prosecuting the witness in
the instant case for perjury, witness tampering, or a similar offense
involving misuse of the judicial process; and (3) this evidence is
admissible when its exclusion would violate the constitutional rights
of the accused.
(c) Procedure. A party intending to offer evidence subject to this
rule must file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered
unless the court, for good cause, requires a different time for filing or
permits filing during trial. Before admitting any evidence subject to
this rule, the court shall conduct a hearing in camera and shall afford
the witness and parties a right to attend and be heard. If the court
rules that evidence subject to this rule is admissible, the court may,
upon motion of a party or at the court’s own initiative, instruct the
jury about the proper use of this evidence.

1640

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1557

APPENDIX 2: PROPOSED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION
Prosecution Witness with Civil Claim
You have heard evidence indicating that a prosecution witness
has filed a civil lawsuit against [the accused] [another party]. The
weight that you give to that evidence is up to you. If you find that the
witness has an interest in the civil suit that might shade the testimony
of the witness in the present trial, you may consider that possibility in
assessing the credibility of the witness. You are not required to find
that the civil suit affects the credibility of the witness in the present
case.
I instruct you that the legal system does not prohibit a witness in
a criminal trial from filing a civil suit based on the same facts or
similar facts. A witness in a criminal trial has no obligation to wait
until the end of a criminal trial to file a civil suit based on the same
facts or similar facts.
The act of [indicate offense at issue, e.g., rape] is not only a crime
under the laws of [indicate jurisdiction], but it is also a tort. A person
who believes he has suffered a tort has a right to bring a civil lawsuit
seeking an award of money or other relief such as an order requiring
changes in the defendant’s conduct.
You should not consider the civil case for any purpose other than
to assess the credibility of the witness who is involved in the civil case.
You should not attempt to predict the outcome of the civil case. You
should not try to evaluate the need for punishment in the present case
based on what you expect may happen in the civil case.
I instruct you that the filing of a civil lawsuit against [the accused]
[another party] does not necessarily mean that the accused has
committed any wrongful conduct. Bear in mind that the standard of
proof is lower for a claimant in the civil system than it is for the
prosecution in the present case.
The civil case will have a separate jury if it goes to trial. You will
not be on that jury. Your task is to determine whether, in the present
case, the prosecution has proven each element of each charged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

